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Abstract 
Television Content Control in a Developing Country: A Case Study of Senegal 
Layire Diop 
 
 
 
         Senegal is a country in West Africa where television has long been a stronghold of the 
government. The first private television experience began in 2005. The liberalization of the sector 
was accompanied by the inception of a regulatory body entitled to set requirements and guidelines 
for television operators. Apart from technical conditions, television networks have the obligation 
to ensure freedom of information, equal access for politicians, trade unions and civil society 
organizations, the promotion of public interest as well as the protection of childhood and human 
rights. As of 2016, the number of television networks was estimated at 17.  
       The rapid growth of the sector has been accompanied by numerous lawsuits. Defamation, 
broadcast of false news, infringement on people’s private lives and several other offenses are 
rampant, so much so that the national journalists trade union is advocating for the depenalization 
of press misdemeanors. 
       The objective of this research was to study the efficiency of the system established to control 
the content of television programs and prevent misconduct by network owners and journalists. The 
researcher also inquired as to the challenges linked to a shift from analog to digital that became 
effective in Senegal in June 2015. The field work was conducted through interviews with the 
members and staff of the regulatory body, media operators and specialists as well as trade union 
leaders in Senegal.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Context of the Study 
     Senegal is generally referred to as the “Gateway to Africa” (Hargreaves, 2016). It is located at 
the westernmost point of the African continent. This geographical position justifies the important 
role the country has played in the different phases of African history, namely the slave trade and 
Western colonization. Several countries including England, France, Portugal and The Netherlands 
competed to conquer the territory which finally fell under France’s total dominance in the late 19th 
century (Hargreaves, 2016). 
     According to the Fourth Census of the Population, Housing, Agriculture and Livestock carried 
out in 2013, the population of Senegal is estimated to 12,873,601 inhabitants with 6,428,189 men 
and 6,445,412 women (National Demographic and Statistics Agency, 2014). The vast majority of 
the population is made up of young people. In fact, the Census reveals that children under 15 
represent 42.1% of all inhabitants.  
      Despite the early introduction of Western education in the country, the literacy rate remains 
low. Only 49.7% of the population can read and write (Index Mundi). As a legacy of colonization, 
French is the official language of Senegal and it coexists with several local languages among which 
Wolof stands out as most often spoken. 
    Islam is the dominant religion in Senegal and Muslims account for 94% of the population. The 
Christians (5%) are mainly Roman Catholics whereas 1% of the population practices indigenous 
beliefs (Central Intelligence Agency). 
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     The economy of Senegal revolves around agriculture. Two-thirds of the active population earn 
a living in that field with a main focus on peanut crops. Fishing and tourism represent the other 
important sources of revenue (Camara, 2016). 
     The political system in Senegal is a constitutional democracy with the presence of hundreds of 
political parties. The President of the Republic, also called Head of the State, is elected by direct 
universal suffrage.  The President is at the head of the executive power and is assisted by the Prime 
Minister and the Ministers of the Government. Legislative power is exercised by 150 members of 
the National Assembly whereas judicial power is represented by the Courts and Tribunals. The 
Constitution of the country establishes a separation between the executive, legislative and judicial 
powers.   
     The introduction of media outlets in Senegal dates back to colonization and took the form of 
newspapers and radio stations which mainly served as means of propaganda for the settlers. Long 
after the independence of the country, the media have continued to remain in the hands of the 
ruling party.   
     The conjunction of internal and external factors led to the liberalization of radio airwaves 
followed much later by access of private operators to the television frequencies. Nevertheless, the 
change in media policy has been accompanied by the implementation of rules and the creation of 
a regulatory body entitled to monitor the content of radio and television stations evolving in the 
broadcasting sector. The regulatory institution came into existence on May 25, 1991 and was 
known as High Council for Radio and Television. On March 2, 1998, it became the High Council 
of Broadcasting before being changed to the Senegalese Council for Broadcasting Regulation 
(CNRA) on January 8, 2015. 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem  
     In late February 2015, the Senegalese Council for Broadcasting Regulation (CNRA) issued a 
formal notification enjoining the private television station, SenTV “to stop immediately” the 
broadcasting of its new show entitled “Kawteff”. In its communique, the CNRA underlined that 
“on February 21, 2015 between 9:30 to 10:30 pm, SenTV aired a new show called ‘Kawteff” in 
which people come to the stage, exposing to the public their private lives made of betrayal, 
blackmail, adultery, vices, which are all contrary to the values on which our society is based”. The 
CNRA noted that “all the show was marked by obscene words, insults and verbal abuses, as well 
as scenes of violence”. The regulatory institution then asked the television station not to rerun the 
show and added that a failure to follow these instructions could lead to a withdrawal of the station’s 
license. (National Council of Broadcasting Regulation) This incident is a clear instance of the 
various challenges facing the television sector in developing countries. 
      The program “Kawteff” which is an imitation of the Jerry Springer show, featured in its first 
episode the story of a girl who found her sister making love with her boy-friend. In her revelations, 
the young girl who was pregnant, confessed that her boyfriend was not the father of her baby. 
Although the participants in the show were actors in a fictional presentation, the first episode 
produced a public outcry which led to the cancellation of the production. It appears then that the 
success of a show in one country does not mean that it can win a similar acclaim in a different 
context. Whatever the audience of The Jerry Springer Show may be in the US, the values it carries 
are considered opposite to the Senegalese people’s beliefs and customs (interviews members of 
the council).  In Senegal, “the Kawteff case” is not an isolated example. In the late 1990s, the 
National Broadcasting System was compelled to remove US shows like Dallas and Dynasty from 
its line-up because of religious pressure.                      
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     The inception of a program like “Kawteff” is closely linked to the liberalization of the television 
sector which occurred in the early 2000’s. In fact, from the 1960’s until 2005, the television sector 
in Africa had always been a stronghold of the governments. Generally placed under the tutelage 
of the ministries of information and communication, television has long been under the control of 
public authorities (Nyman-Metcalf et al., 2003). Legal censorship has always operated through the 
ministries of information and communication or through the implementation of regulatory 
institutions. In Senegal, the long combat for democracy brought along the acceptance by the ruling 
authorities of the implementation in 1992 of a regulatory body for supervision of elections and a 
fair access for political parties to the national radio and television networks (Mbodj, 2000). Named 
The High Council for Radio and Television, the institution had the mission to ensure fair 
broadcasting of political parties’ declarations and meetings during election periods. It was also in 
charge of supervising the organization of a bi-monthly television program for political parties. In 
1998, The High Council for Radio and Television became the High Council of Broadcasting, 
following the liberalization of the radio sector. Political change in the year 2000 ushered in a new 
era of private television networks and the birth of a new regulatory institution called the National 
Council for Broadcasting Regulation in 2006.  
     In the explanatory memorandum of Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006 which implements the 
CNRA, the legislators state that “the rapid development of the broadcasting sector which predicts 
a large range of changes makes it necessary to set up an institution in charge of ensuring its 
cohesion and respect of the rules of pluralism, ethics, deontological principles, existing laws and 
regulations as well as requirements, specifications and conventions governing the audiovisual 
sector.” The CNRA which is conceived as a “strengthened authority” compared to the High 
Council of Broadcasting is marked by representation of the youth and the elderly people’s 
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associations. It has a mission to ensure a respect of cultural and linguistic diversity in shows 
destined for the public. It is also entitled to find a solution to the verbal abuse noticed in many 
interactive programs (Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006). 
     Through Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006, legislators wanted to minimize problems linked to 
the development of the media and anticipated the challenges of emerging private television 
networks. In 2005, Senegal was already experiencing its first private television station with RTS 
2, which resulted from a partnership between the National Broadcasting System and private 
operator El Hadji Ndiaye. It was therefore clear that other operators would ask for television 
licenses and the sector would become liberalized, as was the case with radio.  
     Like the former institution, the CNRA was conceived as an independent institution but contrary 
to the High Council of Broadcasting which only supervised the print press and radio, the CNRA 
had a field of competence which also covered radio and television stations.  
   This thesis will study the legal framework set up for the broadcasting sector and the role played 
by the CNRA ensuring respect for the rules and regulations. It will also review the provisions 
implemented for the success of the mission of the CNRA. In fact, the regulatory body has always 
been criticized for its close connections with political power (Samb, 2008). For many scholars and 
media specialists, the nomination of the members by the Head of State without any consultation 
with the different unions and workers’ organizations is a limitation to the independence of the 
institution. The study will highlight the guarantees legally provided to the members of the CNRA 
in order to ensure their freedom of actions and sanctions. 
     An important part of the study will focus on the system and strategy developed by the CNRA 
to achieve its mission which consists of controlling the content of television programs.  
6 
 
 
     Beyond the technical tools used to monitor the television networks, the emphasis will be on the 
cultural standards and the values promoted through the supervision of the CNRA. As stated in Law 
2006-04 of January 4, 2006, the CNRA should work for political, cultural and linguistic diversity 
in television programs. The purpose of this research will be to see if television content reflects the 
terms of reference defined by the authorities.  
    Another aspect of the study will be dedicated to the different challenges facing the CNRA. The 
issue is all the more important as the transition from analog to digital transmission achieved in late 
June 2015 has fostered the emergence of new television channels and complete coverage of the 
national territory by the different broadcasting networks.  
     The opinions of television operators about the regulatory institution will not be overlooked 
since their recommendations and suggestions could contribute to improving the role and mission 
of the CNRA. 
1.3 Purpose of the study  
    At a period when digital technology made its worldwide breakthrough, the study has the 
objective to shed light on the preparation of the Senegalese broadcasting industry to face the 
challenges related to the digital era. It will provide insight to the organization of the broadcasting 
sector in Senegal. Through a case study of the regulatory body, the researcher will provide 
information about the relationship between political authorities and the television industry. The 
research will also try to assess the guarantees set up in order to ensure the independence of the 
CNRA from any sort of political, social, religious or economic groups. The functioning of the 
regulatory body and its human, technical and financial means will be emphasized as well as the 
scope of its competencies. Through a comparison with the system set in other Western countries 
(like France) or African States (like Benin) which appear as references in terms of media 
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regulation, the researcher will point out what should be done in order to increase the efficiency of 
the CNRA. A review of the different abuses and misconduct on Senegalese television channels 
will help in understanding the different factors that plague the media industry in general and the 
television sector in particular.  
1.4 Hypotheses and research questions 
     The research will be based on a series of hypotheses regarding the evolution of the media sector. 
Finding answers to different research questions will help prove or disprove the hypotheses.  
1.4.1 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis one: The development of the television sector goes with the implementation of rules 
and regulations which the networks should respect. 
Hypothesis two: The existence of a regulatory institution is necessary for a compliance with rules 
and laws. 
Hypothesis three: The independence of the regulatory body is an important factor for the 
fulfillment of its impartial mission.  
 Hypothesis four: The liberalization of the television sector followed by a flourishing of television 
channels results in infringements on rules and ethical standards. 
Hypothesis five: The control of television networks requires appropriate human, technical and 
financial resources.  
Hypothesis six: The move from analog to digital brings more challenges in terms of content 
control. 
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1.4.2 Research questions 
    The above-mentioned hypotheses will be tested through a series of research questions.  
Research question one: What is the legal framework of the television sector in Senegal?  
     The answer to this research question will require the researcher to delve into the laws and 
decrees that organize the broadcasting sector. The objective is to better understand the obligations 
of the Public Broadcasting Service as well as the terms of reference set up for private television 
networks.  
Research question two: What does the CNRA bring to the media sector?  
     The answer to this question will help to understand the organization of the CNRA, the scope of 
its competence, the evolution of its role, the actions it undertakes as well as the appreciation that 
the television operators have regarding its mission.  
Research question three: What are the guarantees of independence for the CNRA?  
     By answering this question, the researcher will give a clear description of the system of 
nomination of the members of the CNRA, the nature of their mandate, the financial treatment and 
other advantages they receive, and the relations that the Council has with political authorities. 
Research question four: What are the categories and causes of misconduct in the broadcasting 
sector? 
     Through a study of the quarterly notices and final reports of the CNRA, the researcher will 
provide insight into the respect of journalists and TV operators regarding the terms of reference. 
This research question will determine the political, social, economic or cultural factors that lie 
behind the infringement of ethical and professional standards. 
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Research question five: What resources does the CNRA have in order to monitor television 
channels? 
     The aim of this research question is to assess the human, financial and technical means provided 
to the CNRA for fulfillment of its mission. A comparison with similar institutions will help 
measure the efforts that need to be made. 
Research question six: What are the challenges linked to the shift to digital technology? 
     Since June 2015, the transition from analog to digital technology has become effective in 
Senegal. Currently, the digital shift has resulted in an increase in the number of television channels 
and better coverage of the territory. This research question will determine the way in which the 
CNRA should adapt to the new environment. 
1.5 Significance to the field 
     The Senegalese television landscape has undergone significant changes. From a situation of 
monopoly dominated by the prevalence of a State-run television network, the country has moved 
to a context of competition with the liberalization of the airwaves in the 2000s. The creation of an 
institution entitled to monitor public and private channels appeared as a necessity on account of 
the experiences drawn from other African countries where the lack of control has fostered hate and 
fueled ethnic conflict. The study will bring to light the different constraints that hinder the 
functioning of the Senegalese regulatory institution. It will also identify a strategy to adopt in order 
to increase the efficiency of the CNRA and allow it to face the challenges that lie ahead. 
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1.6 Definitions of terms 
    At the outset of the study, the researcher will define key concepts that are relevant to the 
understanding of the study. The first concept is “television regulation” and the second is 
“developing country” 
1.6.1 Definition of “television regulation” 
      The idea of television regulation arose with the development of the electronic media. The 
scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum made it important for the authorities to decide who should 
be allowed to use the airwaves. As legal scholar Marc Sophos puts it, the necessity of regulation 
is related to the fact that "Broadcast channels are "scarce" (that is, there are not enough available 
channels for all of those who wish to broadcast), and the electromagnetic spectrum has been 
deemed, since the beginning of broadcast regulation, to be a publicly owned natural resource. 
This "scarce public resource" rationale formed the foundation on which broadcast regulation was 
based” (O’Mailley, 2004). 
     The use of the spectrum which is a public resource is subject to a license. Institutions like the 
US Federal Communications Commission are set up to regulate broadcasting in the “public 
interest”. The regulation does not apply solely in the attribution of license but also to the content 
of programs. This differentiation is what scholars like Lori A. Brainard (2004) refers to as 
economic regulation versus content regulation.  According to Brainard (2004), economic 
regulation includes licensing, rules and ownership limits. Its objective is to shape television 
programming indirectly. Television operators are required to obtain a license because of the finite 
and public nature of the electromagnetic spectrum. The licenses are given for a definite term and 
need to be renewed (Brainard, 2004). Licenses are provided to the operators that are considered to 
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be serving the “public interest”. As for ownership regulations, they limit the number of stations 
that an operator is allowed to own and/or the extent of the population that a single company can 
reach through its stations.  Ownership regulations aim to eliminate media concentration and to 
protect the general public from a “monopoly of the marketplace of ideas” (Brainard, 2004). The 
fear is that the concentration of mass media in the hands of a few companies will make the quality 
of news more suspect (Feld, 2004). A study carried out by the Pew Foundation Project on 
Journalism has shown that reporters used to censor themselves in order to avoid the dissemination 
of something which is not in favor of the financial interest of their parent company. The study has 
also shown that “as fewer owners controlled more outlets, the quality of the local news suffered” 
(Feld, 2004, p.5).  
      In the US, the FCC does not only limit the number of radio and television stations that one 
company can own at national and local levels but also limits cross-ownership between newspapers 
and television and between radio and television (Candeub, 2004). The American regulatory body 
revises its cross-ownership rules every four years. On its website, the FCC indicates that the 
2010/2014 quadrennial review remained valid in 2016. As an example, the rule stipulates the 
prohibition of “common ownership of a daily newspaper and full power broadcast station (AM, 
FM or TV) if the station’s service contour encompasses the newspaper’s city of publication.” It 
also mentions that there is no limitation in the number TV stations an entity may own nationwide 
“so long as the station group collectively reaches no more than 39 percent of all US TV 
households.” The FCC also prohibits any merger between ABC, CBS, NBC and FOX. Regarding 
local television multiple ownership, “the rule allows an entity to own up to two TV stations in the 
same DMA if either the service areas – known as ‘grade B signal contours –of the stations do not 
overlap; or at least one of the stations is not ranked among the top four stations in the DMA (based 
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on market share), and at least eight independently owned TV stations would remain in the market 
after the proposed combination” (Federal Communications Commission).    
      As far as content regulation is concerned, it is related to the nature of the programs aired by 
television operators. One of the most relevant facts regarding content regulation in the US occurred 
in 1990 with the Children’s Television Act. This legislation requires broadcasters to air 
programming that meet children’s educational needs and sets limits regarding the amount of 
advertising that can be shown during those programs. In 1996, the FCC passed a rule that applied 
a quota for such programming and set its airing period between 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. Another type of 
content regulation was introduced in 1998 with the Telecommunication Act which made 
mandatory the equipping of TV sets with a V- chip (“V” meaning violence) in order to rate the 
level of violence in the programming (Brainard, 2004).    
     Content regulation includes the prohibition of obscene programming as well as the limitation 
of indecent and profane programming to certain hours (Brainard, 2004). The obscenity, profanity 
and indecency rules set in the US are seen by many as censorship in the sense that they set limits 
to the airing of particular programs. 
     In some countries, regulatory bodies are responsible for the delivery of licenses and for the 
control of content. In other countries, instead, different entities have been established. That is the 
case in Senegal where the institution in charge of awarding television licenses is the Agency for 
the Regulation of Telecommunications and Post (ARTP) whereas content regulation is under the 
responsibility of the National Council for Broadcasting Regulation (CNRA). 
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 1.6.2:  Definition of “developing country” 
     The terms “developed countries” and “developing countries” are commonly used to identify 
the difference between the countries that are “industrialized, have political and economic stability 
and high levels of human health and the countries that do not” (Karpilo, 2010, p.1). The concept 
of “developing countries” refers to the world’s poor states and has replaced notions such as 
“underdeveloped countries” and “the Third World”. Although people and institutions seem to 
agree about the denomination, different standards are chosen to measure the level of development 
and as the United Nations has stated “there is no commonly agreed definition of developing 
countries” (The Library of Congress Collections Policy Statements, 2008). To evaluate a country’s 
level of development, the World Bank focuses on the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, 
which comprises the total value of domestic and foreign output produced by the residents of a 
country. As for the International Monetary Fund, the option is for a more comprehensive method 
which takes into account factors such as “per capita income, export diversification and the degree 
of integration into the global financial system” (Kuepper, 2015). The United Nations, for its part, 
defines a developing country as a “country with a relatively low standard of living, underdeveloped 
industrial base, and moderate to low Human Development Index” (Educational Pathway 
International, 2010). The Human Development Index (HDI) was invented “to emphasize that 
people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a 
country, not economic growth alone” (United Nations Development Program). The HDI compares 
a variety of factors which include poverty, education and life expectancy. 
     In the case of Senegal, the different economic and human factors place it among developing 
countries. In 2014, its Gross National Income per capita was estimated at $1,040 and it ranked 183 
out of 213 countries in the world (data.worldbank.org). Its economy is mainly based on the primary 
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sector and agriculture employs the largest number of people in rural areas. The country “relies 
heavily on donor assistance, remittances and direct foreign investments” (Central Intelligence 
Agency). 
     According to the 2014 Human Development Report released by the United Nations 
Development Program, Senegal is among the countries with a low human development. Its Human 
Development Index for 2013 was 0.485, which positioned the country at 163 out of 187 states and 
territories (Human Development Report, 2014). 
1.7 Limitations 
     As with any sort of academic research, this master’s thesis suffers from a number of constraints. 
In any case, the researcher will point out the main limitations encountered at the different steps of 
the production of the thesis. One of these difficulties is related to the fact that the researcher did 
not have enough time to meet in-person with the different stakeholders involved in this study. The 
interviews were conducted in French which is the official language of Senegal. As a consequence, 
there was a need for transcription and translation of the statements.  
     Another limitation is that a large part of the literature is written in French, which also requires 
a significant amount of translation and adaptation.  
1.8 Ethical considerations 
     The researcher carried out the study without committing any ethical breach having 
communicated through phone calls and emails to the different people responsible for the 
functioning of the CNRA. The persons contacted include the Chairman, the Executive Secretary, 
the Communication Advisor as well as the Archivist of the institution. The researcher received 
approval from the authorities who also declared their readiness to contribute to the success of the 
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research. All information that the researcher produced was obtained legally. Any other sources 
used were cited. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
     In this literature review, the researcher explores first the development of television on the 
African continent and the legal framework implemented in order to ensure its regulation. The 
second part of the literature review is dedicated to the specific case of Senegal. In this country, the 
necessity of regulation arose with the authorization of private networks after the accession to power 
of the opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade in 2000, putting an end to the reign of Socialists who 
had presided over the country’s destiny since its independence in 1960. 
2.2 Television regulation in developing countries 
     In many African countries, the media have always been a subject of concern for governments. 
In fact, its capacity to shape public opinion makes the media a target for control. Because it enables 
people not only to hear but also to see what is happening, television has been subject to tighter 
control compared to the radio and print media. A free press and in particular a free television 
industry is a valuable tool for fighting against corruption, dishonesty, and mismanagement 
(Callamard, 2010). Until the new millennium, several African countries had not yet liberalized the 
sector. That is still the case in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Guinea and Gambia. A country like 
Mali has a continental network (Africable) whose function has long been limited to relaying 
programs from other African channels. In some countries like Nigeria, although there are many 
television channels at the state level they are not allowed to cover the entire country (Callamard, 
2010). In other countries like Senegal, television liberalization came along with political change. 
In fact it was only in the year 2000, in the aftermath of the arrival of Abdoulaye Wade to power 
that private operators were allowed to own television stations.  
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     The reason is that television is often seen as a means of political propaganda but it also appeared 
as a threat to governments. Like the colonial administrations which introduced television in order 
to perpetuate their dominance over the colonies, the African post-independence leaders exerted an 
overall control of the medium, especially for political reasons. Considered a means for fostering 
development, unity, the promotion of national culture and identity, public broadcasting services 
were tightly controlled by the State through its Ministries of Information or Broadcasting (Nyman-
Metcalf et al., 2003). In such a situation, censorship and bias used to be recurrent options. The 
main local programs consisted of newscasts which largely relayed the activities of the Head of 
State and the government.  
    Apart from news and talk shows, television schedules were (and in some cases still are) made 
of foreign productions because of the high cost of production. International cooperation provided 
local stations with a variety of programs in all genres.  
      In the media sector and the economy at large, the high cost of technology hindered initiatives 
and ideas. The less developed countries of the world required large injections of information in the 
form of technology transfer if they were to have economic growth and development. However, the 
means of acquiring it were far from being affordable (De La Sola Pool, 1979).  
     For television stations, the programming of western content was an easy shortcut. As a 
consequence, “many African networks have already allowed themselves to become dumping 
grounds for old and often inferior, western programs” (Martin, 1992, p. 335).  
     Nevertheless, shows imported from abroad were generally inconsistent with the social and 
cultural environments. In Senegal for example, shows like “Dallas” and “Dynasty” came to be 
canceled in the 1990s because of the active lobby of religious groups, despite their popularity 
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among young people. That was the case also in The Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly 
Zaire) where “Dallas” was removed from the network line-up because of “immorality” 
(McFarlane, 1990). The difference of culture and beliefs appeared as the core grounds for 
removing programs that could supposedly spoil the youth.  
     The fear became heightened with the appearance of cable and satellite television on the 
continent. For many decision makers, the exposure of the young audience to “uncensored foreign 
programs may affect their cultural belief and value systems” (Madu & Obono, 2010, p. 85). The 
great inflow of western programs appeared as a threat for political authorities. With the overall 
control of public media, foreign cable networks stood out as an alternative to accurate information 
and programs, and in most cases “governments fear loss of media control as western influence 
grows” (McFarlane, 1990).  
      In most cases, the continent relied on foreign agencies for information. As Paterson put it in 
1998, “Television coverage of the developing world is already deplorably infrequent and 
misleading. Africa appears now to be more excluded from contribution to the global flow of 
television news than it has ever been” (Paterson, 1998, p. 581).  
     The debate on the information divide first arose in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. It became 
an international issue embodied by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) which, through the McBride Commission, pondered over the New World 
Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The NWICO was a series of demands, 
principally from Third World nations and appeared essentially to be a plan that proposed to put an 
end to the inequality in the flow of information (Raube-Wilson, 1986).  
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     The NWICO was pioneered by the Mass Media Declaration of 1978 which called for a free and 
better balanced flow of information, requiring from the media actions for peace, development, 
antiracism and the protection of culture. It recognized that at that time, four western news agencies 
(the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters and Agence France-Presse) gathered 
and reported over 80 percent of the news in the world. News and other information about the Third 
World was provided from a Western perspective (Raube-Wilson, 1986). Critics pointed out that, 
there were, “disparities between developed and developing countries, regional disparities, one-
way flow, vertical flow, market dominance, distortion of content, cultural alienation, barriers to 
democratization, lack of critical awareness and lack of cooperation between nations when it came 
to communication and information sector” (Media and Development, 2012). 
     The entire developing world had a mere 4% of the world’s computers, 34 countries had no 
television sets, and that there were more telephones in Tokyo than on the entire African continent 
(Vincent, 2013). The report of the McBride commission entitled “Many Voices One World” was 
presented in 1980 at the 21st UNESCO Conference in Belgrade. It included 82 recommendations 
among which were the removal of the imbalance and inequality of the current situation, plurality 
of information sources and channels, freedom of press and information, respect for both cultural 
identity and for the right of each nation to inform the world public opinion about its own interests, 
aspirations and social and cultural values (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, 1981). 
     The issues raised by the NWICO remain topical. In terms of news coverage worldwide, the 
situation has not evolved. “With the nations claiming to have greater press freedom, technology 
and skilled journalists, the bias seems to be more than ever before”. (Media and Development, 
2012).  
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    The appropriation of media technologies in Africa is still very low. In 2011, 47% of Sub-Saharan 
African households owned a television set, 80% had a radio and 30% a cell phone (IFDC Report, 
2012). In 2013, it was estimated that all households in the developed world owned a TV set while 
69 percent owned at least one set in developing countries. In Africa in particular, less than a third 
of the households owned a TV set; the low rate is mostly related to limited access to electricity 
(International Telecommunications Union, 2013). So, the digital divide remained significant 
between the North and the South. Among the factors that explain the low penetration of television, 
Nyman-Metcalf et al. mention the high cost of sets, the lack of electricity and weak coverage 
(Nyman-Metcalf et al., 2003) 
     For most African countries, the implementation of regulatory institutions dates back to the 
liberalization of the airwaves in the 1990s (Nyman-Metcalf et al., 2003). This process can be seen 
as a consequence of the democratic wind that started to blow on the continent after the France-
Africa Summit held in June 1990 at La Baule (France). While receiving his African counterparts, 
the then-French President Francois Mitterrand made it clear that France’s aid to African countries 
would depend on the efforts made by the African leaders for democracy which implies a free press. 
In fact, there is a tight link between the existence of a free press and democratic advance. By 
serving as a watch-dog, providing a civic forum for multiple voices in public debate and 
highlighting social problems to inform the policy agenda, a free press contributes to transparency 
and a consolidation of democratic systems (Norris, 2006). 
    The creation of private networks started to accompany the inception of democratic regimes. At 
the continental level, the liberalization of radio and television was clearly stressed during the 32nd 
Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, held in Banjul, 
Gambia in October 2002. The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression adopted as a 
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resolution specify the guidelines for private broadcasting. According to Principle V of the 
Declaration: 
1 States shall encourage a diverse, independent private broadcasting sector. A State 
monopoly is not compatible with the right to freedom of expression. 
2 The broadcast regulatory system shall encourage private and community broadcasting in 
accordance with the following principles: 
- There shall be equitable allocation of frequencies between private broadcasting uses, both 
commercial and community, 
- An independent regulatory body shall be responsible for issuing broadcasting licenses and 
for ensuring observance of license conditions, 
- License processes shall be fair and transparent, and shall seek to promote diversity in 
broadcasting, and 
- Community broadcasting shall be promoted given its potential to broaden access by poor 
and rural communities to the airwaves (Declaration of Principles, 2002) 
     Conscious of the challenges linked with the liberalization of the airwaves, the African 
Commission also recognized the necessity of the implementation of regulatory institutions. 
Principle VII of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression entitled “Regulatory 
Bodies and Telecommunications” states that: 
1. Any public authority that exercises powers in the area of broadcast or telecommunications 
regulation should be independent and adequately protected against interference, 
particularly of a political or economic nature. 
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2. The appointment process for members of a regulatory body should be open and transparent, 
involve the participation of civil society, and shall not be controlled by any particular 
political party. 
3. Any public authority that exercises powers in the areas of broadcast or telecommunications 
should be formally accountable to the public through a multi-party body (Declaration of 
Principles, 2002)  
     Despite these guidelines, it is difficult to find an African country with an independent regulatory 
institution for the broadcasting system. The interference of the executive which appoints the 
members seems an in-born defect (Callamard, 2010). Licenses are generally allocated on a political 
basis. Sanctions and threats of closure often appear as ways to restrict freedom of expression and 
to set the press aside from sensitive subjects. The cases of the Uganda Broadcasting Council, the 
Rwanda Media High Council and the Communications Commission of Kenya are often cited as 
institutions that are used by political powers to exercise pressure on the press and diminish its 
freedom (Callamard, 2010). In other countries like Ghana, the existence of overlapping regulatory 
bodies explains the lack of transparent and independent regulation. In South Africa, there are many 
limitations set by the government. As an example, legal amendments have been enacted that 
allowed the South African Minister of Communications to appoint the members of the regulatory 
body (Callamard, 2010). 
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2.3: Overview of television regulation in Senegal 
      Like many countries, freedom of information is guaranteed by the Senegalese Constitution 
which stipulates in its article 8 that “The Republic of Senegal guarantees to all citizens the 
fundamental individual freedoms, the economic and social rights as well as the collective rights. 
These freedoms and rights are notably: the civil and political freedoms: freedom of opinion, 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom 
of movement , freedom of manifestation, the cultural freedoms, the religious freedoms, the 
philosophical freedoms, the syndical freedoms, the freedom of enterprise, the right to education, 
the right to know how to read and to write, the right to property, the right to work, the right to 
health, the right to a healthy environment, the right to plural information.  
These freedoms and these rights are exercised within the conditions provided for by the law.”  
     For a long period of time, the National Broadcasting System had a monopoly over the television 
sector. The first experience of television broadcasting which started in 1963 with the UNESCO 
pilot project focused on educational programs, and ended in 1972. The broadcasting of the Munich 
Olympic Games (1972) opened the era of television broadcast. In fact, the sports event aired in 
lieu of former hygiene and health shows. The popularity of the programming ushered in the 
creation of the Office de Radiodiffusion Television du Senegal (ORTS) by Law 73-51 of 
December 3, 1973 with two radio channels and one television channel. The ORTS functioned as a 
public administrative network and was essentially funded by the State. It worked under the legal 
and economic sponsorship of the government which had a monopoly over its means of operations. 
(Sylla, 2006) According to a study carried out by UNESCO, 2 years after the launch of television, 
there were 35,000 TV sets in the country, which represented 8 per thousand inhabitants. More than 
20 years later, in 1996 the number of TV sets were estimated at 350,000, representing 41 per 
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thousand inhabitants and the technical infrastructures of the television network reached 55% of the 
territory and 70% of the population (Sagna, 2001) 
     The ORTS operated through 10KW transmitters installed in different regions (Thies and 
Tambacounda first, then Ziguinchor in 1986, Louga in 1990). The broadcast network underwent a 
great evolution on January 6, 1992, with the passing of Law 92-02 creating a national broadcasting 
company named Radiodiffusion Television Senegalese (RTS), the Senegalese Radio and 
Television Broadcasting System. The new corporation was run by an administrative board of 
twelve members. “RTS is legally dependent on the State, and the ruling party even though it derives 
most of its resources from its own operations” (Sylla, 2006, p. 43). 
     For more than 2 decades, RTS was the only provider of television programs for the entire 
nation. Nevertheless, the country, like many other nations, experienced in the 1990s the emergence 
of cable and satellite networks which broke the boundaries set by local authorities.  
     The first international network to access the territory was the French television operator Canal 
Horizon, which executed an agreement with Senegalese Radio and Television for the creation of 
Canal Horizon Senegal, which started direct satellite broadcasting in 1991. It had an “exclusivity 
on satellite distribution of a Francophone bouquet through its subsidiary, Portavest” (Seck, 2006, 
p.20). In the Europa World Yearbook of 1994, Canal Horizon Senegal was described as “a private 
coded channel in which RTS and the French private television company, Canal Horizon, 
participate as part owners. RTS owns about 19% of the company and Canal Horizon (France) 
owns about 15%” (The Europa World Yearbook, 1994). Canal Horizon offered a variety of 
networks with music, sports, news, documentary and many other channels. Access to the services 
was linked to the purchase of a receiver and the payment of a monthly subscription fee.  
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     The availability of foreign networks would increase in 1998 with the allocation of Microwave 
Multipoint Distribution System channels to EXCAF (Expo Carrefour), a company founded in 1972 
by the local promoter Ibrahima Ben Bass Diagne. According to many analysts, EXCAF got this 
favor because of its financial contribution to the implementation of the French-speaking channel 
TV5 Afrique, a project launched by the International Organization of the Francophonie (Sylla, 
2006). EXCAF enabled free access to TV5 through the MMDS. In July 1999, EXCAF started 
encrypting most of its other channels, with the exception of TV5, the French channel TF1 and 
Saudi TV (a channel based in Saudi Arabia), the access to the services being subject to the purchase 
of a receiver and payment of a monthly fee (Sagna, 2001). 
     The evolution of the media landscape was accompanied by institutional changes for better 
supervision of the sector. In 1991, the High Council for a Regulation of Radio and Television 
(HCRT) was established through Decree 91-537 of May 25, 1991 with the objective of reinforcing 
the “democratization of the audiovisual sector and radio and television pluralism” (Sagna, 2001). 
The decree was passed as Law 92-57 of September 3, 1992. The HCRT was composed of nine 
members, eight of whom were appointed by the President of the Republic and one designated by 
the President of the National Assembly. The members had a 3-year mandate, renewable once. The 
mission of the HCRT was to ensure access by political parties to public radio and television 
services and a respect for pluralism in news delivery. The inception of the HCRT stemmed from a 
long struggle led by political parties and the national union of journalists against the monopoly of 
the ruling party over public radio and television, and the ostracism suffered by opposition parties 
(Mbodj, 2000). The first article of Law 92-57 provided competing political parties with the same 
amount of airtime. They were allowed to express their opinions in weekly political programs. The 
article also urged public radio and television stations to cover events held by opposition parties, to 
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read communiques released by their governing entities and ensure balanced retransmission of 
parliamentary debates (Mbodji, 2000).  
     The main criticism of this institution was related to its “lack of independence”. Most observers 
saw the nomination of eight of its members by the President as a weakness (Mbodji, 2000; Seck, 
2006). Moreover, the change in the broadcast landscape with the appearance of private radio 
stations required an adjustment to the new situation. The first private radio station (Sud FM) was 
launched on July 1st, 1994.  The new media outlet tried to find its own way in a landscape 
dominated by the public broadcast system and the presence of the first two foreign radio stations 
namely RFI and Africa number 1 which started broadcasting on FM in 1989 (Senghor et al., 2011). 
     The success of the first private radio station would appeal to private operators who launched 
their own stations.  Dunya FM (December 24th 1994), Nostalgie-Dakar , a subsidiary of the French 
station of the same name (July 15, 1995), Wal Fadjri (December 1997) came into existence 
followed soon by 7 FM (December 1998), and Diamono FM in October 1999 (Sagna, 2001). 
     To face this new situation, the government decided to enlarge the responsibilities and mission 
of the regulatory body replacing the High Council for Radio and Television with the High Council 
for Broadcasting. According to the first article of Law 98-09 of March 2, 1998 the new institution 
was created as an “independent body” whose jurisdiction covered all audiovisual media. It was 
entitled to ensure freedom of information and communication in audiovisual media, objectivity 
and balance in news management and fair access by political parties to public media. The law also 
gave it the responsibility of setting rules for the production, programming and broadcasting of 
audiovisual media’s regulated programs during election campaigns. Its role in the organization of 
media coverage of election campaigns is considered to be prominent (Mbodji, 2000). 
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     Like its predecessor, the High Council for Broadcasting would undergo a drastic change as the 
country entered the new millennium. In fact, the change of the political regime in 2000 came along 
with the hope of liberalization of television airwaves. The first private television channel 2S TV 
was created in 2005. To anticipate the development of the sector, the authorities established in 
2006 the National Council for Broadcast Regulation (Sagna, 2001).  
   The stronghold of executive power over the Public Broadcasting Service (RTS), the difficulty 
for journalists to freely access and dissemination information, the prevalence of state control and 
in-house censorship have favored what the journalist and writer Issa Thioro Gueye described as 
“Media Under Control” (Gueye, 2006)  
      As of 2016, no study had been carried out regarding state control of the media through an 
analysis of the functioning and the efficiency of the CNRA. The researcher’s objective was to 
delve into the organization of the regulatory institution and study the guarantees that have been 
implemented to ensure its independence. The guarantees are related to the quality of the members, 
the duration of the mandate and the requirements that they have to follow. Another consideration 
is related to the financial and technical means provided to the institution for its operations. The 
development of online media also represents a new challenge that has not yet been taken in 
consideration in the literature. In this study, the researcher intends to explore other new challenges 
related to the shift from analog to digital which became effective in the country in June 2015. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
      After the liberalization of the television sector in some African countries, the industry has 
undergone noteworthy developments marked by the creation and operation of a variety of 
networks. If in some countries, the authorities are still reluctant to open the television sector to 
private operators, in other countries, regulatory institutions have been implemented to avoid 
misconduct and misdemeanors. The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze the system 
created by the Senegalese government in order to monitor television content and ensure pluralism, 
cultural diversity, child protection and respect for human rights. The objective at this level is to 
discuss the efficiency of the strategies undertaken by the National Council for Broadcasting 
Regulation (CNRA) and the factors that hinder its actions.  With the development of the internet 
and the shift to digital which occurred in June 2015, the study will also present the new challenges 
facing the National Council for Broadcast Regulation. 
      In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the methodology used in order to achieve a relevant 
description of the system. The study starts with a presentation of the legal framework of the 
television sector in Senegal. The role of the CNRA is emphasized afterwards through the study of 
the laws and decrees that have been enacted in order to clarify its mission and ensure the 
independence of its members. In-depth interviews with the administrative staff and the appointed 
members of the CNRA, as well as discussions with media operators and experts were used to 
complete the information.  
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3.2 Research methodology 
     The methodology is first based on a study of the laws and decrees that organize the television 
sector. It goes back to the liberalization of the television airwaves in the 2000s and presents the 
decisions made regarding the public broadcasting system as well as private television operators. 
After this step, the researcher analyzed the legal text that defines the ambit of the CNRA. The 
objective is to make clear the organization of the institution, its missions and the means of actions 
that have been provided to the regulators. A comparison with other similar regulatory bodies will 
help explain the scope of action of the CNRA. In fact the literature search has shown the existence 
of broadcast regulation entities in other African countries and the case of Benin is often referred 
to as a good example. The parallel between the two bodies will help to make suggestions for 
improvement of the Senegalese institution. Samb (2009) and Barry (2010) mentioned a lack of 
independence of the members of the CNRA and the scarcity of means for the regulatory body. 
However, there has not been a clear description by the members themselves of the difficulties and 
the limitations they have to overcome. By giving the members an opportunity to express their 
opinions regarding their missions and their working conditions, the researcher intended to present 
more accurate results.  
3.2.1 Design of Instruments  
     As described above, the research was carried out based on two types of sources: in-depth 
interviews and legal documents. The in-depth interviews were done with people operating in the 
broadcasting sector. These oral sources were complimented by print sources, which consist of the 
collection of information through the analysis of legal texts as well as documents produced by the 
CNRA.  
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3.2.1.1 The in-depth interviews 
     Interviews were obtained during a visit to Senegal from September 5th to October 4th, 2015. 
They were conducted in Dakar, the capital-city of Senegal, which headquarters the CNRA, the 
television stations and all administrative service offices of the government. A total of 18 people 
were interviewed. 
      Within the regulatory body, the main objective was to get the maximum amount of information 
from the members and the working staff of the CNRA. As far as the members of the CNRA were 
concerned, contact with them was achieved by the Chairman who asked the Executive Secretary 
to send them an email for that purpose. Some of them requested an explanation about the general 
idea of the thesis and the issues that the researcher wanted to discuss with them. Finally, 5 out 9 
members including the Chairman accepted an interview. The figure represents 56% of the 
members, so more than half of the members responded to the interview request by the researcher.  
     The interviewed members were:  
- Mr. Babacar Toure, Chairman of the CNRA: Mr Toure is a journalist and founder of the 
media group Sud Communication which owns the daily newspaper Sud Quotidien and the 
first Senegalese private radio station Sud FM 
- Mrs. Sokhna Benga, Famous for her novels, Mrs Benga is a jurist who works as Director 
of Maritime Security and Marine Pollution Prevention at the National Agency for Maritime 
Affairs.  
- Mr. Jean Meissa Diop a former journalist who has been working for the daily newspaper 
Wal Fadjri for 25 years. He was one of the leaders of the affiliate newspaper Walf Grand 
Place, which went bankrupt.  
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- Mr. Mouhamed Fadel Dia, a retired teacher and media columnist who authored books on 
politics such as “Wade Mecum” (2013). 
- Mr. Ibrahima Mbaye Sope a well-known young actor and screenwriter. 
    Since the members of the CNRA are not permanent workers and some of them are only present 
at the institution twice a month, the main difficulty was securing a similar setting for the interviews. 
Only one of the members (Ibrahima Mbaye Sope) was interviewed in his office at the CNRA, 
whereas another one (Sokhna Benga Benga) was interviewed in her office at the National Agency 
for Maritime Affairs. The Chairman as well as the members Jean Meissa Diop and Mouhamed 
Fadel Dia were interviewed in their homes.  
     The questions were related to their careers prior to their nomination to the CNRA, the 
nomination process, the relationship they have with the Chairman, their appreciation as to the 
independence of the institution, their working conditions, the system of remuneration, the 
advantages and benefits they have as members, the way they monitor television stations, their 
perception of the causes of misconduct, the problems facing the CNRA, the challenges relating to 
the internet and the shift to digital. With the Chairman, the focus of the interview was the 
relationship of the CNRA with the executive authorities, the system of nomination, and the actions 
undertaken since his nomination. Since he participated in the creation of the first regulatory body, 
the researcher wanted to probe the circumstances of that creation, the evolution of the institution 
and the challenges facing the new organization. 
     As far as the working staff was concerned, the researcher’s objective was to include all the 
services of the CNRA. In this perspective, all executives accepted interviews. The researcher 
interviewed: 
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- Mr. Cheikh  Mouhamadou Bamba Niang, Chief of Staff of the Chairman of the CNRA. Mr 
Niang is a magistrate who graduated in 1999 from the Judicial Training Center of Dakar. 
In his career, he has been deputy public prosecutor in the Capital-city Dakar, and 
prosecutor in cities such as Mbour and Saint-Louis. He has also worked at the Ministry of 
Justice as spokesperson for the Minister, Head of the Communication Service. His 
international experience includes his working as an expert of the Inter-Governmental 
Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). He joined the CNRA 
in 2012 at the Chairman’s request. 
- Mrs. Marie Ndiaye Ngom, Executive Secretary of the CNRA. Mrs Ngom, who has a legal 
background, is in charge of administrative tasks which include management of the staff, 
the provision of material and equipment and official correspondence. As she states “the 
Executive Secretary is the backbone of the CNRA”. Mrs Ngom took office in October 2012. 
- Mr. Mame Ndiack Wane, Technical Advisor and Head of the Monitoring Service. Mr. 
Wane is an IT expert who graduated as an engineer in information systems. He is a 
technical assistant and advisor to the Chairman who nominated him on September 7, 2012. 
- Mr. Souleymane Diallo, Head of the Technical Service. Mr. Diallo joined the regulatory 
body in 2007 after graduating as a design engineer in computer science.   
- Mr. Salif Diallo, Head of the Archive Service. Mr. Diallo is a special librarian who 
graduated from the School of Archivists and Librarians. He joined the CNRA in 2012 after 
working at the United Nations’ African Institute for Economic Development and Planning 
(IDEP) and the Suffolk University Dakar Campus. 
33 
 
 
Apart from the executives, the researcher interviewed two out of six monitoring agents, 
which represents 33% of the group of persons in charge of monitoring television and radio 
channels. The monitoring agents that the researcher interviewed were: 
- Mrs. Khady Diouf, who also works a supervisor in the monitoring service.  
-  Miss Ndeye Coumba Gueye, a monitoring agent who joined the regulatory body in 2010 
after obtaining her baccalaureate degree. 
        All working staff members of the CNRA were interviewed at the headquarters of the 
institution on different days, depending on their availability. The selection of a worker for an 
interview was done based on the position of the worker in the organogram of the CNRA and the 
types of information he or she could provide. The researcher asked questions relating to the profile 
of the workers, their function in the CNRA, the way they were recruited, the number of years they 
had been working in the CNRA, their working conditions, the benefits they have, the problems 
they face, their opinion about the role of the CNRA and its method of operation as well their 
understanding of the causes of misconduct in the broadcasting sector. The working staff with a 
legal background, such as the Chief of Staff of the Chairman and the Executive Secretary were 
asked specific questions relating to the judicial status and the guarantees of independence of the 
CNRA, the nomination of the Chairman and the members, the organization and functioning of the 
CNRA, its budget, etc. 
     For the interviews with the working staff such as the Chief of Staff, the Executive Secretary, 
the Heads of the monitoring and the technical services, the researcher made the request via emails 
sent to them prior to his travel to Senegal. As for the monitoring agents, the interviews were done 
without preparation. In fact, it was during his visit at the headquarters of the CNRA that the 
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researcher made the decision to ask questions about their profiles, their working conditions and 
difficulties.  
      After the collection of data from the working staff and members of the CNRA, the researcher 
found it necessary to secure the opinions of people who had either worked as members of the 
regulatory institution or had experience related to its organization and functioning. From this 
perspective, two media experts were identified: Mame Less Camara and Professor Moustapha 
Samb.  
     Mame Less Camara is a journalist and teacher of journalism who used to chair SYNPICS, the 
union of Senegalese journalists. He was also a member of the first regulatory institution before 
being expelled. His interview questions focused on the circumstances that led to the creation of 
the regulatory body, the system of nomination of the first members, relations with the authorities, 
the reason for his eviction from the body and the evolution of the institution through the years.  
     Professor Moustapha Samb is a Professor of Communication who produced several works 
relating to regulatory bodies in West Africa. In 2009, he authored the article “Media, Pluralism 
and Regulatory Bodies in West Africa” published in the journal Notebooks of Journalism. His book 
entitled “Media, National Languages and Regulatory Bodies in West Africa” published in 2013 is 
a reference for many researchers. The interview with Professor Moustapha Samb specially focused 
on a comparison of the regulatory bodies in Senegal and other countries such as France and Benin.  
     Since both Mame Less Camara and Professor Moustapha Samb are teachers at the Schools of 
Journalism, they have also provided some explanation about the causes of misconduct in the 
audiovisual sector and suggested options for improvement of the role and missions of the CNRA. 
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      Research into the broadcasting sector cannot be achieved without the participation of media 
operators. For this reason, the researcher decided to include at least two broadcasters in the sample. 
The first is the Public Broadcasting Service, which is the oldest broadcaster in the country. For 
this reason, the researcher interviewed the General Manager of the Senegalese Broadcasting 
Service (RTS) about the relationships his company has with the CNRA, the actions they take to 
comply with the law on pluralism, the over-presence of the ruling party on the public media and 
the projects of the public broadcasting service with the digital shift. 
    The second targeted broadcaster was Youssou Ndour, the founder of the Groupe Futurs Medias 
who owns TFM (Tele Futurs Media), the private TV station with the largest audience. The 
researcher was unable to secure an interview either with him (he did not answer phone calls) or 
with the CEO Mamadou Ibra Kane, who had traveled to Mecca (Saudi Arabia) for the annual 
pilgrimage. For these reasons, he chose to interview Bougane Gueye Dany, the owner of Sen TV, 
the second largest TV network, according to polls carried out in January 2015 by the groups 
Mediametrie and Omedia. Mr. Bougane Gueye is the CEO of the media group DMedia which also 
owns a newspaper (La Tribune), the radio station Zik FM, the advertising company Dak’or, and is 
also active in money transfer with the service called “Joni Joni”.  
      The selection of Mr. Gueye for this research is all the more important as recently his television 
channel made headlines for producing a show (“Kawteff”), which the regulatory body cancelled. 
      With him, the interview focused on the creation of his media group, the reason for the creation 
of the television station, the way he obtained the frequency, the shareholders of the television 
station, his appreciation of the terms of reference, the recruitment of his staff, the level of education 
of the personnel and the causes of misconduct in the broadcasting sector. Mr Gueye also explained 
the reason why he decided to copy the Jerry Springer show in the form of a program entitled 
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“Kawteff” and gave his opinion of the cancellation of that show by the CNRA. He also answered 
questions related to the concentration of several media outlets by his media group and the 
challenges facing his television station and the other operators.  
    Both the General Manager of the Public Broadcasting Service, Racine Talla and the CEO of 
DMedia were interviewed in their offices.  
       The other categories of persons interviewed were the Secretary General of the Union of 
Senegalese Communication and Information Professionals (SYNPICS) and the Chairman of the 
Council for a Respect of Ethics and Deontology (CORED). The purpose of this approach was to 
single out the strategies of self-regulation implemented by the journalists themselves as opposed 
to the State regulation. The Union of the Senegalese Communication and Information 
Professionals (SYNPICS) has always denounced the system of nomination of the journalists within 
the CNRA. Therefore, the interview with the Secretary General Ibrahima Khaliloulah Ndiaye 
focused on the relationship between the Union of Journalists and the CNRA, and the reason why 
journalists do not identify themselves with the regulatory body and do not take into consideration 
its actions. The interview included questions related to the causes of misconduct within the 
broadcasting sector and the actions undertaken for the promotion of ethical behavior among 
journalists. As for the Council for a respect of Ethics and Deontology (CORED), it is an 
organization set up by the Union of Senegalese Journalists in order to address the infringement of 
ethical rules within the media sector. The interview with the Chairman focused on the importance 
of self-regulation, the reasons that led to the creation of CORED, the scope of competence of this 
institution compared to the CNRA, the role and organization of the peers’ tribunal created by the 
CORED, as well as the causes of misconduct in the media sector.  
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      For each category of interviews, the researcher established a guide which started with open 
questions in order to tackle general issues. Several other follow-up questions were also asked 
depending on the answers given. The interview guides included general questions as well as 
specific ones. For example, a general question such as the reason for misconduct in the 
broadcasting sector was asked of almost all the resource-persons. In contrast, a specific question 
such as the budget of the CNRA was tailored for the executives of the regulatory body.  
     Apart from one monitoring agent who wanted to answer in the native language Wolof, all 
interviews were carried out in French, which is the official language of Senegal. All interviewees 
agreed to answer the questions without demand for anonymity.  
  The researcher used the same method to interview all subjects. They were all in-person interviews 
recorded by means of a digital audio recorder.  
3.2.1.2 The print sources 
    The second category of sources for this research consists of a series of print documents. They 
include decrees taken by the Senegalese Head of State, legislative texts voted upon by the National 
Assembly as well as the legal decisions affecting the organization and regulation of the media 
sector. 
- The texts on the regulatory body: The main legal documents which trace the history of the 
regulatory institution are:  
• Decree no. 91-537 of May 25, 1991 relating to the creation of the 
High Council for Radio and Television, 
• Law no. 92-57 of September 3, 1992 relating to pluralism on radio 
and television, 
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• Law no. 98-09 of March 2, 1998 creating the High Council of 
Broadcasting, 
•  Law no. 2006-04 of January 4, 2006 relating to the creation of the 
National Council for Broadcasting Regulation (CNRA). 
        Thanks to the collaboration of the Secretary of the CNRA (Mrs. Niang), the researcher was 
able to access the legislative texts relating to the creation of the High Council for Radio and 
Television, and the High Council of Broadcasting. 
        The information on decree no. 91- 537 was obtained from the books “Television Pluralism: 
State of Affairs” and “The African Charter on Broadcasting: A Review of its Impact in West Africa” 
published by the Panos Institute West Africa in 2006 and 2011 respectively. 
        As for the legislative text creating the National Council for Broadcasting Regulation (CNRA), 
it is available on the websites of the institution and the official journal of the Republic of Senegal.  
- the other legislative texts organizing the broadcasting sector:  
Apart from the Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006 relating to the creation of the CNRA, the 
legislative texts organizing the sector of broadcasting in Senegal are: 
                * The Law on the Monopoly of the Public Broadcasting Service (RTS) and  
                * Law 96-04 of February 22, 1996 relating to the professions of journalist and technician 
for social communication.  
       The researcher was able to obtain from the legal department of the public broadcasting service 
a copy of Law 92-02 of January 6, 1992 relating to the status of RTS. As for Law 96-04, its content 
was found in the literature review. 
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      The CNRA also contributed access to print sources by providing the researcher with a series 
of documents including: 
• The annual reports of 2012 entitled “For a Fulfilment of the 
Imaginations and a Protection of the Youth”, 
• The annual report of 2013 entitled “Another Way to Regulate”  
• The annual report of 2014 entitled “Towards a New Media Society: 
the Big Projects”. 
• The quarterly notice of January, February and March 2014 entitled 
“Money in the Shows, Medical Advertising, Sport and Political 
Violence, SMS and Server Games, and a Lack of Cultural Diversity 
Affect Radio and Television Programs”. 
• The quarterly notice of April, May and June 2014 entitled 
“Supervision of the Media Coverage of the Elections of Municipal 
and Departmental Councilors”.   
• The quarterly notice of July, August and September 2014. 
• The quarterly notice of October, November and December 2014 
entitled “The Continuing Misconduct in the Media Pollute the 
Public Space”. 
• The quarterly notice of January, February and March 2015 entitled 
“Broadcasting Media Must Avoid to Fuel an Exacerbation of Vices 
and Disturbances in the Society”. 
• The quarterly notice of April, May and June 2015 entitled “A 
Broadcasting Sector in the Service of a Plural Society”. 
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• The Terms of Reference applicable to private television stations, 
• A list of the radio and television channels operating in Senegal. 
3.2.2 Data Analysis 
    This study required quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. The data analysis 
method depends on the research questions. For example, for the research question related 
to the financial or human means of the CNRA, the data analysis consisted of a comparison 
with similar institutions like the regulatory bodies of Benin or Morocco. For a research 
question such as the factors that explain the abuse and misconduct in the television sector, 
a qualitative analysis is used in order to organize the answers in major themes and patterns. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
4.1 General characteristics of the Senegalese television landscape  
     The obsolete nature of existing laws, a flawed policy of frequency allocation and a lack of 
respect for the terms of reference on the part of television operators stand out as the main 
characteristics of the Senegalese television sector.  
4.1.1 The weaknesses of the legal framework 
     The Senegalese television sector has undergone important changes with the liberalization 
of the airwaves in the 2000s but this evolution has not been accompanied by the adoption of 
new laws that organize the sector. Currently, apart from the law on the CNRA, only two major 
laws constitute the reference of the media operators and journalists: the law on the Public 
Service of Broadcasting, RTS and Law 96-04 relating to the professions of journalist and 
technician for social communication. 
4.1.1.1 The law on the monopoly of the Public Broadcasting Service: Television in Senegal 
has long been a preserve of the government. The ORTS (Senegalese Radio and Television 
Broadcasting Office) was created on December 3, 1973 by Law no. 73-51 and was placed 
under the legal and economic supervision of the State (Sylla, 2006). The public radio and 
television network which symbolized the State monopoly was a public administrative 
establishment and essentially received funding from the State. ORTS became a national 
company called RTS (Senegalese Radio and Television Service) on January 6, 1992 with Law 
no. 92-02. The new law changed the judicial status of the RTS, which moved from a public 
administrative establishment to a national company. Nevertheless, it reaffirmed the RTS 
monopoly for the production and broadcasting of radio and television programs throughout the 
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national territory (Law 92-02 of January 6, 1992). The evolution that the law brought was that 
the Public Broadcasting System was provided with an administrative board of twelve members. 
The General Manager is appointed by the President of the Republic and is a member of the 
Board. RTS continued to be legally under the supervision of the State but had to derive its 
resources from its activities (Sylla, 2006). Despite the provisions of the law, RTS still depends 
on the government for financial assistance. It is seen as a political arm for the ruling party. Law 
92-02 stipulates that the General Manager is appointed to a renewable term of three years after 
the approval of the Board of Administrators and the parent minister. The current General 
Manager of the company is an active member of the Alliance for the Republic (APR), the party 
in power.  
   With the law of January 6, 1992, private radio operators had to sign a contract and pay a 
license fee to the public broadcasting service. That provision would be cancelled with the 
adoption of Law 2000-07 of January 10, 2000 which ushered in the era of pluralism in the 
broadcasting sector. It stipulated that “Broadcasting and distribution rights, exclusively 
belonging to the State, can be subject to total or partial concession by one or several 
concession-holders of public or private law, by agreements with contract specifications clearly 
stating the reciprocal obligations of the concession-holders and of the State” (Sylla, 2006, 
p.50). So with this new law, RTS no longer had the “power to contract, on behalf of and for 
the State of Senegal” (Sylla, 2006, p.51). Like radio stations, television channels sign a contract 
with the State for their operations and need to pay a license fee to the Agency for 
Telecommunications and Posts Regulation (ARTP). 
    Despite the evolution of the sector, Law 92-04 which was modified in 2006 with the creation 
of the CNRA remains the main legislative text of reference in the television sector. 
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4.1.1.2 The lack of respect for the provisions of Law 96-04 of February 22, 1996: This law 
relates to the media and to the professions of journalist and technician for social 
communication. It regulates the broadcasting sector as well as print media. One of the 
criticisms levelled at this legislative text is that it does not give a clear definition of a journalist. 
Article 23 of law 96-04 defines a journalist as “any person qualified by a school of journalism 
and who exercises his/her profession in the area of communication, any person whose main 
activity and regular exercise of his/her profession takes place in an organ of social 
communication, a school of journalism, a company or a news service, and who derives the 
major part of his/her income therefrom”. It appears that the law does not set restrictions for 
access to the profession of journalist. The vague definition explains why many people have 
entered the sector as journalists without any degree or vocational training. Several other 
provisions of the law are also disregarded. That is the case in the prohibition of all kinds of 
ownership concentration. Article 4, section 1 entitled “Of ownership” stipulates that “no 
natural or legal person of Senegalese nationality may own or become a majority shareholder 
of more than three organs of social communication. Natural or legal persons of foreign 
nationality may own or be majority shareholders of only one organ of social communication”.  
         There is also a legal ban on any single person holding directly or indirectly all the shares or 
voting rights of the entity authorized to broadcast. 
        Despite this legal provision, many media groups including Wal Fadjri, Groupe Futurs Media 
and DMedia own several media outlets. Bougane Gueye Dany, the General Manager of DMedia 
explained that he started with an advertising and communications company, Dakar Consulting and 
Research (Dak’Or) which managed the communications budgets of several multinationals 
including Nokia, Emirates, Danone, Ulker, Ecobank and Western Union in Senegal and West 
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Africa. As he confessed, these activities enabled him to make money and launch a magazine 
(Dakar Life) in 2008. Some months later, in partnership with the General Manager of Avenir 
Communication Group, Madiambal Diagne he launched Radio Zik FM. At the end of 2011, he 
became the sole owner of the radio network after buying the shares of Madiambal Diagne.  He 
explained: “My intention was to have a media group”. He created the group DMedia which 
launched a daily newspaper “La Tribune” in 2011 and the television channel Sen TV in January 
2012. He justified this concentration by the desire to complete a range of products. Mr, Gueye is 
the sole shareholder of the television channel Sen TV, whose capital and total resources are 
estimated at  approximately CFA Francs 3 billion ($US 6 M). Although he was conscious of the 
existence of a law that bans vertical and horizontal concentrations, he thought that certain theories 
such as the concept of concentration were developed because of certain fears. He believed that the 
authorities should not have any fear towards him because he had “no interest to defend”. According 
to him, as an operator, he had already made money in the communications and advertising sector. 
He justified his creation of media outlets by a passion for journalism since he started as a reporter 
for the private radio station Wal Fadjri. He said “I am in the sector of the press but this does not 
make my fortune.  I struggle in other sectors and today these other media outlets help me at the 
commercial level. Since I have an advertising company, an advertising department, I manage 
advertising budgets, which enable me to concentrate the maximum of these budgets on these media 
outlets because these outlets have large audiences, and this enables the advertisers to reach their 
objective”. 
     He asserted that he had never intervened in the newsrooms in order to ask journalists to treat 
the news in one way or another. He thought that journalists today are so independent that it is quite 
impossible for a media owner to orientate their reports or analyses. “The journalists are extremely 
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jealous of their freedom and they do their best to demonstrate to the public that they are not so 
easy to manipulate as people think they are.” 
4.1.2 A lack of transparency in the allocation of frequencies 
       In Senegal, the allocation of radio and television frequencies is officially incumbent upon the 
Agency for the Telecommunications and Posts Regulation (ARTP). Applicants have to submit 
their request for a frequency allocation to the Ministry of Communication. After revising the 
application, the Ministry gives its opinion and sends it to the ARTP, the agency in charge of 
allocating radio and television frequencies. However, the general opinion is that the allocation of 
frequencies depends upon the good will of the Head of State. According to media specialist Mame 
Less Camara the allocation of frequencies is often done on account of the applicant’s identity, and 
on account of the relationship that he or she can develop with the President of the Republic. “The 
President gives the frequencies as he would give money or a vehicle to someone”. He explained 
that the situation had remained the same since the second President Abdou Diouf’s tenure. “Abdou 
Diouf allocated to people like Sidy Lamine Niasse and Alioune Badara Diagne Golbert their radio 
frequencies. His successor, President Abdoulaye Wade gave a frequency to the singer Youssou 
Ndour. Both Presidents Diouf and Wade were able to give twenty frequencies to one single 
individual at the same time because any time they gave to someone a frequency for broadcasting 
in the capital-city, they would ask for signals in the different regions such as Saint-Louis, Kaolack, 
Ziguinchor, and each regional signal is a frequency”  
      The Chairman of the CNRA who launched the first private radio station in the country on July 
1, 1994 recalled “three months after we got our authorization for radio broadcasting, eighty other 
frequencies were allocated for commercial or community radios, depending on the applicant’s 
identity. Frequencies were given to political supporters including religious guides, tradesmen, 
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charlatans and politicians; everybody has a radio frequency”. According to him, the allocation 
procedure was not based on legal text and hundreds of frequencies have been given out. Mame 
Less Camara remembered that, “at a certain moment the authorities had noticed that they had 
been very generous and they had tried to catch up. They knew that some of the frequency owners 
did not have the means to use them, so they asked those who could not use their frequencies to give 
them back. The objective was to sell the frequencies in order to have some money”. The Chairman 
of the CNRA indicated that the situation was the same for the television frequencies. He mentioned 
that with the liberalization of the sector, the procedure was quite simple. “The applicant had just 
to enter the office of the Head of State. After a good discussion with the President of the Republic, 
the latter would call the ministry of information and communication and tell him ‘Mr. X is in my 
office, I have just authorized him to broadcast in our country, and you need to allocate him a 
frequency.’ Subsequently, the minister would call the Chairman of the Agency for 
Telecommunications and Posts Regulation, and the Agency would give a frequency to the 
applicant and that’s all”.  
     The case of the allocation of a television frequency to private operator Bougane Gueye Dany is 
worth mentioning. He confessed that the procedure was achieved in President Abdoulaye Wade’s 
office. He related that between 2008, the year when it was launched, and 2011, his radio station 
Zik FM was ranked number one in the capital-city Dakar in terms of audience. As a consequence, 
between 2010 and 2011, his company was trying to gain authorization for broadcasting in the 
regions, but their attempts were unsuccessful. So he decided to complain to the President. “When 
I met him in November 2011, I told him that I could not understand why a radio station which, in 
a record time, had made a remarkable breakthrough in the media landscape could be denied 
authorization to air in the regions, despite all our attempts. So I found an attentive presidential 
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ear. There were his Chief of Staff, and all his cabinet. After deciding to give me regional radio 
frequencies, he asked ‘Do you have a television station?’ I answered, ‘Mister President I still have 
difficulties to get the authorization for my radio station to air in the regions, I don’t know how I 
can get a TV station’. He then told his then Chief of Staff, Habib Sy, ‘Give him a frequency. His 
company is doing a good job, so give him also a television frequency’. This is how we got our 
frequency”.  
     Currently there are officially seventeen television stations operating in the country: RTS1 and 
RTS2 which belong to the public broadcasting service, 2STV and 2SI Racine which are owned by 
the same operator, RDV, RDV Sports Musique , TFM, Walf Fadjri, Sen TV, Africa 7, LCS, Lamp 
Fall, Mourchid TV, Al Madina TV, Africable, Diaspora 24, and Touba TV.  
      The Chairman of the CNRA mentioned that many of these television networks, including the 
most watched channels, have not signed any contract and have the authorization to broadcast. As 
is the case with radio stations, many television frequencies have been allocated to people who 
neither have the experience nor the financial means to run a station. On account of this situation, 
the CNRA has asked the Head of State to freeze the allocated frequencies that are not in use. 
According to the Chairman, the next step will be a withdrawal of the frozen frequencies. 
4.1.3 The lack of respect for the Terms of Reference 
      The liberalization of the television sector came along with the obligation for a television 
operator to sign a contract called a convention, and the Terms of Reference. The contract 
determines the orientation of the television channel. It is signed with the Ministry of 
Communication and must be renewed every five years. The Terms of Reference set the guidelines 
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upon which the television channel has to operate. It is also signed by the Ministry of 
Communication. 
     Among several other measures, the Terms of Reference stipulate that:  
-Private television channels have the obligation to dedicate 60% of their programs to original 
African productions of which 30% consists of Senegalese programs (article 3), 
-Private television operators must provide the regulatory body and the Ministry of communication 
with any information relating to the nature of the company, the composition of the capital, the 
allocation of voting rights, and any modification of these facts (article 4), 
-One single person cannot own all the capital and voting rights of an entity that holds a 
broadcasting license (article 7), 
- Television operators are obliged to pay a license fee to the authority in charge of 
telecommunications regulation, 
-The television operators must see to it that general information and political programs are 
produced in a way that guarantees freedom of information, in particular with regard to the 
economic interests of the shareholders (article 16), 
-Television license holders have the obligation to ensure pluralist access for political parties, trade 
unions and civil society organizations in the same conditions of programming. The journalists, 
presenters, entertainers and other TV partners should ensure honest, unbiased and objective 
presentation of the issues and subjects, and the expression of different points of view (article 17), 
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-When dealing with legal affairs, television journalists and reporters must respect the presumption 
of innocence, privacy and anonymity. Comments about legal decisions should not affect the 
independence and authority of justice (article 18). 
-The holders of a television license must not encourage delinquent or uncivil practices or 
behaviors. They must respect the viewers’ different political, religious and cultural sensitivities. 
They must not encourage discriminatory behaviors based on race, ethnic group, gender, age, 
religion or nationality. Private television programming should reflect the cultural and linguistic 
diversity of Senegal (article 20), 
-The holders of television licenses make a commitment to not impair human dignity and to respect 
private life, the image, honor and reputation of human beings (article 21), 
-Family programming should prevail at the hours when the young public is mainly likely to be 
watching television, that is to say between 6 am and 10 pm. Violence should not be pervasive on 
the screen during this time period (article 24). 
-Television license holders must set up screening committees within their stations. They must 
classify programs with regard to youth protection and apply adequate signals or pictograms that 
indicate their acceptability (article 25). Programs with erotic scenes cannot be aired before 10 pm 
whereas others with pornographic and violent actions cannot be broadcast unscripted before 
midnight (article 26). 
-Television operators must clearly delineate the difference between news and entertainment. For 
news programs, they must hire professional journalists, 
-Advertising messages must be announced as such (article 39), 
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-Total advertising time must not exceed 30% of the daily broadcasting time. The duration of ads 
should not exceed 20% for a one-hour program. For all fiction programs, only two advertising 
breaks are allowed, 
- In periods of elections, disguised propaganda is forbidden on all national, private and public 
media outlets during the thirty days preceding the electoral campaign. Political advertising is 
banned during the electoral campaign (article 43). 
      The Chairman of the CNRA announced that when his team took office, they conducted a 
census of the existing channels and their programs and asked the Agency for Telecommunications 
and Posts Regulation to provide them with all the list of all frequencies allocated to national and 
foreign operators. This data was analyzed and correspondences were sent asking for their contract, 
the Terms of Reference and the program schedules.  The result was that only a small number of 
them were able to provide the three documents requested. Moreover, some television channels 
which had signed a contract as a cultural or religious television station turned out to be general 
public-oriented channels. That is the case with TFM, the television channel owned by the famous 
singer Youssou Ndour, which is now a general public television station but started as a cultural 
channel. Another takeaway is that no contract has ever been renewed. According to the Chairman, 
if the law was applied consistently, all radio and television stations would be shut down because 
most of them do not have a valid contract. 
          As far as the Terms of Reference are concerned, they were written by the Ministry of 
Communication but many authorities including the Executive Secretary of the CNRA doubt 
whether television operators know what it stands for. 
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           Media specialist and former radio manager Mame Less Camara explained that the Terms 
of Reference allows two things. First, it provides a strict definition of what television stations have 
to do, which means that they have to inform, educate and entertain the audience. Second, it urges 
the networks to reflect the national diversity at the political, cultural and religious levels. “This is 
so easy to say but the implementation is a real problem” he declared. He believed that some social 
considerations such as religion lead to a violation of the Terms of Reference. As an example, he 
mentioned the situation of private radio stations and the richness of their religious programming 
when it concerns Islam but the schedule is poor when it is about the Christians.  Most often private 
radio stations which are supposedly secular, having one day for Catholic programs which is 
Sunday morning, whereas for the Muslims’ religion it is almost at any time and every morning. 
All radio stations open with Islamic programming, and some close their programs with that. 
Thursday evenings and Fridays are scheduled with Islamic content. The situation is the same for 
television channels and at this level Mame Less Camara believed that there was too much work to 
do, which required a lot of courage, because as he puts it “if you want to reduce the airtime of the 
religious Muslim programs, you run the risk to be scolded, even if you are a private operator. The 
situation is all the more difficult when you work in the public broadcasting service”. According to 
him, there is some sort of dialectic to which the public has been accustomed, which means that the 
media should reflect the prevalence of the Islamic religion in the country. 
     Article 7 of the Terms of Reference, which stipulates that one single person cannot own all the 
capital of a television station has never taken into consideration the fact that in general, the Head 
of the State gives the authorization. According to the Chairman of the CNRA, this is a drawback 
in the political system which gives too much power to the President. He says “here appears what 
I call the ‘over-presidentialism of the African power’, which does not care about formalism. When 
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the President calls his minister and asks him or her to give a frequency to a person, the minister 
is much more preoccupied by following through with the President’s request that the person who 
wants the frequency does not need any file and does not bother about any terms of reference.” 
     According to private TV operator, Bougane Gueye Dany, the CNRA is doing a good job in 
enforcing the Terms of Reference with media owners but some provisions such as the amount of 
the television license fee needed to be scaled down. He informed that some provisions ask private 
operators to cover the national territory, but they do not have the same objective as a state or public 
service. He also lamented the large amount of money that private operators have to pay to the 
Agency for Telecommunications and Posts Regulation each year for the license fee. “Today you 
have to pay CFA Francs 25 million (US $50,000) for each region where you have a transmitter. 
For operating in the capital-city Dakar you have to pay CFA Francs 75 million (US $150,000) 
each year combined with the license fees for the regions, it ends up being a big sum. For our part, 
we had authorizations for nine regions, so we have to pay for all nine.  At the end of the year the 
amount we pay for our radio and television stations is around CFA F 240 million (US $480,000). 
It is huge. Many stations face this problem. I know some television stations which have to pay CFA 
F 700 million (US $1,400,000). This has always been a big difficulty, which leads to frequent 
clashes with the Agency for the Regulation of the Posts and Telecommunications”.  
4.2 The CNRA: an institution with a “congenital defect” 
     As the current Chairman of the CNRA put it, the institution has been created with a “congenital 
defect”. What Babacar Toure meant was that political authorities have always strived to have 
control of the regulatory body. Since the first institution known as HCRT, the intention has 
remained and this appears in the functioning of the institution and the nomination of its members 
even though important guarantees have been provided to ensure their independence. 
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4.2.1 From the HCRT to the CNRA  
      The first regulatory body of the media landscape was announced to the Senegalese public on 
December 31, 1990 by then President Abdou Diouf during his traditional address to the nation 
(Sylla, 2006). If some scholars see this decision as a response to the claims of the opposition 
leaders who “called for demonstrations to protest against what they considered as the monopoly 
of the ruling Socialist Party, over the State media” (Sylla, 2006, p.97), the Chairman of the CNRA 
recalled that the creation of a regulatory body had always been one of the most important demands 
of the Union of the Senegalese Journalists (SYNPICS). Chairman Babacar Toure, one of the 
leaders of SYNPICS related that the union had been asking for the creation of a regulatory 
institution for six to seven years; at the same time, his media group Sud Communication had make 
a request for a broadcasting license on the FM band. The claims had not found an attentive ear. He 
confessed: “During a meeting with President Abdou Diouf, he told me ‘listen, in my cabinet as 
well as at the ministry of communication and the Prime Minister’s Office everybody is against the 
demand.  What kind of guarantees can you give me? I answered ‘I can give no guarantee’. So I 
told the President of the Republic that we will do our best to respect the laws and regulations. All 
the countries which liberalized the audiovisual sector did as such. They have created a 
broadcasting law which governs the sector. This legal framework has enabled the specialists to 
create a convention and the terms of reference which organize the relationships between the 
parties, the rights and responsibilities of each stakeholder. Since the frequencies are national 
resources of the public domain, it is a concession of public service that the State does with the 
private sector. So all this should be organized, and I said to the President that all we could offer 
him was to work on the drafting of legal texts since there was no text relating to the regulation of 
the sector.”  
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     The Chairman of the CNRA recalled that the Head of State then created a working group which 
involved the Director of Communication Mister Diongue, the Communication Advisor of the Head 
of State Cheikh Tidiane Dieye, and Guila Thiam who was the General Manager of the Public 
Service of Broadcasting as well as Abdou Latif Coulibaly, who was one of the leaders of the Group 
Sud Communication. “As members of Sud Communication Group, Abdou Latif Coulibaly and I 
wrote the draft of the bill, taking into consideration what was being done in other countries such 
as the French High Council of Broadcasting, the British system, and even the US FCC”. 
     According to the Chairman of the CNRA, in the draft of the bill, the working group suggested 
what all countries do in terms of regulation. It proposed that the regulatory body should elaborate 
the terms of reference and sign contracts with media operators, review the applicants’ files, and if 
need be, grant broadcasting authorization for the frequencies which were at that time under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Communication. Chairman Babacar Toure explained “Of course 
in the heads of the governing leaders, this bill reduced the powers of the Ministry of 
Communication. Since this ministry is a political position, and in general the Minister of 
Communication is the spokesman of the government, the leaders did not accept to have an 
independent authority with some competences over a sector which is considered sensitive.” So 
there was a reluctance to have an independent organ, which would not be under the control of the 
State. As a consequence, the High Council for Radio and Television which was created by Decree 
91-734 of July 25, 1991 had limited powers over the sector. According to Chairman Babacar 
Toure, only two or three articles of the bill they had drafted were included in the new text which 
had a punitive aspect and made the regulatory body appear as a law enforcement organ. The first 
Council had seven members including: 
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- Two magistrates (Cheikh Tidiane Sarr who was the Chairman, Amadou Makhtar Samb 
representing the human rights organizations), 
- One jurist (Bakary Traore, a law specialist at the Faculty of Science),  
-Three journalists (Mame Less Camara for the broadcasting sector, Ibrahima Fall for the print 
media and Annette Mbaye d’Ernerville representing women’s organizations), 
 -One writer, novelist Aminata Sow Fall (Barry, 2012). 
    As the current Chairman of the CNRA explained, the HCRT only made its voice heard during 
election campaigns because it had the obligation to organize airtime for the political parties. The 
institution, which had limited means, had to struggle for legitimacy and credibility since journalists 
did not identify themselves through it. 
     According to Chairman Babacar Toure, the congenital defect of the regulatory body which is 
related to the desire of the ruling authority to have control over it, has always prevented the 
institution from playing an important role. Mame Less Camara, who was a member of the first 
team of the HCRT remembers the reflection of the then Minister of Communication when the 
regulatory body was initiated. “As soon as the regulatory body was set up, the then minister of 
communication Moctar Kebe who was also a former journalist, declared ‘I know that all that is 
left for me to do, it is to work for the decay of my ministry’. The minister made this statement 
because he could not conceive his ministry as anything else but an authority which weighs over 
the broadcasting sector and the print press”. In the eyes of the minister, the mission of the 
regulatory institution seemed to rival the competences of the Ministry of Communication.  
   According to Mame Less Camara, the will to control the HCRT has always remained, and 
explained later why he was evicted from the HCRT; because of his points of views were not well 
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appreciated by the ruling authorities. He recalled that the first members of the HCRT took their 
mission seriously and started giving notices which did not spare the ruling power. The result was 
immediate. The then President of the Republic Abdou Diouf decided that it was necessary to 
change the system of nomination of the members of the HCRT. Instead of a decree, the Head of 
State decided that the members should be appointed with more solemnity through a law on account 
of the importance of the institution. Nevertheless, to their great surprise, Mame Less Camara and 
Chairman Babacar Kebe were removed from the new list of members. According to Mame Less 
Camara , the explanation was quite simple: “we did know why because during our debates, the 
Chairman Babacar Kebe and I defended the idea that for the presidential election the religious 
guides only gave voting recommendations for the President and candidate Abdou Diouf,. They 
used the Public Broadcasting service to do it, which was a violation of the electoral code. In 
periods of electoral campaigns, religious guides did not have the right to interfere in the electoral 
process, and if they wanted to give voting orders, they could do it like any citizen during the airtime 
allocated to the presidential candidate. Our point of view gave to the authority the impression that 
the Chairman and I were becoming hotheads.  So this was enough to turn the institution upside 
down, the Chairman was sacked, as well as me as a member. This shows how much our political 
powers are still not prepared to share at least the authority relating to the regulation in the 
broadcasting sector”. 
    The changes in the HCRT occurred with Law 92-57 of September 3, 1992 relating to pluralism 
on radio and television. So, instead of a simple decree made by the President of the Republic, the 
institution was then set up by a legislative text voted on by the National Assembly. The 
modifications brought to the regulatory body were related to the mandate of its members which 
went from three years to six years and the number of Councilors increased from seven to nine.  
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    The system of nomination of the members demonstrates the will of the authorities to continue 
to have control over the institution. In fact, it was composed of: 
 
- One member chosen by the President of the Republic, 
- One member of the Parliament chosen by the Chairman of the National Assembly, 
- One magistrate chosen by the President of the Republic from a list of names submitted by the 
President of the Constitutional Council who would be the Chairman of the HCRT, 
-One journalist working or who had worked in the audiovisual sector chosen by the President of 
the Republic from a list of three names submitted by the most representative union of 
communication and information professionals, 
-One journalist working or who had worked in the print media sector, chosen by the President of 
the Republic from a list of three names submitted by the most representative union of 
communication and information professionals, 
-One representative of the women’s associations chosen by the President of the Republic from a 
list of three names submitted by the Federation of Senegalese Women’s Associations, 
-One member representing culture, arts and letters chosen by the President of the Republic from a 
list of three names submitted by the Minister of Culture, 
-One member chosen by the President of the Republic from a list of three names submitted by the 
Senegalese Committee of Human Rights, 
-One top-level jurist chosen by the President of the Republic from a list of three names submitted 
by the assembly of the Law Faculty of the University of Dakar. 
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     The Secretariat of the HCRT was ensured by the Director of Communication of Ministry of 
Communication (Law 92-57 of September 3, 1992).  
     As it appears, the executive authorities had sufficient leeway to give the HCRT the kind of 
composition they wanted it to have. Eight out nine members were chosen by the Head of State. 
Only one was chosen by the President of the National Assembly. The members served a 3-year 
term renewable one time. 
    The new institution which was supposed to “grant political parties access to public radio and 
television, in conformity with the rules on pluralism in the treatment of information” was still seen 
as an instrument of the ruling power and did not gain credibility from the political parties (Sylla, 
2006, p.98).  
   The development of the media sector and the liberalization of the radio airwaves would 
precipitate the replacement of the HCRT by the High Council of Broadcasting (HCA) with the 
adoption of Law no. 98-09 of March 2, 1998. For the first time, Article 1 of the new law defined 
the regulatory body as an “independent authority”. Despite that provision, the system of 
nomination of the nine members of the HCA was similar to that of the HCRT. The only changes 
were related to the mandate, which was set for six years and was not renewable, and the 
enlargement of the mission of the institution to private radio stations, and its involvement in the 
process of frequency allocation. In fact, article 4 of Law 98-09 stipulated that “the High Council 
of Broadcasting sits with voting rights on the Administration Board of the Public Broadcasting 
Service during the review of the issues relating to the concession for public service of 
broadcasting” (Law 98-09). Despite timid changes, the High Council of Broadcasting was seen as 
a “political mechanism set up to counter the rise of private commercial radio stations whose 
outlook is generally hostile to the ruling authorities” (Senghor et al., 2011, p. 138). 
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   After the political regime change of 2000 marked by the removal of the Socialist Party which 
had been ruling the country since its independence in 1960, the new President Abdoulaye Wade 
set up a working group in charge of reflecting on Senegal’s audiovisual policy reform. The 
proposals made by that Group included a restructuring of the High Council of Broadcasting (Sylla, 
2006). As a consequence, a new regulatory body came into existence on January 4, 2006 with Law 
2006-04. 
4.2.2 The CNRA, an attempt to anticipate the emergence of the television sector 
     The explanatory statement of Law 2006-04 affirms that the legislative text’s object was “to set 
up a new organ which is more suited to the new Senegalese broadcasting landscape, marked by 
the advent of several commercial and community radio stations as well as the perspective of new 
television channels. The rapid development of the broadcasting sector, which is a harbinger of the 
wide changes that lie ahead, makes it necessary to set up an organ in charge of ensuring its 
cohesion and to enforce rules on pluralism, ethics, deontology, the existing laws and legislation 
as well as the terms of reference and convention governing the broadcasting sector in Senegal. To 
achieve this and in view of the previous experience of the High Council for Radio and Television 
(HCRT) created in 1991 as well as the High Council of Broadcasting (HCA) created in 1998, there 
is need to give the new body a greater authority based mainly on the provision of a range of 
sanctions and measures that can be implemented with a strict observance of the defense’s rights. 
The new body is also marked by the representation of youth and elderly people with the permanent 
mission of ensuring a respect of Senegal’s cultural and linguistic diversity, which should be 
reflected on the programs destined to the public. Finally, with regard to the interactive shows 
which are highly increasing in number, the new body is in charge of ensuring that the radio and 
television stations have the technical equipment that allow to avoid the excesses noticed so far and 
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which affect essentially the institutions or the honor and reputation of people.” (Law 2006-04 of 
January 4, 2006). 
4.2.2.1 The CNRA, an independent administrative authority 
     The new regulatory body was defined as independent administrative authority (article 1 of Law 
2006-04). This precision seemed to reflect the will of the authorities to provide guarantees of 
independence to the CNRA which was totally separated from the government and other 
institutions. In fact, independent administrative authorities are defined as “non-judicial public 
organs without moral personality which have the legal mission to ensure the regulation of sensitive 
sectors, the respect of certain individual rights and which have statutory guarantees and powers 
which enable them to exercise their functions without being under the control of the government” 
(Gentot, 1994, p. 16) 
       According to the Chairman’s Chief of Staff Mouhamadou Bamba Niang, institutions like the 
CNRA have been imagined in accordance with the evolution of economic activities and social life. 
“Such evolution has shown the inadequacy or even insufficiency of the judiciary and institutional 
instruments to take into account the specificities of an economic activity or a particular activity. 
This has led to the creation of structures adapted to what is called regulation, which falls halfway 
between legalism represented by the courts and tribunals, and pure administration.  So its judicial 
status is a kind of junction between certain aspects of the administration and certain jurisdictional 
functions.” As he explained, this judicial status means that the CNRA can take administrative 
decisions such as formal notices or sanctions against broadcasting stations but it also implies that 
the institution does not depend upon any authority. 
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4.2.2.2 The members are appointed by the President of the Republic 
       Article 3 of Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006 stipulates that the nine members of the CNRA 
are appointed by the President of the Republic. The members are: 
- The Chairman of the CNRA, 
- A member from the women’s associations movements, 
- A member from the sector of broadcasting & communications professionals, 
- A qualified member of the sector of arts, 
- A qualified member of the sector of literature, 
- A member from the university community, 
- A member from the human rights movement, 
- A member from the National Youth Council, 
- A member from the elderly people’s association. 
       Although the judicial status of the CNRA is that of an independent administrative authority 
which does not depend upon any authority, its members are appointed by the Head of State. In 
comparison with the previous formula which consisted of choosing from a list of three names 
submitted by organizations or associations, in the new composition of the CNRA, the President of 
the Republic was given leeway to nominate the members he finds suitable for the mission without 
reference to a list or a proposal.  
      For the current tenure, the nomination of the members was done in a way that created suspicion 
and mistrust. In the aftermath of the presidential elections of 2012, the new Head of State made a 
proposal to Babacar Toure to become the new Chairman of the CNRA. Babacar Toure is a well-
respected senior journalist. CEO of the Sud Communication Group which owns the newspaper 
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Sud Quotidien, he launched the first private radio station, Sud FM. After a period of reflection, 
Babacar Toure accepted the appointment on condition that the President of the Republic let him 
choose the members he wanted to work with and that the members would be appointed on a decree 
different from the one that appointed him as Chairman. He explained: “I did some investigation 
and I learned that, during the previous tenure of the regulatory body, it happened that when some 
members had a dispute with the Chairman, they would tell him ‘we have been appointed by the 
same decree, so you are not my hierarchical supervisor’. That is why I wanted the President to 
take one decree for my nomination as Chairman and another decree for the other members”. As 
for the nomination of the members, Chairman Babacar Toure indicated that he followed the law 
which is explicit and which stipulates that the members of the Assembly of the CNRA should 
belong to a certain number of business sectors. The members were chosen on account of their 
careers and profiles. The Chairman confessed he made the proposal for the members without even 
knowing them personally. He says “Apart from Jean Meissa Diop whom I know by far because he 
was a journalist at Wal Fadjri, I did not know the other members. The way I proceeded was that I 
asked some people in each sector to make to me some proposals of three profiles of persons, and 
of course we did some investigations about their personalities and morality, but I did not know 
them before”.  
     The members Jean Meissa Diop, Mouhamed Fadel Dia, Ibrahima Mbaye Sope and Sokhna 
Benga, whom the researcher interviewed, confirmed that they had never had personal contacts 
with the Chairman before their nomination. They seemed to have a suitable profile.  
     Jean Meissa is a former journalist at Wal Fadjri, a media group he joined in 1987 after 
graduating from the School of Journalism. During his 25- year career at Walf Fadjri he worked as 
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a cultural journalist. He was a media critic and regularly published a column dedicated to the media 
in the daily newspaper Wal Fadjri. 
    Mouhamed Fadel Dia is a retired teacher who used to publish the newspaper’s contributions 
about the media. As a writer he has published several books on politics such as “Wade Mecum” 
(2013) and on the relations between France and Africa. 
    Ibrahima Mbaye Sope is a young actor and screenwriter. He graduated from the National School 
of Art. He is well known for his acting but also for his contribution to the training of young actors. 
     Sokhna Benga, has a legal background and works as Director of Maritime Security and Marine 
Pollution Prevention at the National Agency for Maritime Affairs. She is a well-known novelist 
and a columnist at the private channel 2S TV. 
    The other members are: Caroline Agathe Thiam who sits on the CNRA in the name of the 
women’s organizations, the linguist researcher Jeanne Lopis Sylla and media specialist Matar Sall 
represent the university community, whereas Aliou Sow, Chairman of the Youth National Council 
represents the young generation. 
      According to the Chairman’s Chief of Staff Mouhamadou Bamba Niang, the members were 
selected on the basis of their experience and competence as well as morality. The Chairman 
Babacar Toure found that the way he proceeded ensured credibility of the members. In fact he 
considered that “for the previous tenures, the President of the Republic used to sit with his advisors 
and put names in front of each sector, and we had the list of nine members including the chairman 
of the institution, in the same decree. This system of nomination raised a certain number of issues, 
because the President may not choose the appropriate profiles and favor his political supporters.”  
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     Although the Chairman strived to ensure objectivity in the selection of the current members, 
some criticisms have been leveled after the list of members was published. In fact, SYNPICS, the 
only union of Senegalese journalists did identify itself with the regulatory body. Ibrahima 
Khaliloulah Ndiaye the Secretary General of SYNPICS considered that journalists were not 
represented in the CNRA. He argued that “the Chairman is a journalist, Jean Meissa Diop, one of 
the members is also a journalist, but we should mention that our profession has not sent them 
there. The profession used to send its representative to that institution. That is not the case with 
the current tenure. As a consequence, we do not have any favorable or unfavorable prejudice 
regarding the job that they are doing and the quality of its members, all we say is that their 
decisions do not bind us”. 
     What the Secretary General of SYNPICS condemned was the lack of consultation with the 
union before the selection of the name of the journalist who should represent the profession within 
the CNRA. During the previous tenure of the HCRT and the HCA, the union used to propose a list 
of three names of journalists from which the authorities would choose one as representative of the 
profession. However, since the adoption of the law creating the CNRA, the situation changed. The 
new legal text does not indicate that the name of the representative of the broadcast or print media 
should be given by the most representative of the union of communication and information 
professionals as was the case with the High Council of Broadcasting (HCA). 
4.2.2.3 A Chairman also appointed by the President 
     The Senegalese constitution gives the prerogative to the President of the Republic to nominate 
to all civil and military posts. That is the case with the Chairman of the CNRA. According to 
experts such as Professor Moustapha Samb, if someone is nominated by the ruling power he or 
she cannot make autonomous decisions. Frequently the appointee is obliged to refer to the 
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authority who appointed him or her, and to look in the direction indicated by the authority. He 
thought that “the nomination of the CNRA by the Head of State is a failure in terms of democracy 
in Senegal”. Nevertheless, other people like the CNRA Chairman’s Chief of Staff thought 
differently. According to Mouhamadou Bamba Niang, the fact that the President of the Republic 
is the authority who appoints the Chairman is not a handicap to the independence of an institution 
or an individual. To illustrate his opinion, he mentioned that the first President of the Supreme 
Court is appointed by the President of the Republic and this does prevent the judiciary power from 
being independent. Another example is that the Prosecutor of Dakar is nominated by a presidential 
decree which does not mean that the prosecutor has always to refer to the Head of State. The 
maturity and personality of the appointee contribute to ensure his or her credibility.  
     Most of the interviewees considered that the current chairman had enough credibility and was 
not someone who would pledge allegiance to the President of the Republic. To that question, 
Chairman Babacar Toure answered that at his age (64), with forty years of career experience, he 
could not pledge allegiance to anybody. He had always been independent. Babacar Toure 
confessed “If I have accepted to preside over this institution, it was first because it was the first 
time a journalist would chair the CNRA and I was convinced that professionals had a unique 
chance to be together and address their own problems.  Second, I made it clear to the President 
of the Republic that I could not do a mandate of six years. I accepted the position for eighteen to 
twenty-four months in order to play the role of a consultant, to work as a link with journalists, and 
to induce reflection. I have the intent to achieve a cleaning up of the texts which regulate it, and 
then the drafting of new texts, as well as the implementation of a new doctrine of regulation”.  
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4.2.3 The CNRA, an institution with guarantees of independence 
     To ensure the independence of the CNRA, important guarantees have been provided by the law 
through the functioning of the institution as well as the protection of the members and their 
mandate. 
4.2.3.1 An institution without tutelage 
   As defined by Article 1 of Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006, the CNRA is an “independent 
authority”. According to the  Chairman’s Chief of Staff, this definition means that the institution 
is not placed under the tutelage of any ministry or department whatsoever. It does not even depend 
upon the President of the Republic. Mouhamadou Bamba Niang explained: “We depend on the 
Presidency from a functional point of view, but from the organic point of view we do not have a 
relationship with the Presidency. It is attached to the Office of the President because it cannot be 
a floating electron. For the sake of administrative organization there is need to attach it 
somewhere, but it is just a functional linkage, it is not organic”. The relationship with the President 
of the Republic lies in the fact that the budget of the CNRA is included in the budget of the 
Presidency but the CNRA has autonomy in the execution of the budget. Neither the President of 
the Republic nor any other ministry can intervene in the way the body achieves its mission. The 
CNRA is totally free to establish its operating rules. Its decisions are made by the members and 
the assembly of the councilors. The institution has only the obligation to submit to the Head of the 
State an annual report of its activities.  
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4.2.3.2 A protected mandate 
   The first subparagraph of Article 4 of Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006 stipulates that the 
members of the CNRA are nominated for six years. It is neither renewable nor revocable. This 
provision acts as a protection of the mandate of the members. 
   The Executive Secretary of the institution found that the quite long mandate (six years) is 
something very important since the members need “time to immerse themselves in the subject and 
do the job in the right way”. Others like media specialist Mame Less Camara found that it is too 
long and thought that five or even four years are enough. According to him, it is necessary to 
accelerate the renewal of members in order to avoid any social anchoring of someone in the CNRA. 
“You know how the Senegalese people function. With the CNRA, the authorities should avoid the 
situation that the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA) is facing. There are some 
people who have been working for the CENA for such a long time that critics wonder whether the 
country has other individuals that could do the same job. The authorities should avoid letting the 
members stay for a long time.” 
   The fact that the mandate is not renewable looks like a good guarantee of independence. With 
this legal provision, the nominated members do not need to fear to “displease those who appointed 
them, or seek to please them, hoping thereby to be able to be reappointed” (Emmanuel, 1990, p. 
136 as cited by Adjovi, 2003). So they are likely to act with enough freedom since they do not 
expect another mandate.  
   Moreover, once appointed, the members of the CNRA cannot be removed. The mandate is 
irrevocable, which is another guarantee of independence. As media specialist Moustapha Samb 
put it “revocability of the mandate would appear as a Damocles sword hanging over the heads of 
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the members, since they can be dismissed at any time. In this situation they would not make 
decisions with enough freedom”.  
4.2.3.3 The protection of the members 
   The second subparagraph of Article 4 of Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006 indicates that “the 
members of the CNRA may not be prosecuted, searched, arrested or tried for actions undertaken 
or opinions expressed in their official capacity.” 
    This sort of immunity ensures freedom of actions and initiatives of the CNRA. Whatever the 
issue may be and whoever may be the wrongdoer, the members of the regulatory body have the 
necessary latitude to decide on the noticed misconduct. Even the government can be accused of 
rules infringement. The Chairman recalled that recently the State has been singled out with the 
trial of Hissen Habre, the former President of the Republic of Chad. Since 1990 when he lost power 
because of a military coup, Hissen Habre had been living in exile in Senegal. Accused of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed between 1982 and 1990, a special tribunal had 
been set up for his trial. The State of Senegal signed an agreement with the African Union which 
stated that the trial should be broadcast live. The CNRA took a stand against that decision. “We 
examined the question after Hissen Habre’s lawyers had submitted the case to us. We decided that 
footage of the trial could be taken but the trial should not be aired live, because this infringes upon 
certain principles linked to the presumption of innocence, to the protection of the young public 
who can see footage of violent scenes or hear indecent words” said the Chairman. He added “The 
Ministry of Justice of Senegal, through its spokesperson condemned our decision in the media, but 
we reminded them what the law is, and on a regular basis we re-stated the principles that support 
our position, and today the trial is not broadcast live.”  
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   Another aspect that contributes to the protection of the members is the existence of conflict of 
interest language. Article 5 of Law 2006-04 states that “the functions of members of the CNRA are 
incompatible with any elective mandate. The members of the CNRA may not, directly or indirectly, 
have shares in a broadcasting, film, editing, media, advertising or telecommunications company. 
However, if a member has interests in such a company before his/her nomination, he/she has a 
period of three months to comply with the law.” This provision has the objective to reinforce the 
independence of the members and the objectivity of their deliberations. The Chairman who used 
to be the CEO of the media group Sud Communication explained that he had formally resigned 
from the group after his nomination and his act was notarized.  
    The secrecy and confidentiality of discussions within the CNRA constitute other guarantees of 
independence. According to Article 25 of Law 2006-04, “the members as well as the working staff 
of the CNRA are bound by professional secrecy regarding the facts, acts, and information that 
they have knowledge of, due to their functions and in the performance of their duties”. The 
members of the regulatory make a solemn pledge not to reveal the secrecy of the deliberations. 
According to the member Jean Meissa Diop, the neutrality of the administrative actions of the 
CNRA is another factor which ensures more independence. “Anytime the regulatory body makes 
a decision, it is a collective decision. The formal notices that we issue do not indicate that our 
position was influenced or inspired by a given member.” 
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4.3 The CNRA, an institution with limited powers and means 
   Created by Law 2006-04, the CNRA is entitled to oversee the activities of the radio and television 
networks operating in the Senegalese broadcasting sector. In light of its functioning thus far and 
in consideration of the evolution of the media landscape, it appears that its scope of competences 
and its means are insufficient to help it carry out its mission to the fullest. 
4.3.1 The mission of the CNRA 
    The essential mission of the CNRA is to control the implementation of broadcasting regulations, 
the provision of Law 2006-04 and the Terms of Reference (article 1 of the Law 2006-04 of January 
4, 2006). Its powers and functions make it appear as a body for balance, social peace and 
democratic advance as well as a law enforcement institution and a consultative body. 
4.3.1.1 The CNRA, a body for democratic advance 
   Although freedom of the press is a sacrosanct principle enshrined in the Senegalese Constitution, 
the CNRA is one of the institutions devoted to the implementation of that human right. Article 7 
of Law 2006-04, states that the CNRA should ensure “the independence and freedom of 
information in the broadcasting sector”. So the regulatory body appears as a key pillar in a 
democratic society. It is clear that a free press is essential to a true democracy. In the same vein, it 
is important to stress the role it plays for the access of political parties to broadcasting stations. 
The same article 7 indicates that the CNRA must ensure “respect for an equal access of political 
parties, the union and organizations recognized in the society to the broadcast media in the 
conditions set by the existing laws and regulation.”  
   Moreover, the regulatory body has a key place in the fair organization of elections in Senegal. It 
is responsible for setting the “rules relating to the conditions of production, programming and 
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broadcasting of the regulated shows of the broadcast media during election campaigns.” (Article 
7 of the law 2006-/04). 
   In addition to that responsibility, the regulatory body is entitled to supervise a bi-monthly radio 
and television program aired on the public broadcasting service with the participation of the 
political parties in an open debate. It also ensures the broadcasting of debates at the National 
Assembly as well as coverage by the public broadcasting service of the rallies and activities of the 
opposition in compliance with Law 92-57 of September 3, 1992 relating to pluralism on radio and 
television.  
4.3.1.2 The CNRA, a body for balance and social stability 
    The regulatory body works as a means for ensuring social balance. In a country with millions 
of individuals belonging to different ethnic groups, with different practices and beliefs, there is a 
need to avoid the frustration of minority groups stemming from a lack of consideration by the 
broadcast media. For this purpose, the CNRA should guarantee “respect for the law and the 
preservation of cultural identities”. Similarly, it has the duty to ensure objectivity and balance in 
the process of information (Article 7). This provision requires compliance with ethical rules.  
   The institution also contributes to social stability by ensuring “respect for the institutions of the 
Republic, private life, and the honor and integrity of the human person” (Article 9). In doing so, 
the CNRA contributes to peaceful coexistence within the same nation.  To avoid the broadcasting 
of vulgar statements during live broadcasts, the CNRA must “compel all radio stations to have a 
system that delays the voice for at least three seconds during interactive shows” (article 10). 
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  The regulatory body must also make sure that “the nation’s unity, the national integrity and the 
secular nature of the Republic” are not endangered by the content of audiovisual messages (Article 
9). 
The institution also contributes to social progress by ensuring the protection of youth. It should 
work for the preservation of “childhood and adolescence in the content of programs”. (Article 7). 
 4.3.1.3 The CNRA, a law enforcement and consultative body 
     The responsibilities of the CNRA include its law enforcement activities. The institution has the 
duty to ensure compliance with the terms of reference applicable to the owners of radio and 
television frequencies (Article 7). It is also consulted for the bills and legal texts relating to 
communication (Article 11). For this reason, the CNRA has been involved in crucial reflections 
such the drafting of a new press code and the shift from analog to digital. 
4.3.1.4 The CNRA, a referee for fair production and competition  
   The development of the broadcasting sector always stimulates competition between the 
networks. The CNRA has the duty to ensure “free and healthy competition” between companies 
(Article 7). It also controls content and programming of the advertising messages on public and 
private networks (Article 12).  
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4.3.2 The limitation of powers 
   Despite the fact that all broadcast media are included in its scope of competence, the powers of 
the CNRA seem too limited according to its members. The Chairman of the institution considered 
that the situation goes back to the “congenital defect” of the regulatory body. He thought that the 
ruling political power has always been reluctant to give up certain prerogatives to the CNRA. 
4.3.2.1 A non-involvement of the CNRA in the process for frequency allocation 
    Contrary to France or even some African countries like Benin, the CNRA is not involved in the 
process of frequency allocation in Senegal. As the Chief of Staff of the Chairman put it: “This is 
not logical, this is not rational. In other countries the regulatory body is at the beginning of the 
process. This involvement enables it to have visibility, and to have an evaluation of the project of 
television of the applicants, to have a knowledge of what the candidates want to do. Today we just 
wake up and see that a new channel has started airing. The CNRA is then asked to control the 
content of the new channel without even having any information regarding the contract that the 
owners have signed with the Ministry of Communication. So it is a very paradoxical situation.” 
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4.3.2.2 A non-involvement of the CNRA in the nomination of the General Managers for the public 
broadcasting service 
   In France, a country whose regulatory body has inspired most African nations, the Superior 
Council for Broadcasting (CSA) appoints the Managers of the television networks.  The situation 
is the same in the African country Benin with its High Authority for Broadcasting and 
Communication (HAAC).  
4.3.2.3 A lack of control over the internet 
    The Senegalese regulatory body has no control over the internet and does not entertain relations 
with internet providers. The situation is all the more serious as all television shows are uploaded 
on the internet as the country has witnessed the arrival of digital television. Another factor is that 
most broadcast channels are available for live streaming. It is only during electoral periods that the 
regulatory body tries to set certain rules for websites. Since television is accessible via the internet, 
the scope of competence of the regulatory should be extended in order to include this aspect. 
4.3.3 The means and resources of the CNRA 
      The legislature has provided the CNRA with legal means that appear in the form of sanctions 
that the institution can take in order to regulate the media sector. The means of actions include 
human, technical and financial resources which according to the members and the permanent staff 
seem insufficient.  
4.3.3.1 The means of sanctions 
     A regulatory body cannot reach its objective without a power of sanction that compels the 
networks to abide by the rules. The Senegalese CNRA can make remarks or send formal notices 
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to the channels which violate the norms. Despite formal notices, if the network persists in defiance 
of the law, the regulatory body can implement other sanctions such as: 
• A suspension that can range from one to three months of all or part of the programs, 
• A pecuniary sanction that ranges from CFA Francs 2 to 10 million ($US 4,000 to $US 20,000) 
• A daily penalty for delay that ranges from CFA Francs 100,000 to 500,000 ($US 200 to $US 
1,000) in case the decision of the CNRA is not applied (Article 26). 
   The pecuniary sanctions go to the Public Treasury which is charged with the recovery. 
     Apart from these decisions, the CNRA can suggest to the authority in charge of broadcasting 
authorization a withdrawal of the frequency. 
     The agents of the CNRA are sworn in as officials. They take an oath before the Regional 
Tribunal of Dakar by stating “I swear that I will perform my duties with probity, in strict 
compliance with the laws and regulations” (Article 28).  They can access broadcast media and ask 
for any information or evidence. They make official reports on infringement of the rules. They can 
control equipment and shut down the wrongdoing company. For the fulfilment of this mission, 
agents need the support of police forces (Article 29).  
4.3.3.2 The limitations of the sanctions 
   The main limitations to the power of sanctions of the CNRA are linked to the close connection 
of media operators and executive power. For example, the regulatory body does not have the power 
to cut a television signal or withdraw a frequency. It only has the function to make a proposal to 
the Ministry of Communication which can either approve or deny. Since frequencies are often 
allocated on a political basis, it goes without saying that the suggestions of the regulatory body 
may not prevail if the owners of the frequency have close ties with the ruling authorities. 
76 
 
 
4.3.3.3 Human resources 
  Apart from the members who only meet twice a month within the institution, the mission of the 
CNRA is carried out by a certain number of permanent workers who are present at the headquarters 
on a daily basis. 
• The permanent workers include 
-The Chairman of the CNRA who embodies the moral authority of the institution. 
-The Chief of Staff of the Chairman tasked with coordinating the activities of the Chairman. 
-The Executive Secretary of the CNRA who is in charge of coordinating the services of the 
CNRA. According to the law, the Executive Secretary must be a top ranking civil servant who 
attends the meetings of the regulatory body in a non-voting capacity. 
- The IT (Information Technology) Advisor and Head of the Monitoring Service; 
 Nominated by the Chairman, the IT Advisor is responsible for supervising the monitoring of 
radio and television. The incumbent reports misconduct to the members who make appropriate 
decisions. 
-The Head of Technical Services who is in charge of the maintenance of technical facilities, 
computers and internal networks 
-The Communications Officer who is responsible for the flow of information within and 
outside the CNRA. 
-The Head of the Documentation Unit, who is tasked with the preservation of archives and 
documents tracing the history and life of the CNRA. 
-One administrative agent who works as an assistant for the Head of the Monitoring Service. 
The incumbent supervises the work of the agents operating at the monitoring service. The 
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administrative agent collects their reports relating to misconduct on radio and television 
channels and transmits relevant information to the members of the CNRA. 
-The Secretary, who provides administrative support to the executives of the regulatory body. 
-The Logistics Manager who is in charge of supplying material and equipment to the workers 
and members of the CNRA. 
-The Budget Collector: The work of the budget collector consists of executing administrative 
procedures between the Chairman, the Ministry of Communication and the banks in order to 
ensure the execution of the budget. 
-Six Monitoring agents: They are responsible for monitoring radio stations and television 
channels in order to detect misconduct and abuse. 
-The Messenger who is tasked with the delivery of official correspondence. 
-Two Drivers: One driver is for the Executive Secretary whereas the other at the disposal of 
the other members of the regular staff. 
    The permanent staff of the regulatory body include personnel who are part of the Senegalese 
Public Administration. These workers are civil servants paid by the State of Senegal who has 
assigned them to the CNRA. However, they receive extra allowance for their work with the 
regulatory body. These workers are: the Chief of Staff of the Chairman, the Executive Secretary, 
the Communications Officer, the Administrative Agent, the Logistic Manager, the Secretary, and 
the Budget Collector. 
     The other category of regular workers are people recruited by the CNRA. They include the 
Chairman, the IT Advisor and Head of the Monitoring Service, the Head of Technical Services, 
the Head of the Documentation Unit, the six Monitoring Agents, Messenger and the two drivers.  
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    The salaries as well as the financial and material benefits of these persons are defined by the 
Chairman of the institution, taking into consideration the hierarchies established within the CNRA. 
      The members of the CNRA have a different status. Apart from the Chairman who is present at 
the CNRA on a regular basis, the members of the regulatory body are not permanent workers. 
They meet at least twice a month, every other Thursday, on convocation of the Chairman. 
However, apart from these two ordinary sessions, the CNRA can hold a special meeting, when the 
necessity arises.    
    The remuneration system of the members and the Chairman of the regulatory is set by the Head 
of State through a decree. Although none of them revealed the amount received every month, they 
all admit being well treated in terms of compensation provided to them. 
Apart from the monthly remuneration, the perquisites offered to the members include: 
- An official car, 
- A fuel supply of fifty liters per month, 
- A diplomatic passport  
   According to the members, the fuel supply seems sufficient since they are only obliged to drive 
to the CNRA twice a month. The diplomatic passport is justified by the fact that they often have 
to travel outside to represent the institution and the Chairman.  
4.3.3.4 A lack of human resources 
   The general opinion within the CNRA is that the institution lacks human resources. The total 
number of workers at the institution is twenty-nine including permanent personnel and members. 
Comparing the functioning and organization of the regulatory bodies in Senegal and in Morocco, 
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the Executive Secretary said “I happened to visit the High Authority of Broadcasting 
Communication in Morocco and I found hundreds of people working there. Here in Senegal, we 
do not even have thirty people working for the CNRA”. In terms of comparison, in Benin, another 
African country which is smaller to Senegal with less inhabitants, in 2002 the High Authority for 
Broadcasting and Communication (HAAC) had already hired eighty-five people (Adjovi, 2003).  
   The lack of personnel is obvious at the Service of Monitoring where six agents have the duty to 
supervise thirty-four radio stations and seventeen television stations. As a consequence, the 
monitoring of stations often remains behind schedule.  In the interview done in October 2015, one 
of the monitoring agents who took a leave of absence in August confessed to be still monitoring 
shows aired in June.  
    The situation is more serious for Souleymane Diallo, the Head of Technical facilities who is the 
only person in charge of the maintenance system. As a consequence, he has been unable to benefit 
from his yearly leave of absence since the members of the CNRA took office in 2012. “I am almost 
the only person working here. There is only one agent called Maodo who helps me from time to 
time, but he is more a cameraman, and a photographer than a technician. He just knows a little 
bit of the job and I often delegate certain tasks to him, if not I am alone for all the duties. For this 
reason, I have not taken my annual leave for three years now. I often take one or two days per 
week in order to have a rest but even during those moments I am always on the phone, and it 
happens that I move to the office to solve a problem” stated Souleymane Diallo.  
   The shortage of human resources appears very clearly in the organization of the CNRA where 
there is no HR department or division. Apart from monitoring activities, all services have only one 
staff member. There is a lack of executives and supervisory personnel. One of the members, 
Mouhamed Fadel Dia thought that “there is need for the institution to have specialists in many 
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domains, in the field of television, in the technical field, in the field of broadcasting, in the field of 
law. These people should work full-time, and be able to conduct some procedures against radio 
or television stations which commit abuse or misconduct.” 
   To the question whether the members of the CNRA should be permanent employees at the 
regulatory body, most of the councilors gave the same answer as Sokhna Benga who believed that 
“for an institution such as the National Council for Broadcast Regulation I can understand that 
the administrative staff have salaries but in Senegal the rule is that for all the Boards of 
Administrators or Councils of Surveillance the members do not have a salary, they just have 
allowances for the meetings they attend”. This position is based on the fact that the people who 
are appointed already have another occupation. If they have to become regular workers for the 
CNRA, they need to resign or put an end to their previous activities for at least six years. As 
Sokhna Benga asked, the big question will be “After your mandate what are you going to do?” 
However, another member, Mohamed Fadel Dia thought differently. According to him, in 
countries like France which inspired Senegal, the members of the High Council of Broadcasting 
are permanent workers. “I think the CNRA needs a permanent structure, its needs people who 
dedicate themselves entirely to this mission, with more important responsibility on condition that 
the CNRA develops its mission because the current mission is very narrow compared to the French 
CSA” he said. Mouhamed Fadel Dia is the only member to advocate a regularization of the 
councilors as permanent workers. He is a retired teacher. This situation may explain the possibility 
for him to be available at any time for the CNRA in case of a regularization but the members who 
still have other occupations do not share this point of view. According to Ibrahima Mbaye Sope 
“in Senegal, the luck we have is that the Chairman has his own staff, which is different from the 
members of the CNRA. He has his Chief of Staff and the members of his own cabinet who are 
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permanent workers. This can be seen as a way to compensate the regular presence of the 
members.”  
   Even among media specialists, there is no agreement on this issue. If someone like Pr. Moustapha 
Samb considered that the members should be permanent and totally dedicated to the monitoring 
of radio and television channels, Mame Less Camara for his part thought that this option can carry 
some drawbacks. He considered that: “The danger with professionalization is that this would lead 
to the creation of real press barons, whose legitimacy would only result from the fact of being 
appointed by the President” He thought that the solution resides in nominating members for a 
longer mandate, which would enable them and the regulatory body to work without fearing being 
fired the next morning. 
4.3.3.5 A lack of facilities for the members 
   It is important to mention that the regime change in 2012, with the end of the reign of President 
Abdoulaye Wade has enabled the regulatory body to occupy new premises. Since then, the CNRA 
has been headquartered at the former office of Karim Wade, the son of the defeated President who 
was the Minister for International Cooperation, Regional Development, Air Transport and 
Infrastructure. The location has enough room for the members and the working staff. The 
regulatory body has also benefited from the internet connection set up for the son of the former 
President and his personnel. Although the members do not complain about their monthly 
allowances and working conditions, some of them confess that the provision of certain facilities 
would contribute to an improvement of their productivity. The availability of television and radio 
sets for members could be of great help as well as internet access at home.  
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 4.3.3.6 The monitoring system of the CNRA 
   The monitoring of radio and television is the basis of all activities at the CNRA. All actions or 
decisions undertaken derive from the viewing of programs and shows aired, although many other 
initiatives can be carried out after requests sent by viewers.  
   The monitoring system of the CNRA was acquired in 2014. It includes a dozen computers, a 
server and a series of television sets displayed all along the monitoring service. According to the 
Head of the Service, the regulatory body paid over F CFA 100 million ($US 200,000) for its 
acquisition. A partnership with the Moroccan High Authority of Broadcasting Communication 
(HACA) allowed the CNRA to obtain the software for the monitoring system called “HACA 
Media Solutions (HMS)”. This Moroccan system is also in use in many African countries including 
Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia as well as in some European States such as Belgium (CNRA 
Annual Report, 2014).  
     The system allows the continuous monitoring of twenty-four television channels and thirty-six 
radios stations, seven days a week. It enables at the same time the recording and storage of the 
programs aired on the radio and television networks. According to the Head of the Monitoring 
Service, the server can receive up to 1000 channels. 
      The monitoring system is centered on two key concepts: pluralism and media library.  
   The concept of pluralism: As the law states, the CNRA is charged with ensuring fair access to 
broadcasting outlets by political parties and civil organizations. In this perspective, the reference 
is Law 92-04 which defines the airtime for the government, the majority and the opposition. As 
the head of the Monitoring Service declared “for the sharing of airtime, the government, the 
opposition, political parties, aligned parties, non-aligned parties, non-affiliated parties, all of 
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these groups have a quota. The rule is 30% for the government, 30% for the majority, 10% for the 
opposition, 10% for the civil society”1. Each worker among the six monitoring agents is asked to 
follow some specific programs of a television or radio station and determine the airtime for each 
of the participants. The most often targeted programs are political debates and newscasts. As the 
Head of Technical Facilities explained, the system is operated manually “for example when there 
is a debate with four participants, for each participant the agent in charge of monitoring creates 
a sheet in the computer. As soon as a person starts speaking, the agent sets the timer and when he 
or she finishes the monitoring agent presses the pause button and the time is automatically 
measured by the machine. So the start and the stop signals are given manually, but the time count 
is automatic”.  
    When the participant has several positions, for example a politician who is at the same time a 
researcher, the monitoring agent has to understand whether the participant speaks as a politician, 
a researcher or whatever. At the end of the show, the monitoring agent has the profiles of the 
participants and their speaking time for the database. According to the Head of the Monitoring 
Service, “the objective is not to push the television station to respect the quotas, but the idea is to 
have some sort of balance. It is clear that if you watch the Public Broadcasting Service (RTS) you 
notice that it devotes its largest amount of airtime to the government and its activities. On the 
contrary, when you watch a private television station such as Wal Fadjri it appears that the focus 
is on people who are angry with the government. So the interest of the monitoring of pluralism is 
to provide the CNRA with scientific data relating to pluralism and to urge the television networks 
to implement some sort of balance between the political parties”. 
                                                          
1 Even though the total does not add up to 100, this is the system applied. None of the interviewees was able to 
provide the text that stipulates this rule. 
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   The other concept of the Monitoring Service is the Media Library which is a shared system that 
allows the monitoring agent to watch different radio and television programs and to detect 
misconduct. The system enables monitoring agents to watch the television stations and listen to 
the radio channels in real time. It records all aired schedules including newscasts, movies, and 
entertainment programs as well as advertising. It has a capacity of two months for television 
channels and if maximum capacity is reached, the data is transferred to a local cloud, which is a 
disk with one Terabyte of storage.   
     According to the Head of the Monitoring Service, the system can be augmented. He declared 
“When we started we had this capacity because we did not have many channels, but with the advent 
of digital stations, we can record twenty-four television stations.”  
  Any time a monitoring agent detects some wrongdoing, whether it is in a report, an interview or 
debate, he or she singles it out and shares it with the members of the CNRA who can access it via 
the intranet.   
    Comparing the Media Library to the former system, Souleymane Diallo the Head of Technical 
Facilities found that the new method is more convenient. “In the past, the monitoring agents used 
sheets which they had to fill in, giving the type of show and what they considered to be misconduct. 
It was an archaic system. Today they go directly to the computer and make annotations. They 
mention the media outlet, the date, the start time, the end time, which program is incriminated, in 
which category, in which domain, and give their observations. They also can mention with which 
group of persons in the CNRA they shared the information. All their observations are 
automatically visible on the person’s page” said Souleymane Diallo. 
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      The Media Library enables the staff and members to follow up on viewer complaints. “If you 
call me and say that on this day at this hour a program was aired and there was an abuse, thanks 
to this software I can go into the system and research that program, with all the criteria” explained 
Mame Ndiack Wane, the Head of the Monitoring Service.  
   All different items singled out by the monitoring agents are screened by the members of the 
regulatory body during their bi-monthly meetings. In case the violations are serious, the institution 
undertakes appropriate measures. In some situations, the members may agree that the supposed 
violation does not require action. 
4.3.3.7 The limitations of the monitoring system  
   The members do appreciate the monitoring system and find it very efficient. According to them, 
its main advantage lies in the fact that it relieves members of the task of watching television 
channels or listening to radio stations all day long in order to detect misconduct. Nevertheless, the 
system has some limitations which hinder its productivity. The main limitations are related to the 
lack of human resources, the use of certain languages, coverage of the regions, accessibility and 
the level of study of the monitoring agents.  
- The low number of people:  
  The service hires six people for the monitoring of seventeen television and thirty-six radio 
stations. Although the space can accommodate ten computer workstations, the number of staff 
seems too low compared to the considerable task. As monitoring agent Ndeye Codou Gueye 
declared, the lack of sufficient people explains why monitoring is behind schedule. According to 
her “The ideal situation would be to have as many monitoring agents as there are radio and 
television stations operating in the country”. On account of the shortage of skilled staff, the CNRA 
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is often compelled to refer to certain external consultants for an analysis of the monitoring results. 
The Head of the Service revealed working on a regular basis with three consultants.  “I coordinate 
the work of the three consultants, who are senior persons with long experience on the matter. They 
support us in the reflection and analysis of data relating to subjects such as pluralism, youth 
protection and so on”, he said.  
- The use of national languages: 
   The existence of variety of local language presents a challenge. Although private radio and 
television stations mainly produce shows in the official language (French) and the most spoken 
national language which is Wolof, the Public Broadcasting Service airs newscasts in all national 
languages including Wolof, Pular, Serer, Diola, Soninke and Mandinka. The private television 
station 2STV whose owner is of Pular origin has newscasts and shows produced in that national 
language. As the Head of Monitoring put it “there is a real lack of human resources. This explains 
why we cannot monitor for example the newscasts in Soninke on RTS because we do not have 
someone who understands Soninke, or Serer, and we should monitor these programs because there 
are many public personalities who appear there.”  
-  The lack of coverage of the regions:  
    Headquartered in the capital-city of Senegal, the CNRA has the duty to monitor all radio and 
television stations operating in the national territory. Unfortunately, its monitoring system receives 
only the signals of the radio and television properties broadcasting in Dakar. To have an idea of 
the situation in the regions, the regulatory body is often obliged to collaborate with people living 
in the decentralized areas, especially for the supervision of the activities of community radio 
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stations. With the development of the television sector, the risk is to have the emergence of regional 
television stations which broadcast without any control from the regulatory body. 
- The members cannot access the service outside the CNRA offices:  
   The monitoring system of the regulatory body is only accessible for members when they are at 
the headquarters of the CNRA. Each member has created a password for logging onto the intranet. 
The option to give access to the system only through a local intranet is linked to some security 
reasons according to the Head of the Monitoring Service. 
- The level of study of the monitoring agents:  
   The ability to monitor media outlets requires a certain level of study and maturity. At the CNRA, 
the staff in charge of this task includes people who have not obtained a baccalaureate degree. The 
remark of the Head of the Service was that “the duty to monitor television and radio programs is 
a work of precision that requires a certain level of study, a certain level of judgment. Normally, 
the monitoring should be done by college students or students in journalism who work on rotation 
for a short period of time. The problem is that the monitoring agents have been working for the 
previous tenure of the CNRA and the new Chairman has decided to retain them for the new system 
that has been implemented. It is true that they do not have a high level of study but they are well 
motivated to do the job.”  
4.3.3.8 The financial means of the CNRA 
The main characteristic of the financial means of the CNRA is that the institution has a budget 
which is included in the budget of the Presidency of the Republic. The amount provided for its 
activities does not seem sufficient to help the regulatory body cope with the different tasks. 
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4.3.3.8.1 A budget transferred by the Head of State’s Office  
  The financial resources of the regulatory body are defined by Article 30 of Law 2006 which 
stipulates that “the National Council for Broadcasting Regulation has, as resources, a budgetary 
allocation which covers entirely the expected expenditures. In this perspective, the CNRA proposes 
the voting of the necessary funds for its functioning during the preparation of the national budget”. 
  As indicated by the provision of the law, the financial resources of the CNRA are included in the 
national budget and more precisely in the section dedicated to the Head of State’s Office. 
According to CNRA executives, this connection does not mean that the institution depends upon 
the President. In the past, the financial allocation was allocated in the budget of the Prime 
Minister’s office (Adjovi, 2003). 
     Nevertheless, contrary to the other institutions such as the Economic, Social and Environmental 
Council, and the Court of Auditors, the financial resources of the CNRA are not discussed and 
voted upon by the National Assembly. As the Executive Secretary explained “a good rule would 
be to have our budget voted at the time that the other budgets are voted. Unfortunately, this is not 
the case. What we have is a budget of transfer at the Presidency of the Republic which is provided 
to us at the beginning of the fiscal year in our account at the Public Treasury and we execute the 
budget”.  
     The Chairman of the CNRA is the authorizing officer for expenditures. The regulatory body 
has the autonomy to manage its budget. This means that the Public Treasury provides the 
allowances necessary to meet financial needs and the CNRA will transfer to the Public Treasury 
the money collected from pecuniary penalties. 
4.3.3.8.2 A low budget 
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     The financial allocation of the CNRA appears to be very low according to the executives of the 
regulatory body. The Chief of Staff of the Chairman revealed that the annual budget of the CNRA 
is estimated to be around CFA Francs 280 million (US$560,000). The amount of money looks 
small in comparison with another African country such as Benin which is smaller in terms of area 
and has fewer inhabitants. In his book, “The Media Regulatory Bodies in West Africa, a Case Study 
of Benin”, Emmanuel Vidjinnagni Adjovi informed that in 1998, the High Authority for 
Broadcasting Communication already had a budget which amounted to CFA Francs 333,726,000 
which represents $US 667,452 (Adjovi, 2003). 
   According to Marie Ndiaye Ngom the Executive Secretary of the CNRA who is charge of 
administrative management, “for a good functioning of the institution, with a qualified staff, an 
executive personnel, with branches and offices in the different regions of the country, the ideal 
budget would be not less than 1 billion CFA Francs ($US 2,000,000)”. 
4.4 The categories and causes of misconduct  
    Describing the situation in the television sector, the Chairman of the CNRA presented it as a 
“big mess”. According to him, the lack of a clear definition of the role of each stakeholder has led 
to disorder in the media sector. He asserted “Today there is big confusion: Journalists are doing 
ads, they play in telefilms, and they do entertainment programs. The entertainers are used as 
journalists. Comedians who host shows act as journalists, they invite politicians, and they do talk 
shows.  Even former wrestlers are now hosting shows, inviting politicians and other personalities. 
Entertainers are acting in telefilms. So there is a general confusion, and advertising invades 
everything”. As it can be inferred from the Chairman’s statement, let alone the misconduct, the 
problems facing the television sector are various and the causes are either social, political, 
economic or structural.  
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4.4.1 The categories of misconduct  
The different abuse and misconduct committed by radio and television operators are enumerated 
in the annual report submitted by the CNRA to the Head of State, as well as in the quarterly notices 
it releases. From January 2014 to June 2015, the list of abuse identified by the CNRA included: 
- Fortune teller programs with the use of a phone server without the indication of cost on 
television screens; 
- The frequency of game shows with the use of phone servers or text messages appealing to 
the public including youth. No information about the rules that govern the game shows is 
given; 
- The display and distribution of bank notes and several other products on television shows;  
- Advertising for corporate professional doctors and medical services with the display of 
prices on the television screen; 
- Shows with self-appointed traditional healers who deal with sensitive health matters who 
can endanger viewers’ health by providing inaccurate information; 
- The lack of respect for the presumption of innocence, the dignity and honor of people 
involved in judicial affairs; 
- The lack of consideration for topics related to cultural diversity; 
-  The over-presence of entertainment programs marked with obscene dances; 
- The broadcasting of programs related to violence in the field of sports; 
- The broadcasting of shocking images of corpses of Senegalese people killed abroad or, 
mutilated or decaying bodies taken from reports done by foreign channels operating in 
conflict zones such as Central African Republic, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan; 
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- The use by journalists of certain programs like press reviews as a means for making 
personal comments and for settling accounts with particular people; 
-  The presence of disguised, invasive and untimely advertising; 
- The lack of balance in news programming on the part of the public broadcasting service; 
- The suspension of television debates for political parties on the public broadcasting service; 
- The use of media outlets for flattery and toadyism for financial gain; 
- The involvement of children in game shows for advertising purposes; 
- The broadcasting of statements which may affect the institutions of the Republic, national 
unity and social peace; 
- The lack of balance in the participants of televised debates; 
- Conflict and tension between television operators whose insulting words are aired on their 
media outlets; 
       Besides these remarks, with the organization of the local election on June 29, 2014, the CNRA 
made several observations relating to the misconduct noticed during the pre-electoral campaign 
and the campaign itself: 
- In the pre-electoral campaign: for local elections, the pre-electoral campaign period ran 
between May 16 and June 14. During that period of time, disguised campaigns were 
forbidden on private and public national media. The CNRA even released a communique´ 
for that purpose. Nevertheless, a variety of violations of the electoral code were committed 
on public broadcasting channels as well as on private stations and the internet. They took 
the forms of: 
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• The broadcast of messages calling for votes for particular candidates 
or coalitions made by politicians, religious leaders, entertainers or 
even sportsmen on occasion of different events, 
• The broadcasting of political meetings sponsored by candidates for 
local elections, 
• The broadcasting of callings for vote for particular candidates or 
coalitions made by journalists in different programs. 
• Publication of paid ads in the print media and on websites. 
       During the campaign, misconduct was related to:  
• Advertising offers made by a TV channel for the promotion and 
electoral propaganda for candidates in the local elections, 
• Live broadcasting of meetings of certain candidates on private radio 
and television channels, and websites, 
• Broadcasting of messages calling for vote for particular candidates 
and coalitions, 
• Publication of paid ads in print media and websites 
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4.4.2 The different causes of misconduct 
The variety of abuse and misconduct in the television sector stems from a wide range of causes 
which are related to the structure of the media, the political climate, society and the economic 
environment. 
4.4.2.1 Structural causes   
    The management of a radio or television station has a real impact on society. In Senegal, a series 
of structural factors affect the functioning of the television networks and often appear as causes of 
some misconduct. According to many analysts, the system of frequency allocation ranks among 
the most important factors. As the IT Specialist and Head of the Monitoring Service of the CNRA, 
Mame Ndiack Wane put it, “most of those who have a media group are businessmen. The sector 
was not their vocation. In other countries, television operators are people who have graduated in 
political science, who know the media sector, and who like it and invest in it. Here in Senegal, 
television operators use the media as leverage.” The Secretary General of the National Union of 
Information and Communication Professionals Ibrahima Khaliloulah Ndiaye echoed these 
comments stating that “there are lobbies of all kinds which intervene in the press sector in order 
to protect their economic interests. They are not interested in the news. In some cases, they are 
not even interested in earning dividends. They often engage in combat which can be economic or 
political, and they try to use their media outlets as instruments for their fights. They can even use 
the media to fight against people who belong to their own political camps.” 
Along with the invasion of the media sector by businesspersons and lobbyists, the low level of 
education of some journalists and entertainers is also seen as one of the most important causes of 
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misconduct. In fact, the rapid growth of the television sector marked by the allocation of 
frequencies to a series of businesspersons has given way to the recruitment of a massive number 
of people who never attended journalism school. Most of these new stars are college-drop outs 
who chose to enter the sector without asking for a high salary. The notoriety conferred by television 
and the possibility to generate income through certain practices have attracted many people 
without qualifications into the profession. As explained by Mame Ndiack Wane, the IT advisor 
and Head of the Monitoring Service of the CNRA, most of these “pseudo-journalists” benefit from 
the system called “per diem”. In fact, there is a particular tradition in Senegal which consists of 
reimbursing travel fees and providing a per diem to journalists who cover events such as 
workshops and seminars. This practice, which is considered by many as some sort of passive 
corruption has enticed many people to enter the profession.  Mame Ndiack Wane stated “I have 
heard that some persons go and find the owners of the media outlets and tell them ‘do not pay me, 
just give a card which shows that I a member of your staff’. So with this card, the holder will look 
around for seminars or workshops where per diem or travel fees are provided to reporters”. 
   Another factor that hinders a good functioning of the media sector is the prevalence of nepotism. 
In the opinion of the member of the CNRA Sokhna Benga “Many television stations recruit people 
because they are parents, nephews or nieces of the manager, the friend of a friend, or things like 
that. That is the way things work in Senegal. It is not a situation specific to the broadcasting sector 
but to all sectors. This is a big problem. When you choose someone who is competent, it is not a 
problem, but there is problem because most of the time people who are recruited in this way are 
not competent”. 
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    According to the Chairman of the Council for a Respect of Ethics and Deontology2 (CORED) 
Bacary Domingo Mane, such a situation was made possible by the deficiencies of the provision of 
Law 96-04 which defines the journalist as “anybody who gets most of his or her revenue from the 
practice of this job”. As he pointed out, “this means that you can be a rapper and one day, when 
rap music is not successful, you can become a journalist. We even know the story of a clerk who 
has become a press owner. We have many examples of such kinds of journalists”. 
   Along with the recruitment of people who have no qualifications, the sector has witnessed the 
creation and the multiplication of schools, most of which are not recognized by the State. Until the 
mid-90s, the Center for Studies in Information Sciences and Techniques (CESTI) was the only 
multinational School for Journalists that trained all professionals in Senegal and West Africa. On 
account of the selectivity of the entrance exam of this school, many people who wanted to become 
journalists were denied admission. With the creation of the private school ISSIC (High Institute 
for Information and Communication Science) by the group Sud Communication in 1996, many 
people were offered the opportunity to pay in order to fulfill their dream of becoming a journalist. 
Many other schools have come into existence with some curricula and staff that do not escape 
criticism. According to media specialist and Director of Studies at CESTI, Moustapha Samb “With 
the development of private schools, people graduate without having a good level of knowledge.  
We realize that there are some journalists who write articles with a lot of mistakes, in terms of 
grammar. When they speak on the radio or television it is a catastrophe, they make a mistake in 
every sentence. This is due to the fact that CESTI is no longer the only school that trains 
journalists. There are many private schools and as you know the private schools seek money, they 
                                                          
2 The Colllins Dictionary defines “deontology” as “the branch of ethics dealing with duty, moral obligation and 
moral commitment”. 
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favor the financial aspect. They even train people who do not have a baccalaureate degree, and 
promise to give them an upgrade training for one year. All these subterfuges are being used by the 
school owners in order to have students. The business dimension has taken over the necessary 
rigor in training.” 
    Conscious of this situation, the State of Senegal has initiated training sessions in collaboration 
with the School of Journalists (CESTI) in order to provide the basics of the profession to the 
unqualified staff working in the media. Through the Press Aid Fund, selected persons receive a 
nine-months training. Media operator Bougane Gueye appreciated the project which has 
contributed to an increase in the intellectual level of many members of his staff. “We have seventy-
eight journalists and 80% of them are professionals.  In our suburban offices at Grand Yoff, 
Parcelles Assainies, Guediawaye, Pikine, Rufisque and Keur Massar, we had people who received 
on-the-job training. Today, thanks to the Press Aid Fund all of them are now at the School of 
Journalists and last year alone, three of them graduated from there and they are still serving in 
the suburban area.” 
    It is true that many members of the media need training sessions in order to comply with the 
rules. However, other structural factors can lead journalists who have received adequate 
qualification to engage in dubious practices. One of these factors is the precariousness of the 
profession. In fact, the system of payment for journalists, generally referred as the “Collective 
Convention” seems obsolete according to the Secretary General of SYNPICS. There is a need for 
many media outlets to adapt the convention to meet current reality. As he explained, the 
consequence is that many well-trained journalists do not last long in the sector because they find 
more interesting offers as communication advisors or information specialists in non-governmental 
or international organizations. As a result, the average age of the journalists, reporters and anchors 
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is around thirty-five. According to Ibrahima Khaliloulah Ndiaye, this aspect should not be 
overlooked in the analysis of the causes of misconduct. “Journalists are like wine, ‘the older the 
better’. We need to have responsible persons, people who have been in the editorial rooms for a 
long time, who have gathered a lot of experience. Age is important for the anchors but we also 
need experienced staff behind, in the shadow, who work like coaches for the young people, who 
train them, who make them benefit from their long experience.” According to him, the problem 
with the “Collective Convention” is that after working for fifteen years, media practitioners reach 
the highest level of payment and cannot receive more. The challenge is then to change the 
provision of the “Collective Convention” in order to make the profession attractive and to retain 
journalists.  
   Another factor that seems to favor misconduct is the lack of deterrent sanctions against the 
perpetrators. As the Chairman of CORED Bacary Domingo Mane explained, “despite abuses, 
journalists are rarely brought to court, and even if they are sued, most of the time they get 
suspended sentences. You do not see someone sent to jail for a long period of time, all these factors 
contribute to this situation.” 
     Apart from these causes, other factors are related to the internal organization of media networks. 
In fact, the lack of screening committees in most radio and television networks is seen as a factor 
that leads to abuse and misconduct. The implementation of screening committees is a provision of 
the Terms of Reference whose aim is to avoid the broadcasting of items that offend moral sense, 
affect public institutions or endanger social stability. The screening committee has also the duty to 
do the classification of shows and as a consequence determine the airing time and the rating that 
should be applied to the different programs. As the CEO of DMedia, Bougane Gueye Dany stated, 
in many stations the decision to broadcast a report, an interview or magazine is most often an 
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individual responsibility. “We do not have a screening committee.  For the newscast, we have the 
chief-editor who is responsible for the items aired. For programs, the responsibility is on the 
shoulders of the director who is charged with viewing all elements before they are aired; and most 
of the time the incumbent is a journalist who is charge of following the production”. 
    In many cases, competition with rival media lead to a disregard for necessary precautions. 
According to media specialist Moustapha Samb, many journalists opt for the easiest way to 
practice the profession.  “There are some journalists who publish things without verification and 
afterwards realize that it was not true.  There is another factor, which is the practice of passive 
journalism via internet, or through ‘hearsay’. After some cross-referencing, they publish news, 
which is very risky, because sometimes they do not verify the source”.  
     As far as the internet is concerned, it is worth mentioning that the development of social media 
has been met with excitement by media professionals. Almost all items broadcast through 
traditional media are uploaded on the internet. The possibility to obtain reactions from people in 
the country and around the world explains that “everyone seeks to create buzz on the internet by 
saying the most outrageous thing or by showing the most violent action” according to Mame 
Ndiack Wane, IT Specialist at the CNRA.  
  The Senegalese regulatory body is entitled to monitor internet content only during election 
periods. It faces difficulties in making websites owners avoid disguised electoral campaigns. As 
the Chief of Staff of the Chairman of the CNRA explained, “the question of internet regulation is 
very complicated. We have certain access providers who are not even in Senegal. We have websites 
which are not hosted here. So this raises many issues: do we have to regulate content? Do we have 
to regulate access to the internet? Do we have to regulate providers, or do we have to regulate 
consumers? As you can see it is a very complex situation”.  
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      Asked about the lack of regulation on the internet, the CEO of DMedia, Bougane Gueye Dany 
thought that the only way for the CNRA to regulate it is to act as law enforcement officers, to 
censor or block certain websites. These practices are against the Senegalese democracy which 
advocates for freedom of expression and free access to the media. He considered that “there is 
need for some sort of self-regulation, and the media must be vigilant”. 
4.4.2.2 Political causes 
    The political situation in Senegal and its national policy for the media sector explain to a large 
extent the lack of compliance with regulations on pluralism. 
   Senegal is well-known as a democracy. Pluralism was established in the 1980s. Every 
Senegalese citizen who wants to create a party can do so. As the Minister of Interior declared on 
the private radio station RFM on December 7, 2015, the number of political parties was estimated 
at two-hundred and fifty-five. The multiplicity of political parties raises serious issues for public 
television as well as for private channels. 
    As far as public television is concerned, Law 92-57 of September 3, 1992 relating to pluralism 
on radio and television compels the Public Broadcasting Service to cover events held by political 
parties. It also urges production of a bi-monthly program to which the representatives of political 
parties are invited as guests. These legal provisions are very often ignored. Most opposition parties 
complain about a lack of coverage by Public Television (RTS). Even the bi-monthly political show 
called “Pluriel” had not been produced for a long period of time. Referring to this misconduct 
which the CNRA had mentioned in its quarterly notices, the General Manager of RTS provided 
his own explanations. In the interview he gave to the researcher, he explained that the coverage of 
certain political activities such as the rallies convened by opposition parties depends on the 
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decision of the administrative authorities regarding the rallies. He asserted “When an opposition 
rally is forbidden by the administrative authority, as a public service of broadcasting it happens 
that we refuse even to send a reporter, but when it is authorized we send a crew for coverage, and 
after that we appreciate if you will air it or not.  When we choose to air it, there is a treatment 
which maybe does not show all the dimensions of the event but we treat it. We give the news about 
the organization of the rally but we do not go any further.” Whatever the reason may be, Public 
Television (RTS) is accused of overlooking activities that are not in favor of the ruling party, the 
Alliance for the Republic (APR). In this respect, the General Manager seemed to acknowledge that 
this has always been the rule at the Public Service: the ruling party always receives the lion’s share 
of the schedule. “I agree that there is a predominant amount of coverage of the ruling party, that 
is the truth, but I ask those who are interested in content analysis, in the analysis of the program 
schedule and the analysis of television newscasts, to take a representative sample of the newscasts 
and to make a comparative study with what was done before 2012.  You will notice that during 
three months, six months, you can watch the different editions of the television newscasts without 
seeing a report on the current ruling party, the Alliance for the Republic (APR), which was at that 
time an opposition party.  So there is a challenge that we try to cover the opposition, and as general 
manager of the RTS, this costs me a lot. I receive a lot of pressure from the ruling authorities but 
I try to make them understand that we cannot show only the activities of the ruling party all day 
long, in all newscasts.”  
      Despite the claims of the opposition parties, the Public Broadcasting service seems reluctant 
to give them the floor on various occasions. As the General Manager recognized “for public radio, 
we have ensured pluralism, and it is a notable fact. I can say that so far the public service of 
broadcasting is considered as the instrument for the public powers, and television is a powerful 
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magnetic medium, and people consider that the Senegalese people and the democratic system are 
not advanced enough to allow a balance and diversified flow of information on public television. 
I say it because it has happened that we tried to balance the information but the perception that it 
gives from part of the public authorities is often a negative perception”. 
     As a matter of fact, the Public Broadcasting Service (RTS) appears to be the sounding box for 
the government, a platform for state communication. According to Racine Talla, the General 
Manager of RTS, a deep analysis of the media landscape and situation created this situation. He 
explained that there was a lack of consideration on the part of private television channels for the 
actions and initiatives taken by the government. In his eyes, any time a private channel dealt with 
government programs or projects, the accent was laid on a sensational perspective. He recalled an 
example related to the efforts made for the sector of agriculture. “This year, the State has invested 
billions in the sector of agriculture. The agriculture campaign is launched, seed and machines are 
provided. Everything is available, but there is a small delay in the delivery of fertilizer. With this 
situation, the private media focus more on the delay related to the fertilizer rather than appreciate 
the big efforts made by the authorities. In such a case the Public Service of Broadcasting will leave 
the private media with the freedom to deal with this situation, but RTS, the public broadcasting 
service can choose to focus on the efforts made by the State. Most of the time the perception is 
political but that should not be the case, because in this case it is information that has no political 
connotation. The problem is that since the Head of State is at the same time the President of the 
ruling party (APR), anytime you talk of the Head of State people say that you talk about the 
President of the APR and consider the information given to be political”.  
    The complaints regarding RTS are not just related to the lack of coverage of the opposition 
parties but also a large focus on the President, his party and allies. According to the General 
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Manager, the objective of the public service is to be a platform of expression for the government 
especially when important decisions are overlooked by private outlets.  “That is also the case when 
the private television networks decide not to talk about the President’s economic tours throughout 
the regions, which they consider to be political campaigns. We decided to cover these activities 
and to air them as series of reports in the newscasts. We consider it as public information because 
it is related to the activities of the Head of State”. 
     Regarding the criticism made by the CNRA about the lack of production of the show “Pluriel”, 
Racine Talla the General Manager of RTS recognized having received a formal notice from the 
regulatory body. He linked the halting of the program to the occurrence of certain circumstances, 
namely the month of fasting (Ramadan). He ensured that the Public Service of Broadcasting had 
re-started airing the program. He explained that he never intervened in the choice of the political 
guests. “The host of the program chooses the guests and there is a rule which is that the ruling 
party (the Alliance for the Republic) and the party which has the majority in the opposition (the 
Senegalese Democratic Party) should always be represented. For the rest of the participants, we 
try to make a combination with the two other parties because they are very numerous. We have 
hundreds of political parties. It is often a very difficult choice we have to make”   
  As media specialist Mame Less Camara put it, “equity does not mean equality”. The different 
political parties cannot have similar treatment on media outlets. The country has adopted what is 
referred to as the law of the three thirds: one-third for the government, one-third for the opposition, 
and one-third for the group which is the majority (ruling group). “So with this system, the 
government which is an institution has a double representation because it has a ruling political 
party. The other thing is that the part dedicated to the opposition is also shared with diverse 
organizations which are nonpolitical, such as the civil society, the unions, which are often very far 
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from the political sector”. In this respect, private television operator Bougane Gueye Dany 
revealed that the media themselves implement some kind of “self-regulation” for their credibility. 
He announced that “the debate on pluralism often arises. During editorial meetings, journalists 
make a selection and sometimes they choose four persons for a debate: someone from AFP (the 
Alliance of Progress Forces) someone from APR (the Alliance for the Republic), someone from PS 
(the Socialist Party), someone from the opposition party, the Senegalese Democratic Party, and 
at a certain moment they realize that the representatives of AFP, APR and PS are in favor of the 
President’s camp. In such a case they try to balance by inviting someone from the civil society, so 
it is clear that at this level there is some sort of self-regulation that the media impose on 
themselves”. According to the CEO of DMedia, it goes without saying that the sharp increase in 
the number of political parties represents a major difficulty for media managers. Even though most 
private radio and television channels do not deny access to political parties, the competition for 
the largest audiences often dictate its logic. “For political shows, it is important to know that we 
are looking for high ratings. We try to have the top leaders, the significant political parties, in 
order to enable our television station or our media outlet to be very well followed. As you know 
there are at least two-hundred political parties in this country.  Another fact is that there are many 
political parties that do not attract many people, and as a consequence they do not attract a large 
audience. If you gather representatives of these small parties on a show, you run the risk to drive 
your viewers away. In any case, most of the time we leave this decision to the discretion of the 
presenter of the show, or the newsroom staff for the debates that we organize and which are 
relating to current affairs. However, it is clear that it is difficult to comply with the provision of 
the law relating to pluralism”.  
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   The difficulty in ensuring political pluralism is exacerbated when it comes to election periods. 
The CEO of DMedia recalled the extreme solution his group was compelled to adopt during the 
2014 local elections. “There were five-hundred and eighty lists of candidates for the elections in 
the capital-city, Dakar. This was too much. How can you manage to cover five-hundred and eighty 
lists of candidates? That is impossible. We decided that any political party which wanted to have 
coverage on our newscasts on the electoral campaign had to pay money.  Of course, this was in 
contradiction with the provisions of the CNRA, but the law has not envisioned the existence of five-
hundred and eighty lists of candidates. The regulatory body sent us a reminder, saying that we 
could not sell electoral information. We answered ‘ok you are right but the reason is that you gave 
us five-hundred and eighty lists to cover. We do not have the human, financial and technical means 
to do that’. So to my mind the multiplicity of the political parties is a real problem and at a certain 
moment the CNRA is obliged to understand the situation.” 
4.4.2.3 Social causes  
   Like many African countries, Senegal is marked by the importance of oral tradition. Most of the 
history of the States has been preserved through the legacy of a certain category of people called 
“Griots”. Even though many “Griots” are well educated and contribute to the development of the 
country, the role of this social class was originally to remind people about their genealogy and the 
achievements of their ancestors, in exchange for money. Also known as the “masters of the word”, 
the “Griots” have always kept their importance in society and are generally referred to as 
“traditional communicators”. The development of broadcast media has opened other horizons of 
activity for this social group. According to the Chairman of the CNRA, this fact is at the basis of 
abuse and misconduct. He said “Senegal is the only country where you have a category of people 
who call themselves traditional communicators. This does not exist anywhere else, it is just an 
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invention of some people who have moved from some traditional social function and invaded the 
media, diverting it from its primary objective”. Many television programs, specifically wrestling 
and entertainment shows are hosted by “traditional communicators” who have never attended a 
communication or journalism school. Most of the time, they have been hired because they are 
“good speakers”. Their lack of training and knowledge about the mission of the media explain 
why the outlets are often used to make money or for the purpose of self-promotion.  
   Another social factor that plays its role in the analysis of the dysfunction of the television sector 
is the appearance of a variety of religious preachers. The Chairman of the CNRA sees this 
phenomenon as a threat not only to the media sector but also for society as a whole. “This situation 
leads to obscurantism because this religious preaching is done by people who claim to disseminate 
the message of Islam but they do not retain from the Quranic book neither the context nor the 
perspective. They have a literal understanding of a text which dates back to the Arabic Middle 
Age, in a different context, and they talk to people who are in general, illiterate and ignorant. On 
account of the low level of education of the population, these religious preachers have become the 
new stars. So the star is no longer on the radio or television but the person who preaches”. Like 
the traditional communicators who have invaded media outlets, most of the religious preachers 
have not received any training in journalism or communication. Their designation as preachers is 
mainly dependent on the good will of media managers. According to Chairman Babacar Toure, 
these religious preachers are people who have graduated from Medersas (traditional Quranic 
schools), and as members of certain sects or brotherhoods, they try to impose a certain vision which 
limits the population. “This reductive vision is against the need for openness and assimilation of 
the society”.  
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      Beside the large presence of religious preachers on television program, it is worth noting an 
increase in the number of religious television stations which some people see as a threat to the 
stability and peaceful coexistence in the country. In 2015, four out seventeen television stations 
operating in Senegal were religious channels (Touba TV, Lamp Fall TV, Mourchid TV and Al 
Madina TV). Each of them represents a specific religious brotherhood. According to Mouhamed 
Fadel Dia, it is true that religious channels exist in many other African countries including Nigeria, 
Ghana and Benin, but the fact is that when a media outlet is managed by people who belong to a 
religious brotherhood, it tends to become a radio or a television channel which defends a 
brotherhood without taking into consideration the secularism and the freedom of expression which 
characterize the Senegalese democracy. 
    Along with the appearance of the religious staff, other categories of people such as traditional 
healers and fortune tellers have also found in broadcast media a new way to increase their 
customers and revenues. Because of the illiteracy rate, a large number of people continue to believe 
in these social phenomenon whose practitioners are given large amounts of airtime on radio and 
television stations. The possibility for the audience to call via a phone server and consult with a 
traditional healer or fortuneteller draws a lot of revenue to the media owners. These kinds of shows 
have gained in popularity, raising serious issues. As the Chairman of the CNRA put it “for 
example, with modern medicine it is forbidden for doctors to advertise their services. On the 
contrary we have all these charlatans who often advise the persons with diabetes to consume sugar 
if they buy a certain magic potion. They are criminals, and today all radio and television channels 
have these kinds of programs.” 
 
 
107 
 
 
 
4.4.2.4 Economic causes  
     The economic situation in the country is considered to be a factor that lies at the basis of the 
low quality of programming offered by the channels. Fierce competition for revenue is also quoted 
as an economic cause that explains a series of reprehensible conduct in the operation of television 
networks. 
    The general opinion is that Senegalese television channels only offer programs related to 
“wrestling, music and dance”. If an important part of the audiences seems to refer to foreign 
networks available on cable, others who cannot afford it are compelled to satisfy themselves with 
what is aired on the broadcast channels. According to IT Specialist and Head of the Monitoring 
Service of the CNRA Mame Ndiack Wane, “the television operators offer shows with insignificant 
content because they do not have the means to produce high quality programs. The economic 
situation cannot support that. There is no producer because television productions are very 
expensive and require lots of means. People have ideas but not the means of production. In most 
television stations, the workers have low salaries. Apart from some stars, the others face problems 
and as you know, salaries are at the image of the country”.  
     In the opinion of media specialist Moustapha Samb, the television networks offer mainly 
programs relating to music, dance and wrestling which is a national sport for commercial purposes. 
“When a media organization does not show wrestling, it will not catch the audience. The 
Senegalese youth love wrestling, music and dance. When a television program is too serious, it 
runs the risk of having a small audience. The instruments of communication are constantly 
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searching for audience growth, and for this reason, they try to attract the public which only likes 
those programs, which do not contribute to raise awareness.”  
      The fear of bankruptcy justifies the massive production of low quality programs like music 
clips, dancing or wrestling competitions do not require the investment of vast sums of money. The 
other option for many which networks is to resort to foreign productions which are easy to obtain. 
     According to media specialist Mame Less Camara, an analysis of television content shows a 
large presence of a variety of telenovelas. Although the Terms of Reference set up for private 
television require that 60% of the programs be locally produced, there is a real problem for 
networks to comply with this requirement. “I think this is due to the lack of means. Most of the 
shows are reruns whose depreciation has been secured a long time ago, whether they are Indian, 
Mexican or Brazilian programs. Production costs a lot, and the television networks do not have 
enough budget to dedicate to production. In Senegal, like in many countries in Africa there are 
small co-productions.”  
     The Chief of Staff of the Chairman of the CNRA analyzed the situation as a failure on the part 
of television operators. According to him, it is a showcase of their inability to present something 
useful to the public. He declared “When you have a television channel, my conception is that you 
have a project, a program, a vision, something to propose to society. Out of respect for that society, 
you have to do the work in a professional way, by producing content which will be beneficial for 
education, information, sensitization, and entertainment.” 
     The struggle for revenue has led to a lack of consideration for the provision of the Terms of 
Reference relating to advertising. Article 40 of the Terms of Reference states that “the total 
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duration of advertising should not exceed 30% of the daily airtime. The duration of the ad 
messages must not exceed 20% for a one-hour show.” 
     Apart from the fact that the percentage dedicated to advertising is well exceeded by most 
television networks, there is a general tendency which the Chairman of the CNRA named 
“exhibition advertising” which is done by displaying products simultaneous with programs. A 
television network such as SenTV has often been singled out for the promotion of tele-shopping 
at undue hours. As the Executive Secretary of the CNRA, Marie Ndiaye Ngom mentioned, the 
norm should be to air this kind of programs late in the night, at a time when there is not a large 
audience but not in primetime as is done by SenTV. The CEO of DMedia and owner of SenTV 
denied these accusations. He contends that his television network had not exceeded the percentage 
allocated for advertising. The problem is that the station was experiencing a new concept of tele-
shopping called Sen Kheweul, a program in which products are displayed and the audience can 
make money by calling the hosts.  According to him, the rationale for this program is that “as 
private operators, we don’t have the same preoccupations as the public service. We are obliged at 
the end of the month to pay salaries. We have fixed and variable costs. So for all our initiatives we 
need to take into consideration the commercial dimension and Sen Kheweul is a very successful 
program.” Another reason that can be considered an explanation for this situation is that there is 
no legal provision regarding tele-shopping in Senegalese legislation.  
4.5 The CNRA and the “big mess” 
     Facing a multitude of misconduct in the television sector, the members of the CNRA appointed 
in 2012 have adopted a new doctrine of regulation based on a pedagogical approach. However, 
this strategy does not rule out the possibility of sanctions such as the cancellation of a show, as 
happened with the program “Kawteff” produced by Sen TV. In this context marked by different 
110 
 
 
challenges, self-regulation is often seen an appropriate way to complete the actions undertaken by 
the CNRA. 
4.5.1 A new doctrine of regulation 
     The 2012 appointment of Babacar Toure as Chairman of the CNRA opened a new era for the 
regulatory body. It was the first time that a journalist was nominated to this position. All previous 
chairpersons were judges. As former CEO of the media group Sud Communication which owned 
the daily newspaper Sud Quotidien and the first private radio station Sud FM, Babacar Toure 
benefitted from a favorable image by the ruling authorities and media professionals. Comparing 
the current chairman of the CNRA to his predecessors, his Chief of Staff Mouhamadou Bamba 
Niang described him as someone who has a professional understanding of regulation, “because he 
became chairman of the regulatory body after spending forty years in the sector as a journalist 
and media operator, so he has a different vision and a different approach.” With his nomination, 
the media sector seemed more motivated and professionals considered that their priorities would 
be taken into account more efficiently in the activities of regulation. As the Chief of Staff put it 
“as a professional he understands better and faster certain situations which arise. Thanks to his 
experience and practice of the profession, the reflections within the regulatory body are carried 
out in a deeper and sharper way.” 
   In his career as a media operator, the Chairman of the CNRA suffered a multitude of setbacks in 
his interactions with the previous members of the regulatory body. Media specialist Mame Less 
Camara recalled that “in the past, the publication of his daily newspaper Sud Quotidien was 
cancelled, his reporter Ibrahima Gassama who carried out an interview with the rebel Chief Salif 
Sadio was sent to jail and the operation of his private radio station was suspended. In a nutshell, 
111 
 
 
Babacar Toure has earned respectability and is highly considered in the media sector. So his 
appointment as Chairman of the CNRA was seen as a way to straighten the institution.” 
    Apart from his own experience as media operator, the relationships that the Chairman has 
maintained with various professionals are also seen as an important asset for the success of his 
mission. The member of the CNRA Ibrahima Mbaye Sope considered that “since he is a senior 
journalist, there are some people who are working in some media outlets who have been his 
employees, and sometimes, personal relationships prevail. He can call someone and ask him to 
stop a program or to change the content, or give some advice. This factor is very important.” 
      Interaction with media professionals is what the Chairman of the CNRA called a “new doctrine 
of regulation”. According to Babacar Toure, in the perception of the ruling authorities, the 
lawmakers and even the pubic, the regulatory body is a law enforcement institution for the 
broadcast sector. It always symbolizes “a committee for censorship, which takes sanctions or other 
punitive actions”. In this situation, the Chairman came to the conclusion that “there was need to 
found a new doctrine of regulation which will be proper to our context, to our situation and to the 
types of media that we have.”  
     This new concept derives from the Chairman’s experience since he confessed as having always 
been reluctant to regulate. After being a subject of regulation for forty years as a journalist and 
media operator, he became a regulator. He considered that “regulation should not always mean a 
reference to the civil or penal codes”. To confirm this assertion, Babacar Toure recalled the 
memorable trial that his media company had with the State and sugar company CSS over alleged 
fraud that his newspaper had published. The main preoccupation for the Senegalese and the leaders 
of CSS was to push the media company to reveal its sources. “our group has suffered from a lot 
of setbacks with justice, with some condemnations to pay excessive sums of money, condemnations 
112 
 
 
to jail sentences which have never been executed, namely in the case that opposed us to the 
Senegalese Sugar Company. The main cause was that we refused to reveal our sources. A 
journalist who reveals his sources endangers his job. So we had to intervene in the back office 
because we could not do it in public. At the end, the authorities agreed to put our company under 
judicial control and they understood that we could not reveal our sources in public.” 
       Based on these episodes in his career, the Chairman of the CNRA advocates for discussions 
and dialogue between journalists, media operators and the authorities. The main objective is to 
raise awareness by journalists about what is generally referred to as “sensitive information”. The 
Chairman’s opinion is that “the journalist is not a disembodied person. He or she is not a citizen 
who lives outside of the society. If he gives sensitive information that can endanger the interior 
and exterior security of the nation, he or she will not escape in case of deflagration. So we manage 
to fuel this kind of debate for a better understanding of the needs of information for the public, the 
role of the journalist but also the need to protect national security.” 
      In the Chairman’s vision, censorship should not be considered as the solution for any program 
that a segment of the public finds “inappropriate”. It often happens that some organizations 
express their indignation and call for the cancellation of certain shows. Such attitudes seem not to 
have an influence on the decisions of the CNRA. The Chairman mentioned his mistrust of censors. 
“I am not sensitive to the pressures of people who shout out their indignation towards one program 
or another, one television show or another. The reason is that we do not know their motivations. 
It can be rivalry; they may be in favor of one press owner and not another one. Maybe they do not 
belong to the same ethnic group, or share the same religion. Maybe they have some handicaps and 
they do not know that we are in a society which has evolved, and that their references are being 
replaced, and there is need for them to adapt to the new situation. We often hear a lot of complaints 
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and some people go as far as to say there is need to burn the CNRA. However, they do not influence 
our actions” he stated. 
     In recent years, most complaints were related to obscene dances. In this respect, the CNRA 
thinks that adults who want to look at these programs should have the right to do so. What is 
important is that television channels should see to it that those programs are not aired in primetime 
during family viewing hours. In the opinion of the Chairman of the CNRA “When a show is 
scheduled for midnight, it is a parental responsibility if at that hour the children are in front of the 
television. This is no longer regulation.” 
      Many other complaints are also related to pornographic programs shown on cable networks, 
which are beyond the purview of the regulatory body. In this respect, the opinion of the Chairman 
of the CNRA is that the institution cannot intervene when people make commercial choices and 
subscribe to a cable channel that provides them with a code to access pornographic movies. 
     For the members of the CNRA, their role also consists of being social regulators. As the 
Chairman explained, the media are a true reflection of society. “The radio and television programs 
are caricatured reflections of who we are, what we are and how we perceive things”. Most 
programs that are criticized rank among the most watched shows, which attract advertisers. He 
then advocated for an “education of the tastes and perceptions” as well as a sensitization of media 
professionals about their roles in society. In this respect, the CNRA organizes various seminars 
and workshops with participation by members of the broadcasting sectors, community leaders and 
advertisers. In 2013, the regulatory body organized a seminar on the protection of the young public, 
with participation by childhood psychologists, educators, doctors and journalists. The objective of 
that meeting with multidisciplinary participation was to provide some insight related to the 
behavior of the young public towards the media. Jean Meissa Diop, a member of the regulatory 
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body stated that “it was the first time the regulatory body initiated a meeting of this kind and with 
those different profiles, and since then even the last quarterly notices focus on the protection of 
the young public”. 
     The actions of the regulatory body vis-a-vis advertisers can take a different form. The Head of 
the Monitoring Service of the CNRA explained that “when radio and television channels have 
programs which deal with nasty matters, the CNRA can sensitize sponsors and tell them “be 
careful, don’t have your name linked to those programs that cause problems”, and the sponsors 
will stop because they are doing communication and they stick to their good image, maybe we can 
act on that, but the society itself must be more demanding, and this is not only the role of the 
CNRA”.  
     This pedagogical approach does not exclude the sending of formal remarks which some in the 
media seem to take into consideration. Mouhamadou Bamba Niang, Chief of Staff of the Chairman 
of the CNRA mentioned “it happened that the television network Wal Fadjri wanted to air an 
interview with rebel leader Salif Sadio, and some parts of his speech sounded like the promotion 
of inadmissible ideas such as the partition of the national territory. We told the authorities of Wal 
Fadjri that the speech could not be aired by a television channel and they accepted to abide by 
our decision”. 
       This pedagogical approach which includes developing close ties with media professionals 
involves not only the Chairman but also the various members. Ibrahima Mbaye Sope, a member 
of the CNRA declared “sometimes when I see something condemnable on a television channel I 
call the program director or one member of top management and we discuss it. I ask them not to 
rebroadcast the item”.  
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      According to the Executive Secretary of the CNRA, Marie Ndiaye Ngom, the quarterly 
releases of the regulatory body which point out the media that infringe upon the laws are quite 
efficient since no radio or television station wants to appear as the black sheep of the media sector.  
     Nevertheless, some members like Sokhna Benga who also works as Director of Maritime 
Security and Marine Pollution Prevention at the National Agency for Maritime Affairs thought 
that there was a need to go beyond the pedagogical method and implement punitive measures. “I 
work in the maritime sector. In our struggle for maritime security and against marine pollution, 
we have at the same time the power of police and the power of sanction. Today if our law 
enforcement officers catch someone who infringes upon the regulation, it is clear that the following 
day, the wrongdoer will be in trouble. For this reason, people comply with the rules. With the 
CNRA, we often send formal notices but we do not have the possibility to refer to the public force 
or something else for an implementation of our decisions. The people who receive the formal 
notices will say “it is not a big deal”. Our power of sanction should be reinforced. For instance, 
the CNRA has not closed any television channel, whereas in some countries some television 
networks have been shut down”. According to Sokhna Benga, Senegalese society does not favor 
the implementation of drastic measures. Anytime the CNRA wants to punish a media operator, 
there would be a lot of people intervening for an amicable settlement of the dispute and 
cancellation of the measure.  
     In the opinion of Mouhamed Fadel Dia, another member of the CNRA, the law entitles the 
regulatory body to take deterrent actions but the problem lies in the fact that “a sanction of the 
CNRA is subject to a certain process which may or may not succeed. For this reason, it is 
hazardous to create a sanction which might not be respected. This would lead to a lack of 
credibility for the CNRA”. What Mouhamed Fadel Dia meant was that a decision such as the 
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suspension or withdrawal of a television frequency taken by the CNRA should be approved by the 
Minister of Communication.  
      The pedagogical approach implemented by the CNRA seems accurate on account of the fact 
that journalists do not consider its decisions binding. This situation stems from what the Secretary 
General of the National Union of Communication and Information Professionals (SYNPICS) 
called a lack of collaboration in the selection of the members of the CNRA. “As you know the 
Chairman is a journalist, one of the members (Jean Meissa Diop) also is a journalist, but I should 
mention that our profession has not sent them there. The Union used to send its representative in 
that institution. Currently we do not have any favorable or unfavorable prejudice regarding the 
job that the CNRA is doing. All I can say is that their decisions do not bind us” stated Ibrahima 
Khaliloulah Ndiaye.  
      Contrary to the journalists, media operators seem to be in favor of the pedagogical approach 
adopted by the regulatory body. Bougane Gueye Dany, CEO of the DMedia, remembered that 
“once we tried to organize a dance competition called ‘lembeul’ with the support of an advertiser. 
When the Chairman of the CNRA saw the trailer on air he called me and said ‘listen, I do not think 
that you should indulge in these kinds of things, you need to stop’. For this reason, we decided to 
change the concept. We had also a show called ‘Reug Reug’ which dealt with mystical practices. 
As you know in this 21st Century this kind of program may seem inappropriate. So he did the same 
thing. He called me directly on the phone and said ‘your television channel is among the last ones 
to come into existence but its ranks among the most watched television channels. You should not 
indulge in the promotion of mysticism. This does not fit’. So he talked to me and I was really 
conscious of that he said, and I believed that he was right. For this reason, I decided to cancel that 
program.”  
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     According to Media specialist Mame Less Camara, a pedagogical approach is not the real 
mission of a regulatory body. The CNRA is entitled to enforce the law. The problem is that its 
decisions should not only consist of mere condemnation of “obscene dances” or “abuse made by 
journalists in press reviews”.  
     If need be, the Chairman and his team happen to go beyond the formulation of pious wishes. 
The most memorable case was that of the show “Kawteff”. 
4.5.2 Kawteff, The story of a stillborn show  
    Kawteff was a program whose first episode aired on SenTV on February 21, 2015 from 9:30 
pm to 10:30 pm. As explained by Bougane Gueye Dany, the CEO of DMedia, the group which 
owns SenTV “We have tried to transpose the Jerry Springer show from the US, or to adapt a 
format like that in Senegal but the CNRA has made a big fuss about that. They went as far as to 
forbid us to air that show and ask us to change the content”.  
    The first episode featured a pregnant woman who revealed that a friend of her boyfriend was 
the father of her baby. The revelations were done in the presence of the two protagonists. She also 
confessed having found one day her boyfriend having sex with her sister. 
      The reactions to that first episode of this unprecedented show were unanimous. The Executive 
Secretary of the CNRA Marie Ndiaye Ngom remembered that “the program aired during the 
week-end and we were obliged to call for an emergency meeting. The show was shocking. There 
were obscene words. We had lots of complaints with hundreds of phone calls. I remember we wrote 
a letter and sent it to the top management of SenTV at 8 pm”. In its formal notice, the regulatory 
body described the show as “marked by obscene words, insults, scenes of violence all along the 
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introduction of the facts and the intervention of the public”. The CNRA considered that “the 
content did not correspond with the values that are the basis of our society.” 
     Marie Ndiaye Ngom added: “Since they were airing the trailer of the second episode, we told 
them not to air the second episode and if they did not comply with our decision they would receive 
a financial penalty”. 
      The reaction to the show was a real surprise for the managers of SenTV. Bougane Gueye Dany 
explained that the program was similar to the program called “Teuss” which airs on the radio 
station Zik FM. “What you have in the Jerry Springer show is what you have on Teuss with Ahmed 
Aidara, on the radio.  It is not shocking on the radio whereas on TV it shocks very quickly” 
     According to the CNRA that kind of program was in contradiction with the Senegalese values 
of “sutura” and “kersa” which can be translated as discretion and decency. For the CEO of 
DMedia, these values should not push the media and television in the main to overlook certain 
issues such as incest, pedophilia and rape that occur in Senegal as they happen in other societies. 
“For me, when a victim comes to us and says ‘my father raped me and was sentenced to jail’, these 
are real facts. What is important is the positive aspects of those revelations. We consider that we 
can talk about such cases, with the participation of some sociologists who can explain these 
phenomena and perhaps give a lesson of wisdom. Our objective was to make people understand 
and realize these things happen in our country. Showing it on a television program would 
contribute to raise awareness”. 
     Summoned to the headquarters of the CNRA for a hearing, the CEO of DMedia and his 
production staff made clear their opinion and explained that the participants of the show were not 
the real victims but just actors. Despite this aspect, the regulatory body decided to cancel the 
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program. According to the Chairman of the CNRA, the broadcasting of that show was a threat to 
public order because there were many people who decided to go and attack the television station 
if the program was put in the line-up again. He explained: “It was against all the positive values 
of our society. It was a poor copy of the Jerry Springer show which is not on the big US networks 
but on a cable channel and so it is not accessible to the general public. We told the managers of 
the station that they could not copy everything and try to do it. Every country has its realities and 
values.”  
       Bougane Gueye Dany, the CEO of DMedia agreed and decided to cancel the production of 
Kawteff. He stated: “for me it is a question of mentality. Sometimes, we do not want to go faster 
that the society. We accepted the decision with much philosophy and decided to change the 
concept. So we will come back with a concept which is more adapted to our realities and which 
will not cause too much noise”.  
4.5.3 Regulation versus self-regulation 
      Misconduct in the television sector stems from different causes. However, it appears that the 
attitude of defiance of journalists towards the actions and notices made by the CNRA does not 
contribute to an improvement in the situation. Moreover, there is some of sort of tacit solidarity 
that prevails among professionals. As the Chairman of the regulatory body explained “the 
journalists are complacent among themselves. There is some sort of extraordinary corporatism, 
which means that when a journalist does something stupid, the corporation does not react.” 
    These reasons, combined with a lack of means for the regulatory body explains that “the CNRA 
exists but people do not feel it” as stated media specialist Moustapha Samb. 
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     Facing increasing misconduct and the reluctance of journalists to receive any orders coming 
from people who are not working in the sector, the Union of Communication and Information 
Professionals (SYNPICS) decided to implement self-regulation through an organization first 
known as CRED (Council for a Respect of Ethics and Deontology) which later became CORED 
(the Council for the Observance of Ethics and Deontology Rules). As the Secretary General of 
SYNPICS explained “the CORED in its current format has come to birth because the Union has 
found that it was necessary to set it up. We were hesitating between the creation of an Order of 
the journalists or the CORED. Finally, we agreed to name it CORED, which was an idea of the 
Union of Journalists”. Despite the fact that the new organization was created by the journalists 
themselves, in order to struggle against press misdemeanors, the task was not easy for its leaders. 
Bacary Domingo Mane, current Chairman of the CORED declared “there was first the CRED but 
unfortunately it was not accepted by all. The reason was that the creation of the CRED was not 
the result of an inclusive process. In 2009 we corrected this lack and we finally created CORED. 
Unfortunately, at that time the leaders did not manage to make it achieve its goals. Finally, we 
have this CORED new look, which began its activities in 2014”.  
      In order to have agreement of the press sector regarding the necessity to set up a self-regulation 
mechanism, the Union of Journalists managed to involve professionals in the initiative. Bacary 
Domingo Mane stated “We held discussions with all components of the press sector, namely the 
media owners, the young journalists gathered in the organization called the Young Reporters 
Conventions, and the editors of the newspapers and magazines. So all the components of the press 
were involved and all of them gave their agreement in principle to be members of CORED so much 
so that the decisions of the CORED commit all members of the Senegalese press. This is why this 
process is supported by all journalists.”  
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       For the Secretary General of SYNPICS, the creation of CORED can also be considered as a 
sign of maturity by Senegalese professionals. By implementing a system of self-regulation, 
Senegalese journalists demonstrated their commitment to combat misconduct. “With this 
organization, professionals will be the first to denounce excesses. They will act in order to correct 
all failures and misconduct. It is a way to show to the authorities and the public that we are ready 
to correct the problems and to defend our profession.”  
      The peculiarity of CORED is that it includes the Tribunal of Peers which is composed of ten 
members responsible for judging and sentencing the authors of misconduct. According to the 
Chairman of CORED, the criteria that prevailed for the selection of the members was their probity 
and experience. “We chose people who have nothing to reproach themselves, who have an 
impeccable track record, who have never been involved in contentious cases. We mostly insisted 
on the experience. The average years of experience is around thirty. The youngest member has 
twenty years of experience.” 
      The Secretary General of SYNPICS justified the creation of the Tribunal of Peers in an attempt 
to reach a decriminalization of press crimes. “We believe that journalists should not be sent to jail. 
So it is important to show that self-regulation works, that people can be judged and sentenced by 
their peers. Judgment by peers is very important. A journalist may be condemned many times by 
the ordinary courts, he or she will say the judge has said the law but the judge does not understand 
what journalism is about. He or she would be more sensitive to a condemnation by peers who have 
the experience and credibility that entitle them to do so. We think that self-regulation brings a new 
dynamic which enables correction of some dysfunction, but it is also a way to show the public that 
journalists are not unpunishable.” 
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      Contrary to the CNRA, the Tribunal of Peers can make decisions regarding individuals. As the 
Chairman of CORED stated “CORED can go as far as to require the definitive or partial 
withdrawal of the press card of a journalist. When your press card is withdrawn, this means that 
you are no longer a journalist, this means that you lose your identity.” 
      In general, the members of the CNRA appreciate the implementation of this system of self-
regulation. As Chairman Babacar Toure pointed out “this co-regulation is for the good of the whole 
society.” The creation of CORED is all the more important as it includes in its scope of competence 
the print press and online media which are not regulated by the CNRA. However, the self-
regulation organization has not yet achieved expected outcomes.  
      As its Chairman put it “In reality, journalists seem not to care too much about the decisions 
made by the Tribunal of Peers. When we issue our remarks, they do not even talk about it in their 
programs”. Although an inclusive process was adopted and media owners and operators welcomed 
the inception of CORED, its deliberations are often sharply criticized and overlooked. Recently, 
when the Tribunal of Peers condemned the news coverage of the death of sixty-two Senegalese at 
the 2015 pilgrimage to Mecca by private television channel Sen TV, the journalist involved in the 
news coverage went as far as to file a lawsuit against CORED for accusing him of being 
“irresponsible”. 
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4.5.4 The challenges 
      The shift to digital technology in June 2015 brought along a lot of hope in the media sector. 
The technological change was seen as an opportunity for television operators to reap certain 
benefits. As the IT Advisor of the CNRA put it “with the new system, the television stations will 
not have to pay certain broadcasting fees, the maintenance of their transmitters, the electricity it 
requires, the personnel, and satellites for transmission. Today with digital technology, they just 
pay in order to have the right to broadcast. So they could use the profit to create content or 
buildings.”  
      Whatever the financial benefit may be, most television stations feel the necessity to react to 
new technology which enables them to cover the entire territory. At the Public Broadcasting 
System, Racine Talla, the General Manager confessed that his company was finalizing the 
implementation of digital studios and the development of niche channels to face the segmentation 
of the audience, as “the habits of listening and viewing of the public has changed. The audience 
has become segmented, so there will be a need to find these audiences, and adapt the offer to their 
preoccupations. This explains why, as a public service entity, we have launched regional channels, 
organized in the form of areas, in order to connect to the policy of territory coverage. At the urban 
level we have set up a channel called RTS2 which is mostly dedicated to the young public and 
women, and which does fewer classic newscasts, but which focuses on talk-shows, interactive 
programs, movies, and so on…All this will be accompanied with an upgrading of our staff because 
today the question is much about the production of content”. 
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     For the CEO of DMedia, digital technology brings along better image quality and sound, 
fostering a wider presence in the country for his television station SenTV. In addition to achieving 
the dream of launching a suburban television channel called Banlieue TV (BTV), Bougane Gueye 
Dany intended to launch television stations in the West-African sub-region with ITV in Cote 
d’Ivoire and MATV in Mali. He decided to follow the same strategy he implemented in Senegal.  
Accompanying the shift to digital, private television network TFM owned by the singer Youssou 
Ndour launched three new channels: ITFM dedicated to continuous news broadcasting, OLE TFM 
for culture and sports, and TFM Religion.  
     With technological change, the population located in remote areas has access to more than just 
the public television system. It is obvious that this new situation requires important investments in 
content production. Anticipating the needs of the audience, a particular emphasis is laid on the 
production of local telefilms and series. Media specialist Mame Less Camara mentioned: “We have 
all these theatre productions which are not yet telefilms, and each television channel has its serial. 
I think the fight for content is not just putting things on the line-ups, but the fight for content is in 
relation with the emergencies of the country such as the issues of security and health. The 
television stations must inquire into the populations’ lives and show the needs that arise”. 
      At the level of the CNRA, the advent of digital technology raises questions related to the 
convergence of television and the internet. It would very hard to draw a line between content that 
comes from the channels and the content that comes from the internet. As Souleymane Diallo, 
Head of Technical Facilities noted “with digital technology, with their decoder, viewers can 
connect to the internet. At the end, each channel would have an internet page for itself, which will 
enable them to do the archiving of their own videos. This situation will lead to the existence of 
videos on-demand. So will the CNRA record all these on-demand videos that come from internet, 
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or will the monitoring system only record the items that come directly from the television 
channels?”  
       Another challenge is linked with the limits of the monitoring system. It will be necessary to 
reinforce monitoring capacity in order to be able to monitor radio and television channels 
broadcasting in the rural areas. As CNRA member Jean Meissa Diop said “the technicians said 
that the CNRA will not be able to monitor the radios in the regions before 2020. So the monitoring 
service is efficient but it has some limitations, because we cannot monitor what is said on regional 
radio.” The situation is worth mentioning since the regulatory body does not have regional 
affiliates or antennas whereas, as Jean Meissa Diop observed “we have noticed that in some regions 
some television stations have started opening offices. That is the case of TV Saloum in Kaolack, a 
private TV channel which belongs to the businessman Serigne Mboup. There is also another TV 
called Bambilor TV which is broadcasting from Bambilor.” 
      Since the regulatory body is not present in the regions, it mainly relies on requests made by 
viewers and listeners in order to have an idea of misconduct and abuse.  The challenges for the 
CNRA would be to get well-experienced representatives and supervisors in the different regions 
for the monitoring of stations.  
     The possibility to monitor the channels in the regions is all the more important as some stations 
had even been operating in remote areas without being registered by the CNRA. Jean Meissa Diop 
recalled that the regulatory body received requests relating to a cable television station called 
Diaspora TV and another television station called LG24 and revealed that “all these two television 
channels were broadcasting from the region of Louga and the CNRA was not informed about their 
existence.” 
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     The creation of these fraudulent channels is linked to the existence of a particular situation in 
Senegal. The bouquet of cable television channels offered by the cable operators EXCAF TV, 
Canal Horizon and Delta TV is pirated by a great number of persons who offer illegal and cheap 
subscriptions to the population. Despite lawsuits filed against the dealers, the phenomenon has not 
stopped. The situation is all the more bizarre as the people who commit these acts of piracy have 
organized themselves in an organization called SORTEX (Society for the Redistribution of Cable 
Services) recognized by the authorities. An important aspect is that the cable redistributors even 
have the possibility to show their own content including pornographic videos on the networks that 
they have created. As Jean Meissa Diop mentioned: “Today you can organize a dance or a meeting 
and ask the cable distributors to put it on the air. They cover the activities of ordinary people and 
put it on the cable. Someone can organize a meeting that is not covered by the private television 
channels or national television, and have the cable distributors cover it. It is a big problem”  
     Since the CNRA is empowered to regulate content, the existence of cable redistributors raises 
an issue that must be solved.  
    It is also obvious that the growing number of television stations will require an increase in the 
human, financial and technical means of the CNRA in order to enable it to carry out its mission to 
the fullest.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
    The liberalization of the television sector in Senegal has been accompanied by a series of 
abnormalities that have produced abuse and misconduct by media practitioners. In addition to bad 
policy in the allocation of television frequencies, several other social and cultural factors have led 
to what the Chairman of the CNRA called a “big mess”. Facing this situation, the regulatory body 
undertook a pedagogical strategy based on discussions with the media.  
     Along with state regulation, self-regulation was also implemented by the Union of the 
Senegalese Information and Communication Professionals. As of 2016, the results of this co-
regulation have not yet met expectations.  
       The purpose of this study was to identify the difficulties and challenges facing the Senegalese 
regulatory system. From this perspective, the researcher carried out in-depth interviews with the 
members and the staff of the CNRA as well as media managers, media specialists and union 
leaders. The objective was to secure the opinions of a wide range of professionals working in the 
television sector.  
       In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the findings, point out the limitations of the field 
study and formulate recommendations that should be implemented in order to not only improve 
the efficiency of the regulatory body but also for the good of the society at large. He also suggests 
recommendations that could be applied for further studies. 
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5.2 Discussion  
    The study has led the researcher to a series of findings based on the research questions 
formulated at the beginning of the field work.  
    Research question one was: What is the legal framework of the television sector in Senegal?  
To have an answer to this research question, the researcher requested and obtained the laws and 
decrees that organize the broadcasting sector. The main finding for this research question is that 
the legal framework of the television industry is very weak. Only three major laws constitute 
references for the media:  
- Law 92-02 of January 6, 1992 on the Monopoly of the Public Broadcasting Service which 
was modified by the adoption of Law 2000-07 of January 10, 2000 on Pluralism, 
- Law 96-04 of February 22, 1996 relating to the media and the professions of journalist and 
technician for social communication,  
- Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006 creating the National Council for Broadcasting Regulation 
(CNRA). 
      The weakness of the legal framework may be interpreted as a consequence of the rapid growth 
of the media sector that has not been accompanied by adoption of new legislative texts. At a time 
when the country has shifted from analog to digital, and the internet is increasingly penetrating 
people’s daily lives, Senegal has not taken measures for effective organization of the media sector. 
This may be explained by political changes that occurred in 2012, which has not given the new 
leaders enough leeway to understand the decisions that need to be made regarding the sector. It 
could also have been a result of the complexity and diversity of interests that interact in the media 
industry. Administrative slowness can also be considered as a main factor. Any proposed law has 
to pass through a series of commissions and workshops. It is also important to mention that certain 
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laws do not always get the agreement of all components of the establishment. That is the case in 
the new press code which had been drafted since October 2010, but which the lawmakers have 
decided not to adopt because of one its provisions which advocates for a decriminalization of press 
misconduct. 
    The persons interviewed agreed on the weakness of the legal framework because they share the 
idea that any industry needs rules and regulation for good governance. Without appropriate laws, 
the risk is high to see the press in general and broadcast media in particular fail in its mission of 
information, education and entertainment. 
       Research question two was: What does the CNRA bring to the media sector? The objective 
with this question was to understand the organization of the CNRA, its scope of competence and 
the role it plays in the media sector. The intent was also to have an idea of the actions and decisions 
made by the regulatory body and the appreciation of the media regarding the role and mission of 
the CNRA. 
    To answer this question, the researcher referred to two major sources: print sources and in-depth 
interviews. The print sources provided information relating to the organization of the regulatory 
body and its mission. The researcher had the opportunity to access the legislative text creating the 
first regulatory institution and the legislative modifications that had been made afterwards. The 
oral sources shared with the researcher valuable knowledge that helped shed light on the 
functioning of the CNRA and its strategy of action. 
     The liberalization of the media sector appeared as the main factor that ushered in the creation 
of a regulatory body in Senegal. The development of private radio and television stations led to 
changes in the texts that organize the HCRT which became afterwards HCA and finally CNRA. 
The implementation of the Terms of Reference and the legal texts relating to the media sector is 
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the core mission of the CNRA. In addition to the weakness of the legal framework, the researcher 
found that most television channels do not comply with the Terms of Reference set up for media 
operators. This may be considered a result of the system of frequency allocation, which is often 
done on a political basis. The connection with ruling authorities can be seen as a sort of shield that 
pushes to a lack of compliance with the Terms of Reference by media owners.  
     Moreover, the mission of the CNRA includes that it should see to it that the Terms of Reference 
are implemented. However, it is regrettable that the regulatory body did not participate in the 
drafting of those Terms of Reference.  As media specialist Moustapha Samb put it “the CNRA 
exists but people do not feel its existence”. This situation can be interpreted as the consequence of 
a certain defiance that some segments of the population, including journalists have toward the 
CNRA. The regulatory body appears to really function during election periods, when it has to 
organize airtime for presidential, legislative and local election candidates. 
    The constant desire of the ruling authorities to have a stronghold on the media explains why the 
mission of the CNRA is quite limited. Unlike other African countries such as Benin or developed 
states such as France, the Senegalese regulatory body does not participate in the process of radio 
and television frequency allocation, nor does it take part in the nomination of the managers of 
public media.   
      The mission of the CNRA is the supervision of broadcast media. It does not involve print or 
online media. The regulatory body is tasked with monitoring newspapers and websites only during 
election periods. The lack of consideration for print media may be explained by the fact that print 
media has always been reluctant to accept any control and did not represent a concern for the 
authorities since it does not reach a big number of the population, which is largely illiterate. As for 
the lack of consideration for the internet by the CNRA, it can be explained by the fact that, at the 
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time the law creating the CNRA was adopted, online media were not well developed and the 
country had not entered the era of convergence.  
     Another finding is that the mission of the CNRA does not include sanctions against journalists 
or technicians who infringe upon the rules. Only media outlets receive penalties that range from 
the suspension of programs to the payment of fines. This situation may be explained by the fact 
the media companies are considered as the entities that are responsible for any misconduct 
produced for the channels.   
        The researcher has also discovered that many Senegalese people do not understand the 
mission of the CNRA. The executives of the regulatory body explained that they often receive 
complaints about shows aired on cable networks, which are not under the purview of the CNRA. 
The population cannot always ascertain the difference between broadcast networks and cable 
channels. When a cable channel shows a pornographic movie, the CNRA is always blamed for 
being negligent.  
      With the frequency of misconduct in the broadcast sector, the CNRA has adopted a strategy 
that the Chairman and the members called “a pedagogical approach”.  This option can be 
explained by the fact that the Chairman was a journalist and media owner before his nomination. 
This is contrary to his predecessors who were judges and who might opt for an application of the 
law with its full rigor; the Chairman advocates for discussions and dialogue with the media. As a 
consequence, during his tenure, the CNRA has not shut down any radio or television station. 
However, the episode of the program “Kawteff” which was cancelled thanks to a decision of the 
CNRA shows that the regulatory body can be uncompromising in case of necessity. 
    In the exercise of its mission, the CNRA may be in a situation of conflict of competence with 
the Agency for Telecommunications and Posts Regulation (ARTP).  That was the case in March 
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21, 2016 on the day of the referendum for a new Constitution. The ARTP decided to shut down the 
private television channel Wal Fadjri for “propaganda on an election day”. The researcher 
considers that the CNRA that is empowered for television content control should have its say 
before this decision was taken by the ARTP. 
    If most of the members and staff of the CNRA advocate for a reinforcement of the mission and 
powers of the regulatory body, others such as media specialist Mame Less Camara consider that 
the CNRA already has enough power. The main issue is that it should show courage and not limit 
its mission to mere condemnation of “obscene dances”. 
Research question three was: What are the guarantees of independence for the CNRA?  
    To answer this research question, the researcher delved into Law 2006-04 of January 4, 2006 
creating the CNRA, in order to have an idea of the legal provisions. He also included questions 
related to this aspect in the in-depth interviews. The objective with this research question was to 
describe the system of nomination of members of the CNRA, the nature of their mandate, financial 
treatment and other advantages they receive. In interviews with members and staff of the CNRA, 
the researcher focused on the relationships that the regulatory body has with ruling authorities. 
    An important finding with this research question was that the CNRA doesn’t depend upon any 
ministry or service. It is an independent organization that has autonomy of management. Although 
its financial allocation is included in the budget of the Head of State’s Office, the CNRA does not 
receive any order or command from the ruling authorities. This lack of institutional tutelage can 
be seen as a desire for the executive power to show an equidistance of the CNRA vis-à-vis the 
different powers that form the government. 
        It appears also that the members benefit from a protected mandate that means that they cannot 
be dismissed. Such a provision gives the members independence to make decisions without fearing 
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any revocation. This independence for actions is also guaranteed by the fact that the mandate that 
is quite long (six years) is not renewable. The members who do not need to plan for another 
mandate would act according to their conscience and convictions.  In addition to the protection of 
the mandate, the members of the CNRA are protected against prosecution or arrest for their actions 
or opinions as members of the CNRA. To free the members from any pressure or interest groups, 
they are not allowed to hold an elective mandate or a share in broadcasting companies. In the 
interviews, the members seemed not to complain about the financial compensation they receive, 
which means that the allowances are sufficiently high.  
      Even if the members claim independence, for the media specialists interviewed by the 
researcher, the CNRA does not demonstrate its independence and looks like an institution that 
depends on political power. This consideration should be seen a result of the system of nomination 
of the members which does not include formal consultation with professional entities and civil 
society organizations. Even though, the members have credibility and notoriety, their selection by 
the Chairman and his advisors appears as a cause of certain defiance towards their actions and 
decisions.  
       For research question four, the researcher wanted to know about the categories and causes of 
abuse and misconduct in the broadcasting sector. 
      After a study of the quarterly notices and final reports of the CNRA and different interviews 
with the members and staff of the regulatory body, television managers, media specialists and 
union leaders, it appears that the categories of misconduct are varied. They range from the 
broadcasting of information that can affect the institutions of the Republic, national unity and 
social peace to the lack of balance in news programming and televised debates, and include the 
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lack of protection of youth, the broadcasting of obscene dances and statements, as well as disguised 
advertising, and many more. 
       A variety of social, political, cultural, structural and economic factors are cited as the causes 
for abuse and misconduct. The multiplicity of misdemeanors can be explained by the development 
of the media sector. As of October 2015, the number of television channels was estimated at 
seventeen, and hundreds of radio stations were operating at the local or national levels. All new 
media outlets that are created do not often hire qualified personnel. The competition among rival 
television or radio stations can also be considered as one of the factors that explain the 
multiplication of misconduct in the media sector.    
     The wide range of persons interviewed has enabled the researcher to obtain a diversity of 
explanations relating to the categories and causes of misconduct. The participants in the interviews 
(members and staff of the CNRA, journalists, media managers, union leaders, media instructors 
and specialists) have answered the research question based on their careers and experience. Most 
of them are still active in the media and have a strong background. The answers provided can be 
considered objective since all of the participants seemed conscious about the multiplicity and 
gravity of misconduct. Even the media managers acknowledged the necessity to fight the abuse 
that contributes to the promotion of a negative image of the media sector. 
       Research question five was related to the resources available to the CNRA in order to monitor 
television channels. In his desire for an accurate analysis of the resources, the researcher included 
in the interviews questions about the human, financial and technical means available for the 
mission of regulation. The main source for this research question was in-depth interviews with the 
staff and members of the CNRA. The general opinion is that the regulatory body does not have 
sufficient means to accomplish its mission and face the challenges that lie ahead.  
135 
 
 
     As to human resources, the amount of work that the staff has to do, especially at the monitoring 
service, explains why the number of working agents seems too low compared with the quantity of 
radio and television stations they have to supervise. The fact that most CNRA units or services are 
run by one person justifies the call for an increase in human resources on the part of the members 
and staff.  
      As to financial resources, the CNRA has difficulty hiring more people on account of a low 
budget. This can explain why the executives suggest an increase in financial allowances. A budget 
comparison with similar African institutions such as the Moroccan High Authority of Audiovisual 
Communication and the High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication in Benin has 
convinced the members of the CNRA about the need to provide the Senegalese regulatory body 
with more financial means.  
    As far as technical resources are concerned, complaints received by the members of the CNRA 
about certain stations broadcasting in the regions without any control or regulation can be 
considered a factor that pushes the members to ask for appropriate technical means that enable a 
monitoring of media outlets operating beyond the capital city.  
     With research question six, the goal of the researcher was to study the challenges linked to the 
shift to digital technology. The effectiveness of the transition from analog to digital since June 
2015 required an analysis of the measures that need to be taken in order to help the regulatory body 
face the different challenges. The staff and members of the CNRA agree that the challenges are 
related to the creation of new channels by television operators. Since the CNRA is not involved in 
the process of television frequency allocation, it is up to the regulatory body to manage and get the 
information relating to the creation and operation of new television stations.  
136 
 
 
     Since television operators do not have to pay license fees, they are supposedly able to invest in 
content creation. This situation would imply more responsibilities for the institution tasked with 
television content regulation.  As a consequence, the staff and members believe that the CNRA 
will need more human, financial and technical means in order to face the challenges related to the 
shift to digital. 
     The context marked by digital technology and convergence on the internet would require that 
the CNRA have more powers and the ability to impose drastic sanctions in order to prevent 
misdemeanors. 
5.3 Recommendations 
  To face the different challenges of the media in general and the television sector in particular, the 
researcher suggests the implementation of a series of recommendations. 
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5.3.1: Recommendations for the regulatory body 
    At a time when the country has achieved the shift to digital technology, the structure and 
functioning of the CNRA require a significant change in order to enable the regulatory body to 
adapt to the situation.  
5.3.1.1: An Integration of the CNRA and the Agency for Telecommunications and Posts 
Regulation 
 
        In Senegal the existence of two different entities whose scopes of competence overlap has 
created a sort of “deregulation” in the media sector. The allocation of radio and television 
frequencies is the responsibility of the Agency for Telecommunications and Posts Regulation 
whereas the CNRA is tasked with content regulation and is entitled to implement sanctions in case 
of violation of the media laws. The researcher advocates for an integration of the two entities. In 
fact, in most developed states and even in developing countries, the same agency that is in charge 
of frequency allocation is at the same time responsible for content regulation. That is the case in 
the US with the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) and in African countries such as 
Benin. In a country where financial resources are scarce, this kind of integration would allow a 
rational use of limited means. Moreover, recent political history of Senegal marked by the 
referendum of March 20, 2016 related to reforms in the country’s constitution illustrated the 
necessity to combine the two regulatory bodies. In fact, the Agency for Telecommunications and 
Posts Regulation made the decision to cut the signal of television channel Wal Fadjri for airing 
footage in favor of a vote against the referendum on ballot day, at a moment when the electoral 
campaign was over. Since the regulation of content is the responsibility of the CNRA, the 
researcher found that the decision to shut down the signal should not have been made by the ARTP 
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but rather by the CNRA.  An integration of the two entities would enable the avoidance of such 
role confusion.  
      In case the State chooses to maintain the status quo with two different entities, it is important 
that the CNRA be involved in frequency allocation. The Ministry of Communication can continue 
to provide the authorization after the technical approval of the Agency for Telecommunications 
and Posts Regulation. However, the CNRA should take part in a review of the files and secure 
information about the candidates, their projects and programs, and express its view regarding the 
applications.  
5.3.1.2: An inscription of the CNRA in the Constitution 
     The history of the regulatory body in Senegal shows that the CNRA has undergone a deep 
change since its creation. From an institution created by a decree of the Head of State, it has moved 
to an organization set up by a law voted on by the National Assembly. Despite this major 
improvement that ensures some sort of stability, the researcher suggests that like the other 
institutions in the country, the CNRA should be inscribed in the Senegalese constitution. Such a 
change in status would provide the regulatory body with more respect and strengthen its stability. 
By setting its organization in fundamental law, the authorities would preserve the CNRA from the 
influence of political leaders.  
      The researcher considers that the current context of the country marked by thriving media 
outlets and the multiplicity of abuse requires a change in the status, which would reinforce the 
powers and mission of the regulatory body. In this respect, Senegal should do not less than the 
other West African countries such as Benin, Ghana, Gabon, Togo, Guinea, Niger and Mali, which 
have inscribed the existence of their regulatory bodies in their constitutions (Adjovi, 2003).  
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    Adjovi declared that when a regulatory body is created by the constitution, political leaders do 
not have the ability to change it at any time according to their interests of the moment.   
     Constitutional status would also increase the authority of the regulatory body as Pr. Thiam and 
Sy mentioned: “what is sought through the option for a formally superior and preferably, 
constitutional legal status is not only a high degree of stability of the institution, but also a certain 
standing linked to its rank as an institution of the Republic or as constitutional power”. (Thiam 
and Sy cited by Adjovi, p. 32) 
      By including the regulatory body in the constitution, the authorities would consider the press 
as the fourth power in addition to the executive, legislative and judiciary powers. In addition to a 
gain in credibility, such a change in the legal status for the Senegalese CNRA could imply the 
allocation of more financial, technical and human resources.  
5.3.1.3: An increase of the powers of the CNRA  
       The CNRA’s scope of competence includes only radio and television stations. It goes without 
saying that the era of convergence with the development of the internet requires an adaption of the 
regulatory body to the digital shift. The creation of online television and fast growing streaming 
services make it compulsory to involve this sector in the scope of competence of the CNRA. It is 
true that content regulation will be hard to achieve but a close collaboration with website owners 
and online television operators could contribute to the avoidance of cyber bullying and abuse.  In 
this respect, it is important that the laws on the media set the guidelines for online outlets, the 
responsibilities for online operators and the boundaries that should not be crossed.  
     An increase in the powers of the CNRA also means an involvement of the regulatory body in 
the selection of managers for public service media. Even though the Head of State is entitled to 
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appoint to all civil and military services, it would be helpful if the CNRA had its say in the 
nomination process of the managers of the Public Service of Broadcasting (RTS), the national 
daily newspaper “Le Soleil” and the Senegalese Press Agency (APS). The idea is not that the 
CNRA should select the nominees but that the regulatory body could be entitled to suggest a list 
of persons from which the President of the Republic would choose. This system suggested by most 
of the interviewees is one of the key points of the draft of the new press code (Article 213 of the 
new press code). The researcher finds that this method which helps avoid the selection of 
candidates based on political reasons would make public media managers more accountable vis-
à-vis the CNRA. As an example, involvement of the regulatory body in the selection of the General 
Manager of the public broadcasting service RTS would make the incumbent care about the remarks 
and notices released by the CNRA. If the manager is nominated on a political basis by the Head 
of State, it is clear that what he or she would mostly care about the satisfaction of the President of 
the Republic. On the contrary, if the manager had been selected from a list of persons proposed by 
the regulatory body, it is more likely that the decisions he or she would make would reflect more 
fairness, balance and competence. 
5.3.1.4: An increase in the means of sanction of the CNRA 
     An institution of regulation cannot exist without the power of sanction. Although the 
Senegalese regulatory body has such power, the general feeling is that there is some sort of laxity 
that seems to tolerate misconduct. The reliance on the so-called pedagogical approach would in 
the long run amplify the “big mess” that characterizes the radio and television sector. The media 
landscape should not continue to function as a lawless zone, in which each protagonist operates 
according to its wills and interests without fearing any sanction that may derive from an 
infringement of regulation. The CNRA needs to prove its utility by undertaking and implementing 
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the sanctions that the law has stipulated, if the necessity arises. It is true that the pedagogical 
method that consists of sensitizing journalists and media owners can yield results; however it 
should be combined with the implementation of penalties prescribed in the legislation. 
      In this respect, it is regrettable that the CNRA is only entitled to apply sanctions against the 
media channels as entities. There is no specific sanction that it can apply against a person, journalist 
or producer. The researcher thinks that individuals who commit misconduct should receive a 
similar sanction as the media outlets are subject to penalties. Fairness consists of defining the 
different categories of misconduct and prescribing sanctions that would be implemented not only 
for the networks but also for the persons who favored the infringement of the rules. 
5.3.1.5: An increase of the technical means of the CNRA 
      It appears in the different interviews that the institution in charge of television content 
regulation requires specific means in order to carry out its mission.  The monitoring system of the 
CNRA needs to be updated in order to be able to oversee all potential channels and networks that 
are likely to operate in the country. The regulatory body should ensure supervision of the activities 
of television networks in the capital-city but it should also enlarge its presence to the different 
regions.  
     Such a project requires not only more technical means but it also implies the hiring of skilled 
and qualified monitoring agents.  It is necessary that the people employed for the monitoring of 
television channels have an adequate education level. The complexity of the task makes it 
necessary for the regulatory body to hire university graduates who understand the role and mission 
of the CNRA. The method of recruitment should be transparent and announced in the main 
channels of communication in order to reach the largest number of people.  
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     Among the criteria for applicants, the CNRA must take into consideration fluency in the native 
languages. The development of television networks would surely lead to the creation of niche 
channels, some of which might be airing in national languages as in the case of the Radio 
Television Fulbe that had started broadcasting in Pular in the early part of 2016.  
     With the growth of television and the complexity of the issues related to the era of convergence, 
the regulatory body will need to rely on more directions, services, and departments with a 
specialization of each in a particular sector. This would entail the recruitment of more executives 
who set strategies and coordinate the actions in different departments or directions. 
      It is also important that the financial means of the CNRA be augmented. The budget of the 
institution seems too low as compared to the immensity of the tasks of the regulatory body. Most 
of the interviewees bemoan the scarcity of financial resources that do not even allow the 
recruitment of skilled staff or more executives.  It is clear that apart from the amount of money 
allocated by the State, it is crucial to find additional revenue streams that would allow the 
regulatory body to adjust to the situation. It should be mentioned also that the CNRA should be 
considered like the other institutions such the Environmental, Social and Economic Council whose 
budgets are discussed, assessed and voted by National Assembly rather than depend on a financial 
allocation which is transferred by another institution. By enabling the CNRA to have its own voted 
budget, the authorities would obviously contribute to facilitate the execution of expenditures linked 
to its functioning. 
5.3.1.6: An increase in the independence of the members 
     The general perception that the Senegalese public has of the CNRA is that they are “henchmen 
of the ruling party”. The recent history of the country seemed to confirm that consideration. In the 
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preparation of the referendum of March 20, 2015, when the Senegalese were requested to vote 
“yes” or “no” to constitutional reforms suggested by the Head of State, some television channels 
including public television which sided with the ruling majority spent almost all their airtime 
advocating for a “yes” vote and ignored the activities of the political parties and the civil society 
organization that called for a “no” vote. This situation pushed the CNRA to issue a notice against 
that practice and none of the concerned networks cared about the remark. Even private channel 
TFM was criticized for bias that the CNRA had not condemned during the referendum3. This 
situation put the CNRA in the spotlight and many people questioned its utility in the Senegalese 
democracy; others linked its passivity to the lack of independence of the members. Although 
important guarantees of independence have been provided to the members of the regulatory body, 
the researcher advocates for a change in the process for selection of members in order to provide 
them with more freedom of action. The current tenure of the CNRA is marked by the fact the 
members are appointed after a proposal made by the Chairman. This stems from a deficiency in 
the law relating to the CNRA which does not clarify the way in which the members should be 
selected. It is important that the organizations which the members represent on the CNRA be 
consulted before the selection. In any case, credibility, notoriety and professional qualification 
should remain the criteria for the designation of the members. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Nevertheless, in June 2016, the CNRA produced a document entitled “Analysis of the Media Coverage of the 
Referendum of March 20th, 2016” describing how radio, televisions networks as well as print and online media deal 
with the event.   
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5.3.1.7: A change in the renewal process for CNRA members  
    Another aspect that needs to be highlighted is related to the appointment of CNRA members. 
The law creating the institution indicates that the mandate of the members expires at the same time 
after a six-year term. Such a situation leads to some difficulties in the functioning of the CNRA. 
In fact, when all members are new in the institution, they will necessarily need time to understand 
the organization and the structure of the sector. As is the case in some countries, the authorities 
would be wise to renew a part of the body (for example one-third of the members every two or 
three years). This option would enable a continuity and fluidity in the activities since the new 
members would be mentored by the remaining two-third in order to adjust to the realities of the 
institution. 
5.3.1.8: Making CNRA members full-time employees 
       If since its inception the lack of financial means could justify the fact that members of the 
CNRA do not work on a daily basis and only receive allowances, change in the sector makes it 
necessary to revise that option. Regulation should be considered as a profession done by people 
who commit themselves to the job. In most countries, the members of the regulatory bodies are 
permanent workers who are hired specifically for that purpose. Even though, it may be risky to 
abandon one’s previous profession and be dedicated to the activities of regulation, as the mission 
requires commitment. By providing members who work permanently with adequate working 
conditions, the function would be more valued. The arrival of new channels, their coverage of the 
whole territory and the convergence of television and the internet would imply more 
responsibilities and more challenges for regulators.  In this looming context, it would be hazardous 
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for the members of the CNRA to continue with the current system which consists in meeting just 
every other Thursday. Regulation cannot continue to be a part-time job for the members of the 
CNRA. 
5.3.1.9: A change in the nomination of the Chairman  
     Even though problems can arise when the members elect the Chairman of a regulatory body, 
this option seems more democratic and more transparent than the system which consists of having 
the Head of State nominate the person who should chair the institution. As media specialist 
Moustapha Samb stated in the interview, when the nomination of the Chairman stems from the 
own will of the Head of State, there is a great risk that the actions and decisions that the Chairman 
would take tend to satisfy the executive power. The selection of the Chairman could be done by 
the members who have been appointed on a transparent basis. In addition to the criteria of 
credibility and notoriety, leadership should be put forward as a quality that justifies the election of 
the Chairman. This option ensures that if the Chairman is not up to the job, the members can 
replace him or her, which is much better than having a Chairman nominated by the Head of State 
and who cannot be removed from office whatever the situation may be.  
5.3.1.10: The promotion of co-regulation 
   Ethical behavior can be promoted by the CNRA not only by sending reminders to different media 
organizations but also through a collaboration with professional entities. With the Union of 
Professional Journalists (SYNPICS), the Council for the Observance of Ethical Rules (CORED) 
and the Council of Media Publishers and Owners (CDEPS), the regulatory body can maintain a 
system of co-regulation and raise awareness of the media on the importance of co-regulation. A 
smooth evolution of the sector requires a commitment to all components of the media sector.  
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For media operators and journalists, the pedagogical approach should stress the necessity for 
respect of the Terms of Reference and the implementation of structural change such as the creation 
of screening committees in order to diminish the amount of verbal misconduct. 
5.3.1.11: More sensitization of the public and media people  
     The low level of education of the Senegalese population requires the regulatory body to 
undertake actions for the education of the audience about the media. Through workshops and 
seminars, the CNRA could also contribute to helping the public understand its role and scope of 
competence and encourage parental responsibility. The use of spots and ads could help raise 
people’s awareness.  
5.3.2: Recommendations for the media sector 
The rapid growth of the media sector marked by the shift to digital and the development of the 
internet makes it compulsory for Senegalese authorities to adopt and implement strategic decisions 
for the good of the society.  
5.3.2.1 A new law on broadcast media   
     The current laws that regulate the television sector in Senegal seem obsolete. As stated 
previously, the Law on the Public Service of Broadcasting, the Law on the Profession of Journalist 
and Social Communication Technician and the Law creating the CNRA remain the major 
legislative texts that govern the sector. The development in the sector requires the adoption of a 
new law which takes into consideration the shift to digital, the convergence of television and the 
internet as well as the next step, which is the inception of “TV Everywhere”. Ongoing changes will 
lead to a new context where images, sound and data will be accessible not only on the traditional 
television set but also on computers, mobile phones and other devices. So it is crucial that the laws 
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that organize the production and dissemination of audiovisual content be revised in order to meet 
the challenges that lie ahead.  The new law should also set clear definitions of the professions that 
compose the sector and the criteria for exercising certain jobs such as that of journalist. 
5.3.2.2: Regulation for advertising and tele-shopping 
     Broadcasting laws should regulate the total amount of advertising in a given program or 
daypart. The percentage of time dedicated to advertising must be clearly set. For each category of 
program, there is a necessity to define the duration of the advertising before, after and within a 
show. This new regulation would bring clarity for the audience instead of having programs that 
are cut every now and then for advertising or programs on which the ads are shown simultaneously 
on the screen. Even though advertising revenue sustains the television channels, it should not be 
aggressive. Currently, public and private television stations are competing in order to obtain the 
largest shares of the advertising market. However, ideally, the government should provide the 
public broadcasting network with sufficient funds and require it to exit the advertising market for 
private television channels. This situation would provide more opportunities for private stations to 
increase their advertising revenues.  The public broadcasting network could adopt the system of 
sponsoring and underwriting as is the case with the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) in the US. 
     In the same vein, there is a necessity to legislate tele-shopping, which has not been taken into 
consideration in the Terms of Reference. With the development of the television sector and the 
scarcity of financial support, tele-shopping has appeared as a way for television channels to 
generate sorely needed revenue. Therefore, it is important to organize this activity. The airtime for 
such programs should be defined and the legislators should see to it that the tele-shopping shows 
do not impinge on the mission of information, education and entertainment of the television 
networks. 
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5.3.2.3: A transparency in the allocation of frequencies  
      The system of television frequency allocation needs to be more transparent and based on the 
necessity of the moment. Frequencies are public domain, and for this reason their allocation should 
serve the public interest. Broadcast media, be it a radio or a television station should not only be 
created to serve a person’s political ambition. When the need arises for frequency allocation, the 
rule should be that the authorities send out calls for applications. The already allocated frequencies 
which are not used for any reason should be frozen as suggested by the CNRA. A frequency should 
not be allocated if the applicant has no active project nor the appropriate means to turn its ambition 
into reality. 
5.3.2.4: An update and respect for the Terms of Reference 
       The document called “Terms of Reference Applicable to Private Television Operators” dates 
back to the early 2000s when the government decided to liberalize the sector. It is obvious that it 
is time to think about a new text that formalizes the obligations and duties of television operators. 
The new Terms of Reference should take into consideration the evolution of the sector and seek 
better protection of the nation’s identity, its stability and the peaceful co-existence of its 
communities. A particular accent should be placed on the development of local production in order 
to better reflect the realities of the country. Educational programs which appear sidelined on 
broadcast media line-ups need a special focus in the new Terms of Reference in order to help radio 
and television channels fulfill their real role in a developing nation. The CNRA, which is entitled 
to implement the application of the Terms of Reference, should be involved in the process for the 
adoption of a new text.  
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     In addition, it is clear that the regulatory body should see to it that the rules of the Terms of 
Reference are implemented. However good and accurate, the Terms of Reference may be, if media 
owners, journalists and producers do not comply with it, the same problems would arise. So it is 
necessary that the regulatory body be conscious of its mission to act as a law enforcement 
authority, if need be.  
5.3.2.5: A solution against the fraudulent cable distributors  
     The situation of cable distributors requires drastic measures. These operators should not 
continue to exist in defiance of the law and regulation. It is urgent for the Senegalese justice system 
to put an end to the activities of individuals who hack cable systems and offer fraudulent 
subscriptions to the population. The lobbies that gravitate around their organization, namely 
SORTEX should not prevent justice from applying deterrent sanctions when a person is caught in 
this kind of operation. The situation requires an appropriate solution since cable distributors, who 
have no license, are also broadcasters of any kind of local or foreign content. 
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5.4 Limitations  
    Like any human work, this field study carries certain limitations that need to be pointed out. It 
should be stressed that the results would have been more comprehensive if the researcher had 
enough time to carry out more interviews and to involve many other media people in the research. 
In fact, the researcher had spent less than one month in Senegal for the purpose of the study. If he 
had more time, he could have interviewed more private television operators and the results might 
better reflect reality. Although the media operators interviewed, namely the General Manager of 
the Public Service of Broadcasting and the CEO of DMedia are at the head of prominent media 
organizations, it would be interesting to have the opinion of the manager of the private television 
channel TFM (Tele Futurs Medias) which is the most watched station according to surveys, or the 
answers of the owner of the first private television channel 2S TV. 
      Because of the lack of time, the researcher had not thought about interviewing journalists and 
technicians working at television channels and who are the main authors of misconduct that plague 
the television sector. The possibility to do such interviews would have enabled the researcher to 
have more knowledge about the factors that cause misconduct and obtain the points of view of 
journalists and technicians about the organization of the media industry, the problems they face 
and the functioning of the regulatory body. During his one-month stay in Senegal, the researcher 
was obliged to schedule two to three interviews in one day, depending on the availability of 
interviewees. The interview with the Chairman was done on the eve of the departure of the 
researcher for his trip back to the USA. Because of the lack of time, the researcher was unable to 
contact other resource-persons such as Ibrahima Bakhoum, a prominent Senegalese journalist who 
worked with the Chairman in the selection of the members of the CNRA. Neither was it possible 
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for the researcher to contact Moctar Kebe, a journalist who was the communication minister when 
the first regulatory body was created.  
     Because of the lack of sufficient time, the researcher has not included the general public in the 
interviews. This option would have helped him to know if the public understands the role of the 
regulatory body and to analyze their expectations and fears with the shift to digital. 
     The interviews were carried out four months after the transition to digital became effective in 
June, 2015. At that time, the changes were still in their early stages. It is clear that if the study were 
done one or two years after the shift to digital, the researcher would have been able to give more 
accurate results about the challenges linked to the transition. 
      Some interviewees, in particular the monitoring agents were interviewed without any 
preparation. The reason is that, before visiting the CNRA, the researcher was not aware of their 
existence. If he had known earlier about their work, he would have contacted them for a preparation 
of the interviews. So instead of just two monitoring agents out of six, he would have interviewed 
a larger number.   
      Another limitation of the study is related to the information relating to the execution of the 
budget. The Executive Secretary reported that it was confidential and did not provide it. It is clear 
that such information would have given to the researcher an idea of the operating expenditures 
(salaries, material purchase or electricity) that consume the largest part of the budget. 
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5.5 Recommendations for future research 
   The objective of the researcher was to describe the system of television content control in 
Senegal from the perspective of regulators, media specialists and owners. It focused mainly on the 
means and powers of operation of the Senegalese CNRA. For future research, the study could 
expand in a sense that could take into consideration the opinion of journalists and communication 
professionals regarding the regulatory body. Because of the development of radio and television 
stations in the country, the sample could be enlarged in order to involve a high number of media 
workers. 
   Another option for future research could consist of analyzing the perception of television viewers 
regarding Senegalese public and private television channels, and the mission of the CNRA. This 
perspective would enable future researchers to have an idea about the understanding that the 
general public have regarding the media and the role of the regulatory body.  
  A key aspect of the mission of the CNRA is to ensure free access to media, especially for political 
leaders. The finding of this research relating to the difficulty of opposition parties to have media 
coverage by the Public Broadcasting Service could be expanded through a study of the influence 
of the ruling party on news and programs of the Public Broadcasting Service (RTS). The 
interactions between public television and opposition parties can also be considered as another 
field of study.  
   The study has also revealed that the system of television frequency allocation was mainly based 
on political criteria. It would be interesting for future research to inquire as to the relationship 
between media operators and ruling parties to determine if the connections have an influence in 
the broadcasting of news and programs.  
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   It has appeared throughout the research that advertising is a major issue for the Senegalese 
television industry. In the future, it would be interesting for a researcher to inquire into the 
organization of the advertising market, the companies that lead the sector, the interaction of 
advertisers and media owners. With the lack of audience measurement entities and methods, future 
research could also focus on the tools that influence advertising decisions and strategies. 
   Since the shift to digital in June 2015, the broadcast sector is expected to undergo significant 
changes in the coming years. Future research could study the impact of digital technology on 
television control in Senegal. 
5.6 Conclusion   
    Senegal has a long history of controlling the media. The first broadcast outlets were created by 
the French settlers and served as tools to reinforce their dominance over the colony. Long after the 
independence of the country, the media remained under the control of the executive power even 
though freedom of the press is a major principle of the constitution. Internal and external forces 
have led to liberalization of the radio and television sector for private operators. Despite access of 
private business people to the airwaves, the relationships between the executive power and media 
operators have contributed to what the journalist and writer Issa Thioro Gueye called “Media 
Under Control” (Gueye, 2006). The search to preserve certain economic, social or religious 
interests explained the existence of some thresholds that media operators do not cross in their 
reports and programs. 
     The development of radio and television networks justified the creation of the National Council 
for Broadcast Regulation. The inception of the institution was first made by a presidential decree. 
Later, a law stipulated the organization and functioning of the regulatory body. Despite this 
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democratic advance, the study suggests an inscription of the CNRA in the Senegalese constitution 
for empowerment of the institution and recognition of the role it has to play for social progress. 
The development of the media sector should also be accompanied by an increase in resources and 
powers of the CNRA for better performance. Transparency and equity in the selection of the 
members of the regulatory body would enhance its credibility and independence. 
     The study also advocates for an update to the legal framework that organizes the media sector 
in order to cope with challenges linked to thriving digital technology.  
     As the former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade used to say, “Television is an extremely 
serious matter that should not let in the hands of anybody” (Diop, 2004, para 1). This assertion 
justifies the necessity to implement transparency and equity in the allocation of the television 
frequencies. Applicants for this aspect of the public domain should be treated equally and 
authorization for broadcasting granted to the promoters of the best projects. If not, the media sector 
and the television industry will continue to paddle in a quagmire of political interference, economic 
hardships, and confusion of roles and functions. 
    Education and skills training should be the key focus for television operators in order to reduce 
mistakes, misconduct and misdemeanors whose damage cannot often be made up.  
    A failure to implement appropriate measures would mortgage the future of television and 
obliterate its contribution to the country’s social, economic and cultural development. 
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Appendix 1: Glossary 
ANSD: Senegalese National Agency for Statistics and Demographics 
APR: Alliance for the Republic 
ARTP: Agency for Posts and Telecommunications Regulation 
CDEPS: Council of Media Publishers and Owners 
CENA: Autonomous National Electoral Commission 
CESTI: Center for Studies in Information Sciences and Techniques 
CFA Francs: African Financial Community Francs (CFA Francs 500 equals $ US 1) 
CNRA: The National Council for Broadcasting Regulation 
CORED: The Council for the Observance of Ethics and Deontology Rules 
CRED: The Council for a Respect of Ethics and Deontology 
CSA: Superior Council for Broadcasting (France) 
CSS: Senegalese Sugar Company 
EXCAF: Expo Carrefour 
FCC: Federal Communications Commission (USA) 
GNI = Gross National Income 
HAAC: High Authority for Broadcasting and Communication (Benin) 
HACA: High Authority for Broadcasting Communication (Morocco) 
HCA: High Council of Broadcasting  
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HCRT: High Council for Radio and Television 
HDI = Human Development Index 
HMS: HACA Media Solutions 
ISSIC: High Institute for Information and Communication Sciences 
MMDS: Microwave Multipoint Distribution System 
NWICO: New World Information and Communication Order 
ORTS: Senegalese Radio and Television Office 
RTS: Senegalese Radio and Television Service 
SORTEX: Society for Redistribution of Cable Services 
SYNPICS: Union of Senegalese Information and Communication Professionals 
UNDP: United Nations Development Program 
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
